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3Abstract
C.G. Hempel’s D-N account of explanation marks a cornerstone in the history of 
philosophy of science. Standard interpretations construe it as a naive, if noble, attempt to 
characterize scientific explanations: science locates laws at work in the world and 
facilitates explanations by indicating that the relevant circumstances fall under the cover 
of those laws -  an idea these days appearing credulous at best. The present examination 
is motivated by a curiosity about whether there might be something more interesting to 
be said about the point of Hempel’s account.
This thesis thus considers the historical roots of Hempel’s thought in the Vienna Circle 
protocol sentence debate of the 1930s. Certain principles inherent in that debate suggest 
a reading of the subsequently developed D-N account not as a naive scientistic approach, 
but as a conventionally adopted framework with which to clarify explanatory candidates 
in science. It argues Hempel was not after the ‘right’ account of explanation, but rather 
one which could be assessed for its merits based on how effectively it serves to clarify 
explanations.
This thesis first examines the point of the protocol sentence debate, which was not over 
justifying, via logic, grounding all scientific knowledge in sensation. Rather, as 
empiricists, certain members of the Vienna Circle took the language of sensation as a 
conventional starting point for the construction of scientific language and argued over 
the form and status of the basic statements comprising that language. Second, it surveys 
dissenting criticism within the debate and Hempel’s problematic defence of the left-wing 
view in the Circle.
Third, it locates certain principles that came out of the debate and shaped the subsequent 
development of Hempel’s D-N account.
Finally it suggests a reformulation of the D-N account as a conventionally adopted 
framework for the assessment of explanations and indicates how it may be understood as 
a candidate for philosophical methodology.
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8Chapter One: Introduction -  The historical roots of C.G. HempeFs D-N 
account of explanation
All transformations of science take place within language, not by confrontation 
of language with a *w o r l d a  totality of ‘things’ whose variety language is 
supposed to reflect. -Otto Neurath. Physicalism. (1931c, p. 54)
After studying Carl Hempel’s work for a number of years, a graduate student 
visiting Paris had the pleasure of meeting a distinguished scholar at the College 
de France a Paris. Upon confessing his fondness for Hempel, she replied, “Vous 
ne l’avez pas connu!” She seemed to suggest that if he had known Hempel and 
his work, he might not have bothered. Having worked in proximity to Hempel in 
the 1970s, she certainly was qualified to hold such a view. Hempel, to be sure, is 
regarded as a titan in the history of philosophy of science, but few appear to take 
his work seriously as a philosophical programme that may yet inform 
contemporary philosophers in their assessments of science and its philosophical 
underpinnings. That view is perhaps justified given what is commonly 
understood to be the point of the work for which he has become infamous in the 
field. It sees Hempel’s D-N model as giving criteria of adequacy for what counts 
as a scientific explanation: science locates laws at work in the world and 
facilitates explanations of events by indicating that the relevant circumstances 
fall under the cover of those laws -  an idea these days appearing credulous at 
best. On this view, the D-N account of explanation can be characterized as a 
commendable first-step, if a naive and hopelessly flawed one, in the pursuit of 
accounting for explanation in science.
9This thesis does not take up the standard assessment of HempeTs D-N 
account, but has been motivated by a curiosity about whether there may indeed 
be something more interesting to be said about the point of his explanation 
programme. Though it does not develop a full-blown, reconstituted rendering of 
Hempel’s D-N account, it attempts to indicate why one might reconsider what 
Hempel was up to, and the direction such a reconstituted view might take.
In short, Hempel does not appear to be committed to the notion that 
science discovers laws in the world and one merely needs to formulate 
explanations applying those laws to empirical circumstances in order to render 
them scientific. Rather, his attempt to develop a methodology that does justice to 
both scientific procedure as it is carried out and the normative goals at which it 
aims, stems from scepticism regarding the ability to underpin scientific 
knowledge with an ontological foundation. Absent any such foundation, 
Hempel’s emphasis is on the construction of a methodology with which to 
confront the world. The D-N account is not understood by him to be the ‘right’ 
account of explanation. Rather, it is one which appears to do justice to what 
scientists take themselves to offer in a good deal of their explanations and can be 
assessed based on how well it enlightens inquirers to the nature, structure and 
scope of scientific knowledge.
This aspect of the thesis is rather programmatic: it indicates a research 
direction that might take shape and, possibly, influence the way in which 
philosophers ask questions about the world and the sorts of answers they may 
expect. The final chapter points toward the principal philosophical argument of 
this thesis: it examines the D-N account as a conventionally adopted 
methodology that affords a systematic framework with which to confront 
problems of scientific knowledge. It will indicate that three principles underlying 
Hempel’s work -  adopting the D-N account as a convention, applying it as a 
relativized a priori framework and advocating the methodological distinction 
between formal and empirical aspects of science -  function not as a solution to 
the problem of knowledge, but mark an approach to it. Absent foundations -  
ontological, epistemological or otherwise -  how can one construct a positive 
account of certain features of scientific knowledge? The D-N account can be
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understood to be an attempt to formulate such a construction. It does not ‘attempt 
to get the world right’. Rather, it acknowledges that we are confronted with a 
world for which we cannot fully account and attempts to provide some 
systematic structure to a confrontation of that world. As Otto Neurath (1913) 
said, we are like wanderers lost in an intellectual forest and must decide on some 
direction without adequate means of determining the correct one.
Though the motivation for this thesis came rather out of the blue from a 
one-hour class on Hempel at the London School of Economics, its emergence 
may not have been unforeseen. The turn of the century saw the publication of 
two collected volumes on Hempel’s works (2000b, 2001) that indicate, in part, 
his shift in focus in later life from the logical aspects of science to a socio- 
historical bent akin to Neurath or Thomas Kuhn. Another volume in honour of 
Hempel’s life (Hempel, 2000a, J.H. Fetzer, [Ed.]) begins to delve into his 
philosophy of science, bringing to the fore, among other things, the question of 
the relation between historical and logical studies in his philosophy. Moreover, 
one may recognize a loose connection to the historical work of Michael 
Friedman (1999) who has begun to identify the empiricism of logical positivism 
in Rudolf Carnap, Hempel and others with their neo-Kantian roots (if examined 
as their reaction to neo-Kantianism), as opposed to the British empiricist 
tradition of Russell and Whitehead.
This thesis will forgo sweeping connections among the history of ideas in 
philosophy of science and attend rather to the historical roots of Hempel’s 
thought. Attention there suggests why one might be compelled to re-examine his 
philosophical corpus generally, and his D-N account of explanation in particular. 
Thus a good portion of the present work is dedicated to an examination of the 
Vienna Circle protocol sentence debate of the 1930s, from which Hempel 
emerged. Barring some notable examples, the point of that debate has not been 
understood sufficiently, so this thesis surveys its dynamics to elicit what seems to 
have been at stake for Carnap, Neurath and Hempel in order to give a backdrop 
against which to place Hempel’s subsequent developing philosophy. It also 
provides occasion to indicate how one might grasp the outcome of that debate.
11
The protocol sentence debate was a response to the epistemological 
project in Carnap’s Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, published in 1928. The 
debate over this influential book centered on the question of the possibility of 
scientific knowledge. Carnap’s Aufbau proposed constructing a constitutional 
system,1 wherein all scientific concepts (indeed all meaningful concepts) might 
be derived from a few basic concepts rooted in observation. The debate thus 
centered on the status and form of basic observation statements (protocols) that 
serve as the basis for the constitutional system and knowledge that may be 
understood to be established within it.
Thomas Uebel (1992, p. 14) writes that in the traditional understanding of 
Vienna Circle philosophy, scientific knowledge was taken by its members to be 
“a body of statements whose claim to embody knowledge could be established, 
given experience, by logical means alone.” Uebel worries that this 
understanding, though not altogether incorrect among respective members, 
obscures the relative lack of unity among the views within the Vienna Circle, and 
ascribes to its members a naive foundationalist conception of scientific 
knowledge. As will be discussed below, the protocol sentence debate indicates 
that there was by no means agreement on both how the basis for scientific 
knowledge should be understood, and whether any such basis could be 
understood as foundationalist (indeed quite the contrary for Neurath and Carnap, 
in particular).
Much recent scholarship has noted the inadequacy of the traditional view 
of the goals of the Vienna Circle.2 Uebel (1992, p. 15) states that the traditional 
view of the Vienna Circle stands, at least, in need of clarification because “[a]ll 
of the thinkers of the Vienna Circle struggled with the Kantian question of the 
possibility of objective knowledge and sought to develop an account of 
justification that addressed the normative force which talk of objectivity 
possesses.” They did not ignore Kant’s criticism of empiricism -  “how epistemic
1 “Constitutional system” is used here, following Richardson (1998), though the 
RA . George translation of the Aufbau used presently refers to a “constructional 
system.”
2 For examples and bibliographic resources, see Giere and Richardson (Eds.) 
(1996) and Uebel (1992)
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norms could be derived from an investigation of fact,” as suggested by Popper 
(ibid) -  rather they “sought to answer Kant,” since in the debate the skeptical 
claim regarding the impossibility of knowledge “was itself at issue.”
Friedman (2000, p. 40) notes that the debate began in the Vienna Circle 
meetings in 1928-1930, “wherein quite a fundamental split developed between 
Schlick and Waismann, on the one side, and Neurath, followed quickly by 
Camap, on the other.” He writes further that (ibid), “the two sides can be seen as 
adopting opposing stances toward the Aufbau, with the Schlick-Waismann camp 
(...the right wing of the Circle) pushing in a foundationalist-subjectivist direction 
and the Neurath-Camap camp (...the left wing...) pushing in a ‘physicalist’ or 
intersubjectivist direction.” Further, between Neurath and Camap, Neurath 
objected to the methodological solipsism of the Aufbau. ‘Methodological 
solipsism’ characterized the notion that a construction of scientific knowledge is 
rooted in immediate experience. Neurath resisted this notion on the grounds that 
solipsism itself cannot be given meaning outside the language of physicalism 
because statements about immediate experience cannot be given meaning until 
framed within the intersubjective language of physicalism (and that consequently 
it cannot form the basis of physicalism). Schlick from the other side pushed for a 
more explicit reliance on “individual subjective experience” as a foundation for 
scientific knowledge (ibid). The dynamics of this interaction shall be discussed 
below.
Uebel (1992, p. 24) divides the debate into four stages. The first, as 
mentioned, was initiated chiefly by Neurath’s criticisms of Carnap’s 
epistemological stance in the Aufbau and lasted until 1930 within the Vienna 
Circle weekly meetings. The second marks what Friedman calls the ‘public’ 
form of the debate and occurred principally between Carnap and Neurath in 
publications in Erkenntnis in 1931 and 1932. Uebel marks the third stage as 
Moritz Schlick’s response to the debate over protocols among the left wing of the 
circle and Hempel’s subsequent reply, and lasted until about 1935 when Camap 
adopted Tarski’s theory of truth. The final stage lasted from 1935 until “it 
petered out in the early 1940s” (ibid). Considering this latter stage suggests the
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means for a less disjointed understanding of both the development and relative 
agreement on philosophical methodology within the left wing of the Circle.
Though members of the Vienna Circle shared the goal of formulating a 
language purged of metaphysics, the protocol sentence debate emerged over 
how, exactly to do that. Thomas Oberdan (1996, p. 274) notes that metaphysical 
statements are problematic for physicalism because these were, in Carnap’s 
terms, “metalinguistic statements masquerading as factual statements.” Since 
metaphysical claims lie outside the domain of the physicalist language, they were 
taken to be meaningless because physicalism is understood to comprise the most 
general framework for meaningful statements. Thus one particular problem for 
metaphysics is that it purports to provide claims that lie outside the language of 
science, while making factual claims that appear to be meaningful within it.
This thesis is divided into four discussions. First, it survey’s Alan 
Richardson’s (1998) historical evaluation of Carnap’s seminal text. Richardson 
numbers among proponents of what might be called the “new received view” of 
logical positivism, attempting to grasp Carnap’s programme in its own terms. 
Richardson argues that the traditional received view, inherited from Quine, 
misconstrues the point of Carnap’s Aufbau and obscures tensions within that 
programme that led Camap eventually to reject it in favour of his logic of 
science. In short, Carnap did not understand the reductionist project within the 
Aufbau to be a solution to the problem of scientific knowledge. Rather, he 
understood reductionism to be the problem itself: he asked how far one could 
enlist new tools of logic to facilitate a reduction of theoretical terms in science to 
basic observation. He aimed neither at an epistemological justification of 
subjective experience as a starting point for a system of scientific knowledge, nor 
a justification of the analytic framework employed to facilitate any such potential 
reduction. Rather he took observation and a specified formal framework as 
conventional starting points for the construction of a constitutional system of 
knowledge: he maintained no underlying ontological or epistemological 
commitments to the construction of his system, but held that one could not raise 
epistemological worries at all without first specifying (through empirical 
descriptions of conventions) a class of basic observation statements and formal
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system of relations to link those statements within a constitutional system. 
Richardson distinguishes the epistemological project in Carnap’s Aufbau from 
Russell’s external world project (1914), arguing that the former’s was not merely 
a more rigorous formulation of traditional empiricism, but aimed at 
reformulating what is at stake in the construction of a scientific system of 
knowledge.
Richardson’s interpretation of the Camapian programme suggests a way 
to understand the point of the protocol sentence debate -  and a philosophical 
orientation of the participants in the debate generally. That debate centred not on 
whether basic observation statements were possible, but what the form and status 
a class of these sorts of statements might take. That is, it was waged over how to 
formulate an adequate -  conventionally adopted -  philosophico-scientific 
methodology for the assessment of scientific knowledge. In contrast to Russell’s 
external world programme, it was not aimed at justifying any prior 
epistemological commitments that might underwrite their empiricism. Rather, 
assuming empiricism as a conventional starting point, Otto Neurath worried that 
the structure of Carnap’s programme was given to metaphysics, which led to the 
debate over whether basic observation statements (protocols) ought to be 
understood within the intersubjective language of physicalism, or whether 
proposing a phenomenal language as distinct from physicalism could be given 
meaningful formulation.
Carnap adapted his view throughout the protocol sentence debate both in 
response to Neurath’s worries about metaphysics in a system of scientific 
knowledge, and worries about tensions Carnap came to discover within his own 
project. By the mid-1930s Camap had come to reject the project of the Aufbau, 
which is characterizable as the problem of how to get from subjective experience 
to intersubjective knowledge, in favour of the logic of science, wherein 
philosophy is understood to consist in the logical clarification of languages.
By 1932, before his full procession toward the logic of science, Camap 
and Neurath’s views can be compared and contrasted. Whereas Carnap had 
adapted his views closer to Neurath’s worries by suggesting that phenomenal 
language (of subjective experience) ought to be understood to be a part of
15
intersubjective physicalism, Neurath still worried that an unwarranted status 
might be given to protocols so understood. Basic observation statements could 
not be understood as distinct from any other non-protocols within the language 
of physicalism. He worried that, understood in Carnap’s terms, protocols might 
be given some special status as indubitable building blocks for the edifice of 
science. Neurath remained adamant that protocols could not be conceived as 
somehow primitive or unrevisable. As with all statements in science, they were 
open to revision.
The second discussion outlines Schlick’s contribution and Hempel’s 
introduction to the debate in the mid-1930s. Schlick worried principally that the 
shape of the debate had ignored a central feature of scientific knowledge -  that it 
must be rooted in certainty. Allowing for protocols to be revisable relativizes the 
entire programme, thereby rendering the Camap/Neurath views characterizable 
as a coherence theory of truth. Hempel’s problematic reply argues that theirs is 
indeed a coherence theory of truth, but of a restrained sort.
Both Carnap and Neurath would reject, in their respective ways, 
Hempel’s assessment of their views. And that rejection can be understood 
through a discussion of their adoption of Tarski’s theory of truth. In short, 
Carnap rejected that his was a coherence theory at all, originally because he 
thought ‘truth’ was not syntactically formulable, and eventually because he 
understood ‘truth’ to be a concept only specifiable in formal, and not natural, 
languages. For his part, Neurath ought to be understood as advocating a 
coherence theory of justification or acceptance, rather than truth, although he 
himself was unclear about this in his own work. To be sure, Hempel attempted to 
rectify his own response to Schlick nearly fifty years after the initial publication.
Third, in spite of Hempel’s misfire in his 1935 paper, he nevertheless has 
demonstrated a striking coherence in the development of his thought, which can 
be obscured by even those sympathetic to his overall programme. As will be 
seen, Richard Jeffrey remarks that Hempel held significant regret about his 1935 
paper and postulates that this was in part because of Bertrand Russell’s 1940 
paper, which heaped scorn upon his and Neurath’s alleged ‘coherence’ stance 
during the 1930s. However, Hempel’s view (and certainly the views of Neurath -
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and especially Carnap) was in transition throughout the protocol sentence debate. 
Indeed it is in virtue of the protocol sentence debate itself that certain problems 
emerged in their views, which caused them to sharpen their positions. As 
mentioned, Carnap came to see a tension in the epistemological project of the 
Aufbau of accounting for the move from subjective experience to intersubjective 
knowledge, which led him to reject it. Furthermore, the protocol sentence debate 
came to see a sharpening of the distinction between confirmation and truth. 
Russell criticizes what he calls the Hempel/Neurath coherence theory of truth on 
the grounds that such a theory conflates confirmation with truth. However, this 
would have been old news for Hempel who, by 1940, had not only understood 
the distinction pushed by Carnap, but employed it in his 1939 paper “Vagueness 
and logic.” Russell’s paper is taken to be an important document of that period, 
but he misunderstands the point of the protocol sentence and attributes to 
Hempel views that he had already abandoned.
By the late 1940s the protocol sentence debate largely seemed to have 
dissipated, rather than find any express resolve. Thomas Uebel (2001) questions 
whether any such resolution might be possible: though Uebel argues that a 
resolution is not impossible in principle, this thesis argues that one need not 
search for an ‘in principle’ resolution. Rather, the Neurath and Camap views 
divide into two aspects of a common methodological inquiry into the structure of 
scientific knowledge: Carnap attends to formal attempts to clarify the structure of 
statements, while Neurath focuses on the more general contextual considerations 
within which a formally reconstructed framework of a set of statements (or 
model) might be said to be applied to the empirical domain. Formal and 
empirical considerations are both indispensible for any adequate account of 
scientific knowledge. Hempel, it is argued, can be seen as a unifying 
methodologist in this respect: even while attending to the logical aspects of 
explanation in his D-N account, he remains cognizant of questions of empirical 
relevance of that account -  indeed the formal features of the D-N account raise 
the question of empirical adequacy.
Fourth, the final chapter reconsiders how the D-N account can be 
understood given the historical background. The examination of the protocol
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sentence debate gives an opportunity to understand the dynamics and outcome of 
an important movement in the history of philosophy of science. Furthermore, for 
the present purposes it suggests certain principles for which one needs to account 
when examining Hempel’s D-N explanation. The Aufbau sought no prior 
epistemology or ontology to justify Carnap’s empiricism. The protocol sentence 
debate thus is understood to be about the status and form of basic protocols that 
can serve, conventionally, as the basis for Carnap’s constitutional system. The 
entire edifice of Vienna Circle physicalism is adopted without reference to some 
underlying state of the world. It is assumed as a systematic, relativized a priori 
framework with which to confront phenomena in the world and their discussions 
centred on how to conceive of an adequate characterization of that general 
framework. Moreover, the distinction between logical and pragmatic aspects of 
science came to be a central methodological device in their assessment of 
science.
Likewise, the subsequently developed D-N account of explanation need 
not be understood to be an attempt to provide the right account of explanation. 
Rather, one can adopt it via convention and apply it as a relativized a priori 
framework that employs an indispensable methodological distinction between 
formal truth and empirical acceptance for the purpose of explicating explanatory 
candidates in science. It can be assessed based on its fruitfulness. The D-N model 
provides the inferential framework within which to structure explanations of 
empirical phenomena. Of course most interesting science provides incomplete 
explanations and it remains to an empirical examination to suggest how one 
might categorize them. However, the complete model provides a systematic 
framework against which to do so. And it gives a mandate to push partial 
explanations or explanation sketches toward completeness, thereby specifying a 
goal of expanding the classes of accepted complete explanations of the world. 
Science, by this account, is a heuristic in the search for general laws that apply 
over ever-expanding empirical domains.
Thus the final chapter first, outlines the principles underlying Hempel’s 
D-N account, as extracted from the protocol sentence debate. Second, it 
examines two important papers in Hempel’s canon to indicate how those
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principles appear to be in accord with his overall programme. Third, it examines 
Hempel’s constructed categories of incomplete explanations with an eye for 
showing how these categories serve as methodological constructs for the purpose 
of clarifying explanatory candidates. Indeed, the categories are defined according 
to their logical structure. Empirical explanatory candidates can be placed within 
a given category to raise the pragmatic question of whether and on what grounds 
they should be accepted -  one looks at their constitutive premises outlined by the 
D-N framework to determine whether they will be accepted or not. The fourth 
section looks at two examples to show the way in which the D-N methodology 
can clarify certain problems of explanation. And finally it will look briefly at 
how the canonical view of the D-N account goes wrong and point to a 
programmatic outlook for the D-N methodology as a systematic framework with 
which to confront and assess scientific knowledge statements.
It is hoped that the present inquiry will contribute to the new 
understanding of the point of logical positivism and indicate how Hempel fits in 
with that understanding. One guiding impulse is the response to a philosophical 
undercurrent that attempts to hijack Hempel’s D-N model in service of realism or 
foundationalism. Neither of these appears to characterize what Hempel was after 
in his account of explanation, but both reinforce Hempel’s reputation as 
misguided and naive. Examining the historical roots of his emerging philosophy 
of science ought to shape readers’ expectations of the point of the D-N account 
and indicate an otherwise overlooked richness that might suggest aspects of his 
work as a resource for addressing contemporary problems: reconstituting an 
understanding of the point of the D-N account of explanation as a framework for 
assessment (as it appears Hempel intended it), can indicate the way in which 
Hempel may be viewed as providing a fruitful candidate for a contemporary 
philosophical methodology.
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Chapter Two: Carnap’s Aufbau and the protocol sentence debate
In the Aufbau Camap is concerned with, “a step-by-step derivation or 
‘construction’ of all concepts from certain fundamental concepts.... It is the main 
thesis of construction theory that all concepts can in this way be derived from a 
few fundamental concepts...” (Carnap, 1928, p. 5). Thus, Carnap in the Aufbau 
intended some form of a reductionist programme by which, given the success of 
such a programme, all scientific concepts would be reducible to a class of basic 
concepts rooted in observation. Metaphysical concepts cannot find a place within 
the constitutional system on the grounds that they cannot be constituted within it. 
What is crucial for present consideration is how the nature, scope and limitations 
of such a reductionist programme was to be understood by Carnap himself. 
Furthermore, how was his view affected by the reception of the Aufbau among 
Vienna Circle members?
The present thesis rests, in part, on the new received view of logical 
empiricism. Historical reevaluation over the last decades of the ambitions and 
scope of logical empiricist philosophy of science has suggested the need to 
reshape conventional understanding of those ambitions and the point of logical 
empiricism. Though by no means yet providing a unified account, historical 
analysis suggests certain salient features for which one must account to grasp 
fruitful lessons that might be drawn from the logical empiricist programme -  in 
particular, its attempts to account for the desired normativity in a ‘scientific 
philosophical’ assessment of scientific knowledge given foundational problems 
for any system of knowledge. One of those features is the nature of the 
reductionist programme attributed to Carnap. Another is the extent to which (and 
the ways in which) logical empiricists were committed to undergirding the 
traditional empiricist attempt to justify rooting knowledge in sensation. The
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present section considers the first of these features, while the second can be more 
clearly examined by considering the dynamics of the protocol sentence debate in 
the final section of this chapter.
Alan Richardson numbers among contributors to the new received view 
and explores the question of how Carnap understood his own project within the 
Aufbau. His Carnap's construction of the world (1998) provides a
comprehensive assessment of Carnap’s Aufbau and will be useful for the present 
survey of key themes that motivate the protocol sentence debate. Richardson
(1998, p. 13) argues that grasping Carnap’s programme in its own terms
indicates the way in which the traditional received view misses the
epistemological point and domain of that text; conventional reception attributes 
to Carnap “certain goals that he does not in fact have and makes central certain 
problems that are not central to Carnap’s own avowed concerns.” As will be 
discussed, Richardson argues that Carnap’s empiricism needs to be distinguished 
from traditional empiricism on the grounds that he remained ambivalent about 
empiricist ontological commitments. His construction of scientific knowledge 
takes experience as a conventional starting point for empiricist accounts of 
science and he does not feel compelled to justify this starting point beyond 
locating behavioral psychologists’ accounts of practitioners who, in fact, take 
sensation statements as the basis. Moreover, by missing the intended point and 
scope of the Aufbau, the received view obscures what Richardson takes to be the 
deeper tension that led Camap eventually to reject its epistemological 
programme.
This chapter divides into four parts. First, it outlines Richardson’s 
contrast of Carnap’s project in the Aufbau from Russell’s external world 
programme and it specifies the nature of the epistemological project of the 
Aufbau. Second, it outlines Neurath’s critique of the Aufbau. Third, it accounts 
for Carnap’s shift through the early 1930s toward his rejection of epistemology. 
Carnap’s thought provides a general indication of the orientation of Vienna 
Circle members, both to indicate their shared assumptions and how they differed.
21
And finally, this chapter provides a comparison and contrast of Camap and 
Neurath’s views in 1932.
The Aufbau , Russell’s external world programme and the received view
Richardson argues that Carnap’s Aufbau needs to be distinguished from 
Russell’s external world programme. According to Richardson (1998, p. 5), 
Carnap’s Aufbau marks his “most sustained attempt to provide a general 
epistemology of empirical knowledge.” Starting from immediate experience, 
Carnap attempts to formulate two languages: the phenomenal language, which 
consists of statements of immediate experience and the intersubjective 
“physicalist” language, which marks the domain of scientific statements. The 
epistemological problem of the Aufbau then is to account for the move from 
immediate, subjective experience (his version of methodological solipsism)1 to 
the intersubjective domain of the body of scientific statements (physicalism). The 
project is to examine the extent to which formal tools of logic can be enlisted to 
provide translation rules from the phenomenal to physicalist languages, which 
exhibits important differences from Russell’s external world programme.
Richardson (ibid, p. 5) notes that the Aufbau is “a central document of 
analytic philosophy” and is seen therefore as crucial to understanding “the 
formation of the project of logical positivism,”2 and analytic philosophy more 
generally. However, its influence has come to be understood via the lens of the 
received view of the point of its impact. The principal conduit of this view has 
been W.V.O. Quine in his monumental papers “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” 
(1951) and “Epistemology Naturalized” (1969).
1 Methodological solipsism can be understood here as the notion that subjective 
experience is the starting point for a systematic, philosophic account of scientific 
knowledge.
2 Although, they have historically distinct affiliations in Berlin and Vienna, 
‘logical positivism’ and ‘logical empiricism’ can refer presently to a common 
programme without obscuring their different orientations.
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In particular, according to Richardson (1998, p. 10), Quine provides what 
may be taken to be the “essence of the received view” of the Aufbau. Carnap’s 
constitutional systems are the best attempt to fulfill traditional empiricism’s 
promise to deduce systematically all language of science from an 
epistemologically privileged language of sense data. Bertrand Russell provided 
an updated version of the empiricist project, while Carnap made the most 
successful attempt to carry it out.
Of course, Quine claims the Aufbau fails in this task, both in practice and 
principle. Carnap’s attempt fails in practice, while scientific discourse simply 
cannot always be interpreted strictly in terms of observation statements, since 
individual theoretical statements cannot be tested against observation. Rather, 
empirical assessment pertains to groups of theoretical statements collectively. 
Thus, one cannot deduce individual higher-level theoretical statements in science 
from observation. Insofar as the goal of the Aufbau was to construct a 
constitutional system wherein scientific statements can be constituted via a step- 
by-step construction from observation, that goal was not (and could not be) 
achieved.
Richardson (ibid, p. 12) remarks that Quine sees this failure within 
Carnap’s own internal moves in the Aufbau. When moving from phenomenal 
language to the physicalist world of intersubjective language, Carnap shifts from 
giving explicit definitions to “methodological principles for the mapping of 
qualities from the private realm of experience onto physical space-time points” . 
As Quine says (1951/1961, p. 40), the proposition ‘Quality q is a t* ;y;z;t' could 
never be translated into Carnap’s language of sensation and logic because ‘is at’ 
is undefined: “the canons counsel us in its use but not its elimination.” 
Richardson (1998, p. 12) suggests that Quine sees this conclusion as unavoidable 
and “indicates that there is in fact no way Camap could have succeeded in the 
task he set himself.” If Camap cannot do it, Quine concludes that the programme 
of reducing science to sensation should be given up altogether.
Richardson (ibid, pp. 12-13) writes further:
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This, then, is the received view of the [Aufbau]: It was the most ambitious 
and successful attempt to use the resources of modern logic to carry out 
the reduction of all scientific discourse into the terms of immediate 
experience. The principal legacy of the book is that it failed in this 
reduction -  that it failed not merely in fact but in principle.
However, Richardson argues that the received view fails to take into 
account Carnap’s view on the point and domain of his epistemological worries. 
He does this by distinguishing Carnap’s Aufbau programme from Russell’s 
external world project. The received reading comes in part from Quine’s 
affiliation of the Camapian project and that of Russell’s external world 
programme. Certainly they shared many key points of convergence, like the 
notion that new tools of logic (developed, influentially, by Russell and 
Whitehead) are to be enlisted in the service of answering the question of the 
problem of knowledge. However there are substantial points of difference 
regarding where logic plays such a role and the domain and nature of 
epistemology.
The account of those differences, according to Richardson, is that for 
Russell’s external world programme, logic is used in service of justifying his 
prior epistemology of acquaintance. Russell distinguishes ‘knowledge by 
description’ from ‘knowledge by acquaintance’. The former is characterized as 
when facts about an object are known only via descriptive concepts (‘the surface 
of the sun is composed of mostly hydrogen and helium’). The latter, by contrast, 
is characterized as when one is confronted with something. According to 
Richardson, such things might be particular objects, universals or facts (ibid, p. 
18). Thus, one may have knowledge of the composition of the surface of the sun 
when the proposition, ‘the surface of the sun is composed of mostly hydrogen 
and helium’, “has been fully analyzed” such that “all the constituents of it are 
entities with which one is acquainted” (ibid, p. 18).
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It should be mentioned that Russell acknowledges the need for a certain 
hesitancy with which one approaches an ontological commitment to objects of 
the external world. It will be helpful to quote Russell (1914, pp. 73-4) at length:
While admitting that doubt is possible with regard to all our common 
knowledge, we must nevertheless accept that knowledge in the main if 
philosophy is to be possible at all. There is not any superfine brand of 
knowledge, obtainable by the philosopher, which can give us a standpoint 
from which to criticize the whole of the knowledge of daily life. The 
most that can be done is to examine and purify our common knowledge 
by an internal scrutiny, assuming the canons by which it has been 
obtained, and applying them with more care and with more precision.
[Continues.] Philosophy cannot boast of having achieved such a degree of 
certainty that it can have authority to condemn the facts of experience and 
the laws of science. The philosophic scrutiny, therefore, though sceptical 
in regard to every detail, is not sceptical as regards the whole. That is to 
say, its criticism of details will only be based upon their relation to other 
details, not upon some external criterion which can be applied to all the 
details equally. ...[i]t is not that common knowledge must be true, but 
that we possess no radically different kind of knowledge derived from 
some other source.
[Finally.] Universal scepticism, though logically irrefutable, is practically 
barren; it can only, therefore, give a certain flavour of hesitancy to our 
beliefs, and cannot be used to substitute other beliefs for them.
For Russell then, an ontological commitment to objects of the external world is 
necessary for philosophical inquiry to proceed at all, but any such ontology does 
not preclude a certain hesitancy one may hold toward that commitment. 
Nevertheless, assuming that there are objects about which one can have 
knowledge by acquaintance provides a set of objects that, given sufficiently 
robust logical analysis, can be understood in terms of sense data. Richardson
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notes that this presents the role of logic both to facilitate an interpretation of all 
objects of the external world in terms of sense data and deduce higher theoretical 
concepts from sense data. Moreover by successfully translating all external 
objects into sense data and deducing science from experience, the external world 
programme thereby vindicates the ontology that was necessary to motivate 
philosophy in the first place. All science in this instance can be deduced from 
sensation, while one need no longer be bothered by problems regarding the 
external world, since all objects can be understood in terms of sensation. 
Richardson (1998, p. 19) states, “we legitimate our scientific ontology by 
defining it away in favor of the objects of acquaintance.”
For Carnap on the other hand, epistemology has nothing to say about the 
justification of any prior commitments understood as ontological or, indeed, 
epistemological. Thus, he remains ambivalent about ontological commitments to 
objects in the world and offers no justification for the claim that one can know 
these objects by acquaintance or any other means. Further, and central to the 
Aufbau, he offers no justification for taking sensation as his starting point. While 
for Russell one must assume an ontology of the external world and knowledge of 
objects by acquaintance, for Carnap, some form of logical rules and basic 
observational statements must be assumed before one can raise epistemological 
questions at all. One cannot specify the scope of what we can know until one 
first employs conventionally adopted, factual claims and a logical framework 
with which to interpret relations among them. According to Richardson (ibid, p. 
22), the Aufbau was more than merely “a more thorough working through of 
Russell’s external world program.” If Quine’s assessment were right, it might be 
understood to be a more rigorous undertaking of the attempt to translate 
propositions about the external world into the language of sensation, thereby 
contributing to the goal of legitimating a Russellian ontological commitment 
about those objects. However, Richardson argues that Carnap shared no such 
goal: the domain of epistemology in the Aufbau was in the logical connections 
between a class of basic observation statements and the higher-level theoretical 
statements of science. Although Carnap takes Russell’s maxim for “scientific 
philosophizing” as the motto for his own work (“Wherever possible logical
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constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.”), he did not believe that 
a constitutional system that he was after need have anything to say about 
commitments held prior to its construction. Richardson writes (ibid, p. 23), “By 
the end of the book it is, moreover, quite clear that Carnap takes traditional 
empiricism and Russell’s own views to be as infected with metaphysics as any 
traditional epistemological project.”
Thus, Carnap takes it that the language of sensation as the “starting point” 
of a constitutional systems is a “scientific fact.” That is, he understands 
empiricist epistemological systems as assuming knowledge begins in sensation, 
which can be understood to be a conventional starting point for him. This is 
perhaps a contentious claim, but the salient aspect of this point is that Carnap’s 
epistemological project is not enlisted to justify sensation as the starting point for 
such a project. In so far as sensation as a basis for knowledge is taken to be a 
‘scientific fact’ at all, it is understood as a psychological fact. As such, it has 
explanatory value only in so far as, in virtue of psychological dispositions of 
scientific practitioners (or scientific philosophers), one can provide a 
psychological description of the assumptions motivating them to adopt one or 
another starting point. As a consequence he is not concerned about justifying that 
starting point: “Carnap lacks any epistemological vocabulary of acquaintance to 
undergird the claim that this starting language is epistemically privileged or 
certain” (ibid, p. 24).
So one difference between Carnap and Russell is that the former has no 
goal comparable to the latter’s acquaintance that will ‘undergird’ the starting 
language of sensation as epistemically privileged. A second is that they diverge 
in their attitudes to the role of logic:
Russell has an antecedent epistemological point of view given in his 
adherence to the principle of acquaintance that allows him to have 
epistemological worries about the basic concepts of logic. This is not true 
of Carnap. No concerns of an epistemological nature about logic are in 
evidence in his book. (Ibid, pp. 24-25)
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For Russell, given that talk of external world objects can be replaced with 
successful translation to sense data, the logical tools facilitating such a 
translation themselves come into question. For Carnap on the other hand, “logic 
must be in place before any epistemological question can be raised” (ibid, p. 25). 
Thus, Richardson claims (ibid) that for Carnap, epistemology simply has very 
little to say about metaphysical aspects of prior epistemological programmes.
Thus Richardson argues that the received view that the Aufbau was about 
a reduction of all scientific concepts via the tools of logic to an epistemically 
privileged language of basic observations is misplaced. The nature of the 
problem as understood in this way is whether science can be so reduced and how 
one would justify the epistemological status of a set of basic observation 
statements as a starting point for the system of science. On this reading, Quine 
surely would be correct to claim that the Aufbau must fail (which leads to his 
consequent naturalism). However, because Carnap has sought to recast 
epistemology with the new tools of logic as the move from subjective to 
intersubjective statements, rather than rehash an old empiricist program of 
justifying epistemic norms from experience, the received view talks past the 
Aufbau, ascribing to it goals that it did not have.
As will be discussed below, insofar as the project of the Aufbau failed, it 
is because the epistemological problem presented therein -  how to get 
intersubjective scientific knowledge from immediate, subjective experience -  
comes to be understood by Carnap as a problem as unformulable and is replaced 
by the logic of science wherein philosophy is taken to be the logical clarification 
of concepts.
Two figures can illustrate the nature of the epistemological project of the 
Aufbau.
Figure 1: A comparison of the domain of application for Russell in 1914 and 
Carnap in 1928
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A. [------------------------- -R u sse ll’s epistemology of acquaintance------------------------------------------------------ ]
Justification Justification
' 1 1
B. [External world — ------language of sensation------------------------ intersubjective language of science]
t
Justification
C. [---- ------------------------------Epistemology of the A ufbau -----------------------------------------]
Figure 1 allows one to compare Russell and Carnap. Line B indicates the 
domain between the ‘world’ and science. The domain of application of Russell’s 
epistemology of acquaintance centers on the external world and the language of 
sensation. In his programme the tools of logic are enlisted to justify appeal to the 
language of sensation, via his prior epistemology of acquaintance (by translating 
external world objects into objects known by acquaintance). This raises further 
epistemological questions about logic itself because it is enlisted in the 
translation of external objects into objects of acquaintance -  why would one be 
justified in employing this logic to provide the epistemological underpinning of 
objects of acquaintance?
Carnap on the other hand does not seek to justify the language of 
sensation as a starting point. Rather, it is in virtue of establishing, via convention, 
a class of basic observation sentences, in conjunction with assuming a logical 
framework to provide a system of relations among concepts, that epistemological 
questions can be raised at all. Epistemology, for Carnap then, is the domain of 
the connection between the assumed starting point of the language of sensation 
and the intersubjective language of science -  how does one get from statements 
about subjective experience to intersubjective statements of science (and, indeed, 
natural language generally)?
As Richardson states (1998, p. 27), “The new logic is, thus, not a tool to 
use in pursuit of a reductive epistemological-cum-ontological project bequeathed 
to us by the British empiricists, but rather a way of reformulating the whole 
question of what is at stake in philosophy.” The question then arises in Quine 
about whether Carnap successfully justifies the body of scientific statements with 
sensation (observation statements).
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Figure 2: A comparison of Quine's criticism of the Aufbau and the 
epistemological point according to Carnap
A. [ -------------------------------------------------Quine’s interpretation of the point o f the Aufbau-------------------------------------------- ]
Justification
B. [External w orld ------------------------------------- language of sensation---------------------- intersubjective language of science]
-♦  given a sufficiently constructed system  
Justification
C.------------------------------------------------------------ [-------------------- Epistemology of the A ufbau ------------------------------------------]
Figure 2 locates features for comparison of Quine and Carnap on the 
Aufbau. One might contrast Quine’s conception of Carnap’s goals from the 
latter’s own with the direction of justification represented in Figure 2. The 
direction of the arrows indicates the nature of justification. From Quine’s 
perspective, if Carnap’s constitutional system works, he serves to justify the 
traditional empiricist claims that scientific knowledge is rooted in sensation. On 
the other hand, Carnap’s justification might be understood to move in the 
opposite direction: a sufficiently constructed constitutional system can justify 
theoretical statements of science in virtue of their logical connection to basic 
observation statements. Any higher-level statements of science are thereby 
justified relative to the assumed class of basic observation sentences in 
conjunction with the assumed logical framework specifying deductive relations 
among constituents within the system.
An important feature of Quine’s criticism of Carnap’s reduction 
programme is correct. Regardless of whether one might distinguish Carnap’s 
goal from that of traditional empiricism, Quine’s claim that one can deduce only 
classes of theoretical sentences from observation (and not individual theoretical 
statements) places a major obstacle in the way of Carnap’s ambitions to construct 
a step-by-step system of deduction between theory and observation. In his 
preface to the 1961 edition of the Aufbau, Carnap expressed that he shifted his 
view toward a more liberal notion of ‘reduction’ away from a strict definitional 
connection (p. viii). This point and its upshot can be made clearer in the outline 
of the development of his thought throughout the protocol sentence debate.
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A second consideration is rather more suggestive and indicates an area 
that would be fruitful for consideration, though it would go too far astray from 
the present examination to pursue here. Russell claims that any ontology needs to 
be adopted with hesitancy. Rather than subscribe to full-scale skepticism 
regarding the basis for scientific knowledge, which proves unfruitful for any 
positive account of the possibility of knowledge, one proceeds with reservation, 
acknowledging that there is no standpoint from which philosophers might 
position themselves to assess any such account. One may question the extent to 
which this sort of commitment differs from Carnap’s ambivalence regarding 
ontology. It might be noted that each takes some starting point as a necessity to 
proceed with their respective positive projects: Carnap with the conventional 
adoption of sensation and a system of logic; Russell with an ontological 
commitment to external objects. Without conflating their views, one might ask to 
what extent are their differences substantive? This question would inform an 
understanding of what one commits to when committing ‘ontologically’ to a 
particular viewpoint and could flesh out the scope of commitments that cannot be 
legitimated within an adopted scientific methodology itself.
This query might be read as an effort to undermine Richardson’s attempt 
to distinguish Carnap’s programme from traditional empiricism: Carnap’s 
conventionalism may be rendered not such a distinct project after all and might 
be understood to misconceive the nature of ontological commitments in a 
scientific philosophy. However, one may not feel compelled to take one side or 
another in this consideration and, as noted, the question is raised to consider what 
sorts of problems might present themselves from Richardson’s interpretation. 
What should be noted though is the reasons Carnap may have had a problem 
with Russell’s external world programme. Even if one removed reference to the 
metaphysics of Russell’s commitment, Carnap (and his ilk) may still be troubled 
by the presence of ambiguous or unanalyzed concepts in Russell’s account. For 
example, in his claim regarding the hesitancy with which one needs to employ 
‘knowledge by acquaintance’, Russell (1914, p. 74) writes, “it is not that 
common knowledge must be true, but that we possess no radically different kind 
of knowledge derived from some other source.” A good Russellian may utilize
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the notion ‘true’ in this instance with reservation. A good Aw/5baw-Camapian, on 
the other hand, might be reluctant to use that term in its pre-analytic form at all 
on the grounds that it cannot be explicated precisely. It is in virtue of adopting 
one system or another that one might formulate the concept ‘true’ in the first 
place. In strong terms, one might argue that employing a concept for which there 
is no analytic form can have no meaning in a language. In looser terminology, it 
is, in part, precisely a notion of ‘true’ that one is after in the constitutional 
system. It can be misleading to use the term unless one can specify what the 
concept means.
A further Camapian worry would be that utilizing terms like ‘true’ blurs 
the boundaries of the actual successes in constructing a constitutional system. 
That is, one might be led to claim that successes in science somehow vindicate 
the concept ‘true’; that somehow the successes extend beyond the domain within 
which their success is couched. Claiming merely that the notion is used 
hesitantly only obscures the scope of a successful construction of Carnap’s (or 
any other) scientific system. ‘True’ cannot provide explanatory import within a 
scientific system until it has been specified what that concept is. Then the 
concept can be understood only relative to the framework within which its 
meaning has been expressed. This point, too, will be expanded in the discussion 
below on Tarski’s theory of truth.
However there is yet a significant issue that must be taken into account 
regarding Carnap’s anti-foundationalist stance. In his autobiography he writes 
(1963, p.57), “We assumed that there was a certain rock bottom of knowledge, 
the knowledge of the immediately given, which was indubitable... This was the 
picture which I had given in the Logischer Aufbau.” This quotation indicates the 
need for further discussion in order to clarify the Carnap’s alleged anti- 
foundationalist orientation in the Aufbau. A  sufficient discussion would start by 
looking at Uebel (2007), Friedman (1992) and Christopher Pincock (2005). If 
Carnap himself was not clear on his commitments, then the Richardson reading 
stands in need of defense. However, it can be noted that although Friedman 
(1992, p. 18) claims that in Carnap’s reflections in 1963, “It would be difficult
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indeed to find a clearer statement anywhere of the assumptions and goals of 
phenomenalistic foundationalism,” he also notes that “when we turn to the text of 
the Aufbau itself such an epistemological conception is hardly in evidence.” 
Camap, it seems, has an unclear conception himself of his former philosophical 
project.
Perhaps one could argue that Carnap misremembered the point of his 
work in the Aufbaul As Friedman (1992, p. 40) remarks,
It is not unprecedented, of course, for the character and motivations of an 
earlier and now rejected philosophical project to be grossly misdescribed 
-  even by the philosopher whose earlier views are in question.
Nevertheless, Friedman (ibid) suggests, and goes on to argue that, “in the 
passages in question ... Carnap is describing not so much his own motivations 
when writing the Aufbau but rather the way in which the Aufbau was initially 
understood within the Vienna Circle.” Friedman also argues that evidence in the 
Aufbau, regardless of Carnap’s autobiographical reflections, indicates his 
affiliation with neo-Kantianism more than any traditional empiricist programme 
and its attendant commitment to some version of foundationalism.
But the problem does not disappear. In 1930 Carnap writes the following 
(1930, p. 144):
The positivist system corresponds to the epistemological viewpoint 
because it proves the validity of knowledge by reduction to the given. 
The materialist system corresponds to the viewpoint of the empirical 
sciences, for in this system all concepts are reduced to the physical, to the 
only domain which exhibits the complete rule of law and makes inter­
subjective knowledge possible. [Italics added.]
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The citation suggests that perhaps Carnap was a foundationalist after all. At least, 
it raises the question about how Carnap understood the point of his programme 
between 1928 and around 1930.
While this matter too could do with further investigation, the following 
response suggests itself. Uebel (2007, pp. 129-134, 190-200, 440-449) has 
argued, with reference also to Carnap’s unpublished manuscripts, that Carnap 
did suffer a foundationalist ‘dip’ around this time. Carnap was neither always as 
unconcerned with epistemological foundations as he was in the Aufbau, nor as 
explicitly anti-foundationalist as he was from 1932 onwards. Rather, according 
to Uebel, it was in the protocol sentence debate with Neurath that Carnap was 
gradually weaned, as it were, from his foundationalist sentiments (see Uebel 
2007, Chs. 6-8). It is to this debate that we turn next.
Neurath’s critique of the Aufbau: The protocol sentence debate
The previous section serves to indicate the nature of Carnap’s empiricism in 
1928. It is not because he ignored the problem of the foundations of knowledge 
that he takes sensation conventionally and without justification. It is, rather, that 
he attempts to be clear about the limits of normativity with respect to a 
constitutional system. No system can be employed to justify its own adoption. 
Rather, it is in virtue of adopting observation sentences and a formal framework 
that one constructs a constitutional system that affords internal normative force. 
Carnap is thus not naive about empiricism in his attention to constructing an 
account of knowledge. His methodology clarifies what are taken to be the limits 
of the domain of application of a constitutional system of knowledge: any 
knowledge claims must be understood relative to an adopted constitutional 
system. One might make reference to a theme of this thesis: there is a distinction 
to be drawn between answering a question regarding our knowledge of the world 
and formulating a methodology with which to answer such a question. Russell 
may be understood as engaged in the former ambition, while Carnap can be seen 
to engage with the latter.
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This assessment of the Aufbau and Uebel’s worries about Carnap’s 
foundationalist dip have implications for how to understand the dynamics of the 
protocol sentence debate, which centered on how to formulate a methodology 
with which scientifically to answer questions pertaining to our knowledge of the 
world. Two key published papers of the debate came out in Erkenntnis vol. 2 in 
1931, as “Sociology in the framework of physicalism” and “The unity of 
science” by Neurath and Carnap, respectively.3 Both lengthy discussions, they 
give an indication of where each directed his attentions. Neurath attends to a 
more general account of the way in which various inquiries in Sociology can, 
and ought to, be formulated in the language of physicalism. Carnap provides 
what he calls (1934a, p. 28), “an example of application of Logical Analysis to 
investigating the logical relations between the statements of Physics and those of 
Science in general.” Partly in virtue of their different approaches, they disagreed 
on whether protocol statements ought to be understood as couched in a primitive, 
distinct language from physicalism or not primitive and with no different status 
from other non-protocol statements.
A notable aspect of the emergence of the protocol sentence debate is that 
it did not involve questions of the justification of the purported connection 
between the language of sensation and the real world (appeals to notions of the 
‘real world’ could not be meaningfully formulated in the language of 
physicalism). Neither was it over whether there could be -  in principle -  a 
successful reduction of scientific language in general to the language of 
sensation. Rather the bounds of physicalism extend only to the basic observation 
statements that can be formulated and the debate centered on the status and 
structure of those protocols in the Aufbau. Moreover, this reduction, as noted,
3 The articles are cited as follows. Neurath, O. 1931a. “Soziologie im 
Physikalismus.” Erkenntnis 2, 393-431. Translated as “Sociology in the 
framework of physicalism” in Neurath (1983). Carnap, R. 1931. “Die 
physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft.” Erkenntnis. 
2:432-65. Translated as (1934). The Unity of Science. London: Kegan Paul. 
Friedman (2000) cites these publications as 1932, as does Max Black (1934, p. 
10) in the introduction to Carnap’s “The Unity of Science,” because the last part 
of volume 2, which is marked as 1931, came out in 1932. Here for the purposes 
of internal consistency, they will be cited as 1931.
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was not the solution to the problem of knowledge but was, rather, the problem 
itself -  at that point yet to be worked out.
The debate takes place within a context of relative agreement among 
Vienna Circle members and other practitioners of scientific philosophy. Neurath 
(1931a, p. 58) writes that the Vienna Circle attempts to “further scientific work 
in all fields by means of logical analysis” in an “atmosphere free of 
metaphysics.” They associate their work with that of Mach, Poincare, Russell 
and Wittgenstein among others and “agree” that the language of physicalism (the 
intersubjective language of science) provides a framework for all “meaningful 
statements.” Neurath (ibid, p. 65) notes that his own view is closest to Carnap’s.4
In spite of this agreement, Neurath indicates the need to specify what it 
means for all meaningful statements to be given within physicalism. He writes 
(ibid), “some in the circle” [i.e. Carnap] claim that ‘philosophy’ is given the task 
of clarifying concepts within the language of science. Neurath finds this 
problematic both because it gives rise to misunderstandings (about the status of 
employed protocols as conventionally adopted -  they may be understood as 
somehow justified) and because it puts forward a language outside any 
meaningful framework, which for him is metaphysical nonsense.
For Neurath (1931a, pp. 60-1), physicalism rules out as meaningless any 
standpoint outside of science from which to assess science:
It is certainly possible to speak about one part of language with the help 
of another part; it is, however, not possible to make pronouncements 
about language as a whole from a ‘not yet linguistic’ standpoint, as 
Wittgenstein and some individual representatives of the Vienna Circle 
seem to do.
4 Richardson (1998, p. 10fn9) argues that the list of “historical predecessors” to 
the Vienna Circle is “misleading”: “it certainly does not apply in any clear way 
to Carnap.”
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For Neurath, one cannot assess “language as a whole” from the perspective of 
“experiences” or the “world.” He (ibid, p. 61) writes, “Every statement of the 
kind: ‘The possibility of science rests on an orderly constitution of the world’, is 
therefore meaningless.” He (ibid) writes further that the “possibility of science 
becomes apparent in science itself.... As makers of statements, we cannot, so to 
speak, take up a position outside the making of statements and then be 
prosecutor, defendant and judge at the same time.” Finally, he notes that science 
“remains in the domain of statements” (ibid). There is no further “true system of 
statements” alongside science as a system of statements “even as a conceptual 
boundary” (ibid). “This system of statements is that of unified science -  that is 
the standpoint that we can call physicalism” (ibid).
Carnap’s phenomenal language therefore cannot be meaningfully 
formulated outside physicalism as was apparently presumed by Camap in 1930. 
That language was put forward as distinct from the intersubjective language of 
physicalism. Protocols are formulated in the phenomenal language and the 
problem then was how to deduce the intersubjective non-protocols of the 
physicalist language from the primitive, basic, phenomenal statements. For 
Neurath however, statements of subjective experience can be understood only 
when formulated as intersubjective physicalist statements. For Neurath 
physicalism must be characterized as a singular (if incomplete) system of 
statements: there can be no meaningful languages that lie outside the realm of 
physicalism. Friedman (2000, p. 41) notes that for Neurath physicalism is the 
“essentially interlinguistic standpoint.” And metaphysics is best overcome by 
abandoning any notion of an external standpoint from which to assess the 
language of science. Thus, one rejects notions of Platonic forms as meaningful, 
Wittgensteinian elucidations that would relate language to the “world” or the 
“given” (ibid), or particular ontological commitments that are intended to explain 
the successes of science, but can be provided no meaningful formulation within 
the language of physicalism. Moreover, Neurath (1931a, p. 65) writes, “As the 
views of this paper are above all close to those that Camap has expressed, it 
might be stressed that the special ‘phenomenal language’ from which Camap 
tries to derive the physical one, is discarded here,” which will suggest some
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“alterations” to Carnap’s constitutional system. Likewise, there is no use for 
‘methodological solipsism’, which “will probably also disappear; it can probably 
also be understood as a weakened residue of idealist metaphysics [insofar as it 
might be understood to be justified based on some sort of privileged access to 
truth about the world] from which Camap in particular always tries to keep 
clear.” Neurath argues that methodological solipsism cannot be formulated 
scientifically (that is within the language of physicalism) on the grounds that it is 
the bounds and framework of physicalism itself that serve to provide the means 
to give meaning to statements. Methodological solipsism (ibid) “cannot even be 
used any longer to give an idea of a certain attitude in contrast to another 
attitude, because there is only one physicalism. It contains everything that can be 
formulated scientifically” (ibid). Neurath’s chief worry is that although Carnap 
intends to purge the language of science of metaphysics, the phenomenal 
language could be understood to be metaphysical, since it is assumed in the 
Aufbau to lie outside intersubjective physicalism.
One might be worried about Neurath’s insistence that all meaningful 
statements are formulated within physicalism and that consequently metaphysics 
is rendered meaningless in virtue of its concepts not being so formulable. An 
example from popular culture might provide a helpful way to think about what 
this point means to Neurath (and, broadly speaking, Carnap). Although one may 
not feel compelled to share their view, it may demonstrate the way in which their 
position is motivated.
A few years ago the popular English band Keane produced an exquisite 
music video that starred Giovanni Ribisi. (One need neither know the band nor 
their cultural sphere to grasp the point of this example.)5 In it a young family 
man leaves for work in the morning. His clothes are comfortable. His car is 
practical. And he seems to share an idyllic suburban life with his beautiful wife, 
who reminds him to pick up the dry-cleaning, and clever son, who apparently 
entertains him in the drive to school and work. Entering his office, where he
5 For the initiated, the Keane song is entitled “Crystal Ball” and may be found 
presently on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uJ0z6g6BLj8.
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appears to work as a letting agent, he greets his colleagues, flirts with the 
receptionist and goes to work surrounded by photos of his family.
After a difficult day, his idyllic life appears to unwind. He returns home 
to find a strange car in the driveway. When he tries his key in the lock it does not 
work and when his wife answers the door, she does not know him. Slightly 
alarmed, she calls to her partner, who looks rather like the protagonist of the 
story, and they shut the door. He calls to his son through the window and the boy 
does not know him. The police subsequently arrive and one hears the protagonist 
protesting that he has been married to the woman for seven years, but she is 
pretending she does not know him. Feeling ill at ease, he drives around 
aimlessly, not knowing where to go or who to call, eventually sleeping in his car.
In the morning he returns to work to find the receptionist does not know 
him and the man from his house is seated at his desk. The same photos around 
the desk have no trace of the protagonist, but in his place is the other man. His 
behavior, which up to this point has seemed rational, becomes erratic and he is 
eventually thrown out by security. Walking to the car park, another woman 
drives off in his car and he is left in the parking lot rather confounded.
Thematically, the plot runs like an episode of the Twilight Zone. All 
experiences he held to ground his reality come unraveled in the face of 
subsequent events. Of course, one concludes that the man is in the end 
delusional, but the relevant question for present purposes is on what grounds 
does the viewer come to hold this conclusion? If one starts from the experiences 
of the protagonist at the beginning, all seems normal until it is not. There would 
seem to be no grounds on which to make sense of the change in subjective 
experience and the viewer is left bewildered with the protagonist. It is not until 
one confronts all the other various accounts of the situation that meaning can be 
ascribed to the experience. Not just statements of the experience of the 
protagonist to the police officer, but also those of the wife, son, husband, 
neighbors or alleged work colleagues need to be considered to give meaning to 
the experiences of the protagonist.
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Indeed, it is precisely in virtue of the broader context of statements about 
the experience that one can ascribe meaning to the protagonist’s predicament at 
all. His own subjective experience cannot give meaning to what is happening to 
him until it is formulated against the other body of statements. That body of 
statements includes, not just testimony of others, but home ownership and 
employment records, the man’s own history (if he has one) with police and 
possibly mental health facilities, etc. To be sure, it was only because his own 
experiences fit with his surroundings at the beginning of the story that viewers 
assume there is any coherent picture to unravel in the first place.
Moreover it cannot help to stipulate that the man must be of sound mind 
in order for his subjective experiences to be given meaning. For one cannot 
assess what it means for him to be of sound mind without appeal to this broader 
sphere of meaningful accounts of the experiences.
This example indicates the way in which Neurath and Camap can be 
understood to share a commitment to physicalism (and the way in which their 
consequent debate was over how protocol statements are understood to fit within 
physicalism). Certainly each individual has ‘basic experiences’, but those 
experiences cannot be given meaning until couched within a shared 
intersubjective language wherein one can formulate and explicate concepts and 
statements derived from them (to a greater or lesser extent). It helps nothing in 
the example to suggest that the grounds for the verity of the protagonists’ 
experience are that such experience is caused (or not) by ‘reality’. That concept 
cannot even have any meaning until assessed against the body of statements 
within which it is being asserted.
The left wing of the Vienna Circle does not rule out metaphysics based 
on an ad hoc definition. Rather, its members intend to make clear that 
metaphysical concepts cannot be rendered sensible within an intersubjective 
language. Thus one cannot meaningfully formulate the concept ‘reality’ within 
physicalism: any talk of reality can only consist in all the statements formulated
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about it. This is physicalism in the widest sense: not that everything is physical, 
but every meaningful reference to objects constitutes the ever-growing domain of 
physicalism, outside of which one cannot assert meaningful access. The 
subjective nature of the protagonist’s experience therefore cannot be given 
meaning until it is understood against statements surrounding it. Thus, the 
protocol sentence debate was not over the epistemological justification of basic 
observation statements as a foundation for science. It rather focused on the form 
and status of conventionally adopted protocol statements. For Neurath, protocols 
could not be understood as primitive or rooted in ‘subjective’ experience, the 
language of which is external to the intersubjective linguistic framework dubbed 
physicalism.
What are protocols? Two points can be noted for Neurath. First, protocol 
statements are basic observation statements, formulated as part of the 
intersubjective physicalist language, and are the basis for the construction of that 
language. Second, to determine whether protocols should be accepted, they are 
compared against the body of statements consisting in the language of 
physicalism. This is to say that a statement about a basic observation like, 
‘someone sees a red cube on the table’, is checked against other accounts of the 
cube and corresponding behavioral dispositions that are taken to indicate assent 
to the claim that ‘someone sees a red cube on the table’.
Protocols are the basis on which scientific statements may be made. Since 
there can be no subjective language outside physicalism, protocols themselves 
need to be formulated as a part of the language of physicalism (Neurath, 1931a, 
p. 64): “From the start the perceiving subject will be more closely linked with the 
perception statement and the object determination than was done before.” One 
cannot separate the “thinking subject” or the “ego” from anything that can be 
“experienced;” thus, he (ibid, p. 65) writes,
What we try to detach as ‘ego’ includes, in the language of physicalism,
these processes about which we are not informed through the usual
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‘external’ sense. All ‘personality coefficients’ that distinguish one 
individual from another are of a physicalist nature!
So, one cannot make reference to subjective experience as a foundation for the 
physicalist framework of knowledge. Specifying the role of the perceiver is of 
, central importance to Neurath’s account of protocols, but “perceivers”’ protocols 
are not compared from one subject to another: rather protocols must be 
formulated from the start as physicalist statements if they are to have meaning at 
all.
Two interpreted examples of basic observation statements might be the 
following:6
“The red cube sits on the table.”
“I am hot.”
For Neurath there can be no neat, atomic rendering of a protocol statement 
because any such statement cannot be given adequate translation rules into 
statements actually made within science. On these grounds there can be no 
phenomenal language. The examples are incomplete because all protocols must 
include reference to a perceiver and cannot refer to a subject. This is to say that 
the appropriate form of the protocol should read,
Otto states that, ‘the red cube sits on the table’.
Otto is hot.
Further, Neurath says that to be more precise, one might require statements about 
“Otto” and the time at which he reports the protocol. Thus one may write,
At time t, the person identified by such and such features and called, 
‘Otto’, reports that at t-1, he stated, ‘the red cube sits on the table’.
6 For a Neurath’s discussion of these examples, see Neurath (1932, p. 93-4).
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At time t, the person identified by such and such features and called,
‘Otto’, reports that at t-1, he stated, ‘Otto is hot’.
This reads as a rather flat-footed account of the structure of protocols to be sure. 
‘I am hot’ is less muddled than Neurath’s rather weighty account, while the 
meaning of the simpler expression seems clear. However the former includes 
reference to a subject, which suggests, that there is some independent subjective 
experience forming a basis point. In place of the subject, Neurath makes 
reference to the name of the person, so that one can compare protocols. The 
statement ‘Otto is hot’ can be compared with ‘Karl is hot’. Each of the 
constituents can be further analyzed. Neurath’s ‘I’ on the other hand cannot be 
compared with Karl’s ‘I’ (see Neurath 1932, p. 94).
As formulated, an adequately specified protocol sentence therefore must 
include aspects of the broader context within which the statement is made. This 
precludes any notion that protocols, as the basis for scientific language, can be 
reduced to primitive -  simple and atomic -  statements. Neurath’s own account 
thus moves in the opposite direction from Carnap: not toward a neatly specified 
singular statement, but toward a more tangled account that demands one 
incorporate the role of the perceiver and other contextual elements into any 
account of a basic observation statement. Protocols in this sense have no special 
status over non-protocols; they are selected as a conventional starting point for 
the construction of a Camapian constitutional system. Further, this feature 
characterizes Neurath’s notion of Ballungen as a central aspect of any account of 
scientific statements.7 That is, no observation is primitive, but rather consists in a 
messy cluster, or congestion, of notions built in. One may always further 
elaborate or change the context of a protocol sentence in virtue of the fact that 
there are innumerable levels of specification that one may be inclined to
7 The concept of Ballungen is introduced explicitly in Neurath (1932), but its 
elements can be seen here and it therefore provides an effective way to account 
for Neurath’s point. An extensive discussion of Ballungen and its role in 
Neurath’s account can be found in Cartwright, N., Cat, J., Fleck, L. and Uebel, T. 
(1996, pp. 167-252).
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articulate when accounting for the context of a perceiver’s statement of any 
given protocol.
Carnap’s reply to Neurath, “The unity of science,” was published in 1931 
in Erkenntnis, followed in the next volume in 1932, with “On protocols.” 
Friedman (2000, p. 42) notes that in 1931, Carnap held still that there were two 
languages: the phenomenal language of subjective experience and the 
intersubjective physical language, while the epistemological problem is how to 
move from the former to the latter. The former do not require confirmation for 
Carnap, but function as the basis for all other scientific statements; at this stage 
they still “express the epistemological point of view of a single subject.” The 
physical language is intersubjective and serves as “a universal language for 
science,” since all statements can be expressed within it (ibid, p. 43). Key for 
Carnap, as a response to Neurath’s worries, is that protocol statements now fall 
under the physicalist language as “sub-languages” (Camap 1931, p. 88),8 thereby 
removing, according to him, the point of contention with Neurath.
Richardson (1998, p. 198) notes that there is a substantial distinction 
between Carnap’s programme in the Aufbau and that in “The unity of science,” 
wherein he “employs a new philosophical perspective,” drawing a distinction 
between material and formal modes of speech. The latter, which he now takes 
up, consists in statements about language, while the former -  employed in the 
Aufbau -  is about objects. Philosophy thus becomes solely about language. 
According to Richardson this sharpens his ability to reject metaphysical 
statements. Since any meaningful statement must be formulable in the formal 
mode, metaphysical statements like (ibid, p. 200), “numbers are essentially 
constructs of the human mind” or “the natural numbers, but not the rational 
numbers, really exist” cannot be given meaning, since Carnap doubts that they 
can be given formal expression.
Friedman (2000, p. 43) notes that although Carnap in “Unity” argues that 
the phenomenal language is now to be viewed as a sub-language of physicalism,
8 See Richardson (1998, p. 201).
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“From Neurath’s point of view... Carnap has still not understood his point,” 
since the latter still refers to two distinct languages. Neurath (1932) is an explicit 
reply to Carnap’s views in the “Unity” paper and presents his worries not just 
that a language of subjective experience cannot lie outside the intersubjective 
language of physicalism, but further that Carnap’s move toward the logical 
analysis of concepts cannot be executed because the starting point -  the form of 
any protocol statement -  cannot be a neatly reduced atomic statement from 
which one can employ logical procedures to deduce empirical scientific 
statements.
Neurath writes (1932, p. 91) that scientific statements are becoming more 
precise, but “No term of unified science, however, is free from imprecision, since 
all terms are based on terms that are essential for protocol statements whose 
imprecision must be immediately obvious to everyone.” The notion that there 
may be an ideal language consisting of “neat atomic statements” is a 
metaphysical fiction and scientific language cannot be seen to be an 
approximation to such a language. In scientific practice, one is not given neat, 
precisely specified observation sentences. Any statement about observation 
involves necessarily imprecise elements. Rather (ibid, p. 92), “what is first given 
us is our historical ordinary language with a multitude of imprecise, unanalyzed 
terms [‘Ballungen’]. We start by purifying this ordinary language of 
metaphysical components and thus arrive at the physicalist ordinary language.” 
Although Neurath supports the employment of logic to clarify the structure of 
“physicalist ordinary language,” he argues that a strictly formal representation of 
natural language statements is not possible because the language used in 
scientific practice is imprecise. Carnap’s formal rendering of protocols therefore 
cannot be understood to be about any scientific statements that are actually 
employed in science.
Neurath (ibid) argues thus that a unified language of science utilizes, in 
practice, terms of ordinary and scientific language, which means that one can 
never be rid of the imprecision that comes with the necessary inclusion of 
ordinary language in statements of a unified scientific language. He characterizes
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his physicalist language as a ‘universal jargon’, the key for which is that it is 
purged of metaphysics. It cannot be purged of imprecision because the unified 
language of science, employed as a ‘universal jargon’, always consists of both 
theoretical and ordinary statements.
Referring to Carnap’s discussion of ‘primitive’ protocols that “require no 
verification,” Neurath (ibid) argues that:
Unified science consists of factual statements. These are either protocol 
statements or non-protocol statements. Protocol statements are factual 
statements of the same linguistic form as other factual statements, but in 
them a personal name always occurs several times, in a definite 
connection with other terms.
Thus, Neurath indicates that the worry now is not just whether the 
phenomenal language lies outside physicalism (since by now Carnap has 
renounced this notion), but that Carnap still wants to suggest two distinct 
languages, one of neat, atomic protocols and the other of physicalism, consisting 
in ordinary and theoretical statements. Protocols in the form outlined by Camap 
still may give way to metaphysics on the grounds that they may be taken to 
provide an ultimate foundation from which to build an account of the world. 
Protocols have the same imprecise status as any other statement in science. They 
are used as the basis of a systematic account of science and based on a decision -  
and necessarily may be always further specified through a more thorough 
descriptive account of the protocols. They may also be rejected.
In spite of the persisting disagreement and apparent mounting tension in 
the debate, Neurath’s tone still concludes in a conciliatory manner (ibid, p. 99):
What matters in all scientific work is to establish harmony between the 
statements of unified science: protocol statements and non-protocol 
statements. For this purpose a ‘logical syntax’ is needed, which is the
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main issue of Carnap’s work; Camap has created the first preparations for
this in his [Aufbau],
One can see here Neurath’s receptive nature to Carnap’s own emerging 
development away from epistemology to the logic of science. Though he rejects 
any notion that a study of syntax can bring about a non-protocol language from 
primitive protocols, he endorses the place that the systematic analysis of 
Carnap’s project has within physicalism. Thus, as the debate becomes more 
pointed, thereby indicating differences, it may also be seen to suggest the need to 
more fully articulate Carnap’s developing distinction between material and 
formal modes of speech, which eventually becomes a distinction between 
psychological and logical aspects of science. The full expression of that 
distinction, it will be argued below, is both necessitated and motivated by the 
dynamics of the protocol sentence debate as it develops: both Carnap and 
Neurath’s views require such a distinction to vindicate their viewpoints. Logical 
aspects are developed and employed methodologically to bring clarity to the 
structure of scientific language.
The shift in Carnap’s view can be seen both in response to Neurath’s 
worries and to his own confrontation of problems that emerge within the Aufbau. 
The latter is considered in the next section. Carnap (1932) develops his line of 
thought in response to Neurath. He provides a behaviorist account that drops 
reference to the “first-person epistemological point of view” altogether 
(Friedman 2000, p. 43), thereby addressing Neurath’s worries about appeal to 
different subjective protocol languages. Yet Carnap still suggests one 
legitimately might construe the language of science with one of two forms: 1.) 
His suggested form in which language of protocol sentences is distinct from 
physical language, which requires rules of translation for physical language into 
the protocol language; or 2.) Neurath’s proposal in which protocol-sentences 
belong to the physical language, thereby making explicit that protocol sentences 
are not epistemically privileged.
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Carnap notes that in the end Neurath’s view is to be preferred because it 
precludes any “residue” metaphysical notions like the “given” etc., but he has not 
been willing to drop the development of the concept of a distinct protocol 
language because it stands in accord with his attempts to formulate the 
intersubjective language in more precise terms. Moreover Carnap’s emerging 
“principle of tolerance” indicates that a systematic account of the language of 
science in the form of two languages ought not be rejected based on an assertion 
from the beginning, but ought to be considered in terms of whether it is 
pragmatically fruitful to adopt it or not. Friedman (2000, p. 45) translates 
Camap:
Not only the question whether protocol-sentences occur outside or inside 
the system-language, but also the further question of their more exact 
characterization, is to be answered, it seems to me, not by an assertion, 
but rather by a convention. Although I earlier left this question open and 
only indicated a few possible answers, I now think that the different 
answers do not contradict one another. They are to be understood as 
suggestions for conventions with regard to their consequences and in 
testing their practical utility. (Carnap 1932, p. 216.)9
Neurath (1932) still contrasts his view from Carnap’s, but Carnap’s response 
(1932, p. 457) is, “My opinion here is that this is a question, not of two mutually 
inconsistent views, but rather of two different methods for structuring the 
language of science both of which are possible and legitimate.” He (ibid, p. 458) 
holds that the protocol form “affords greater freedom,” since it allows one to 
select protocols of whatever form, while the Neurath’s physicalism, “has the 
advantage of greater unity of system.” The protocol form (ibid) has protocol 
sentences “outside” the “system” language and their form is “arbitrary,” while 
translation rules will be constructed for protocol sentences into the system 
language. For the physicalist language form, protocols are found within the 
system language and are “bound” to its syntax. Moreover (ibid), “[t]he questions
9 This view can characterize the present proposal for how to understand the point 
of Hempel’s D-N account: it is not assessed as right or wrong, but with the 
pragmatic consideration of how effectively it explicates explanatory candidates.
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of whether the protocol sentences occur outside or inside the system language 
and of their exact characterization are, it seems to me, not answered by assertions 
but rather by postulations.” This comes to be a central distinction between 
Camap and Neurath, but, as will be suggested, it appears to be a methodological 
difference, not a deeper philosophical one. Neurath rejects the primitive protocol 
form outright. Carnap prefers to postulate one view or the other and assess them 
based on their pragmatic benefits.
Further, Carnap (ibid, p. 464) considers the practical application of 
Neurath’s physicalist view and presents for the formulation of the protocol 
language two options:
A) with restriction: it will be postulated that concrete sentences of such 
and such completely specified form shall serve as protocol sentences; B) 
without restriction: it will be specified that any concrete sentence may be 
taken under circumstances as a protocol sentence.
Neurath chooses the first option, which precludes the potential for various 
possibilities of the protocol form. As noted, Neurath suggests that the “name of 
the protocaller” should be included. Camap remarks that this seems a practical 
choice for the first option, but that its practicality in the end is doubtful because 
“it has the defect, from the point of view of syntax, that a sentence which refers 
to another contains the other as a clause.” Here one can identify part of Carnap’s 
motivation for wanting to construct a distinct protocol language: Neurath’s 
formulation of a protocol sentence exhibits a syntactical problem by containing 
the statement to which it refers. Thus it would appear that the sentence can be 
reduced further to the clause it contains: ‘Otto states, “there is a red cube on the 
table’” might be further reduced to ‘there is a red cube on the table’. Reducing 
the sentence to its principle clause may function to clarify the structure of the 
protocol further.
Camap (ibid) is sympathetic with Popper, who is inclined to advocate 
option B, that any concrete sentence (and not merely Neurath’s idiosyncratic
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formulation) may be a protocol. Every concrete sentence can serve as a protocol 
in given circumstances. Suppose one employs the statement, ‘L is a law’ 
(“universal sentence of the system language”). Concrete sentences relating to 
“specific space-time positions” are derived from L. That is, the statements 
derived from L have to have specific space-time positions. One can derive from 
concrete sentences, in conjunction with other laws and “logico-mathematical 
inference rules,” more concrete sentences “until one arrives at sentences one 
wants to admit in the case immediately at hand. Thereby it is a matter of decision 
which sentences one wants to use at various times as such endpoints of reduction 
and thus as protocol sentences.” One is not forced (ibid, p. 466) to stop at any 
one place: “From any sentence one can reduce still further; there are no absolute 
initial sentences for the structure of science.”
Thus Carnap views his protocol language and Neurath’s version of 
physicalism as suggestions for conventions on which to structure the language of 
science. They are not assessed in terms of being right or wrong, but in their 
practicality of application. Camap concedes that Neurath’s view, wherein 
protocol sentences are not distinct from the system language, is perhaps to be 
preferred because it avoids “idealist residues” and the worries of metaphysics 
brought up by Neurath. However he suggests that Popper’s view of the 
application of physicalism is to be preferred to Neurath’s in practical terms. The 
elimination of absolutism is taken by Camap to be the shared starting point of the 
discussion, which for him diffuses some of Neurath’s worries in his suggestions 
regarding a distinction of phenomenal language from the physicalist system 
language.
The protocol sentence debate was not over justifying sensation as a 
foundation for knowledge. Rather it was over what form a methodology for the 
assessment of the language of science might take, given sensation as a starting 
point. Within the debate, that methodology assumes a class of protocol 
statements that can provide a starting point for the assessment of scientific 
knowledge -  indeed, a methodology for formulating grounds for the possibility 
of knowledge relative to the framework within which scientific statements are
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made. Those statements, it is agreed between Camap and Neurath, are selected 
on the basis of convention in practice. There is no question of the justification of 
protocols because they are adopted on the basis of a decision. The question then 
that is central to the protocol sentence debate is what form the protocols should 
take and how the methodology shapes up in light of an adopted system of those 
protocols and the adopted formal framework specifying their relations both to 
other protocols and non-protocols within the system.
Carnap and the rejection of epistemology: Internal problems within the Aujbau
There is a substantial philosophical difference between the Aufbau and the 1931 
“Unity” paper, where Camap introduces the distinction between ‘material’ and 
‘formal’ modes of speech. The former is about objects, while the latter is about 
language and indicates Carnap’s move to develop his methodology toward an 
analysis of language -  not of objects. According to Richardson (1998), the 
epistemological problem of the Aufbau -  how to get from subjective experience 
to intersubjective concepts of science -  is thus reformulated in the formal mode 
as (p. 199), “[t]he terms of physicalist language must be defined in terms of a 
language of primitive experience [protocol language].” The epistemological 
problem has now become the extent to which one can specify the relation 
between two languages, not the relation between subjective experience and 
intersubjective physicalist language. Richardson (ibid, p. 201) notes that 
“protocol languages are meant to capture the given in experience in its given 
form,” which leads Camap to hold that “there is a fact of the matter” about the 
structure of protocols.
According to Richardson, there are three ways in which Camap in 1931 
sees the protocol language as subjective (ibid): first, each individual has her own 
language; second, each language is distinct from the physicalist language; third, 
once translated via rules to the physicalist language, protocol languages are taken 
to be sub-languages of physicalism. The question then is how to translate 
protocol languages into physicalism and that translatability is based on “the fact
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that each agent can discover inferential connections” between the two languages 
(ibid). Richardson notes that (ibid, p. 202): “Carnap now stresses that it is
simply a matter of fact about us that our protocol languages and the protocols 
that we actually endorse have the right structure for this process to go forward.” 
That is, “ordinal properties” of protocols that are “independent of the agent” 
provide the necessary connection between physicalist and protocol languages. 
There is a structural connection and, moreover, an empirical fact of the matter.
Richardson’s account now brings out a central tension in Carnap’s 
thought at this stage: a tension which leads to the distinction between 
psychological and logical aspects of analysis. Camap now argues that two 
empirical facts ground the possibility of “objective science” (ibid, p. 203): that 
agents discover inferential connections between protocols and that there is a fact 
of the matter of the structure of protocols that allows one to make those 
inferences. But if the epistemological problem, as assumed by Carnap, is to 
articulate the conditions for the possibility of empirical knowledge, it cannot 
suffice to appeal to empirical claims, which surely themselves must be in 
question. Since Carnap’s epistemology is logic-centered, it cannot appeal to 
empirical facts to ground it: “if we can simply cite empirical matters of fact as 
answers to epistemological questions, then any and all motivation for Carnap’s 
logical version of epistemology is lacking” (ibid, p. 204). The solution for 
Carnap, of course, is not to follow Quine. Rather, this problem indicates the 
ambiguous nature of the epistemological project from the Aufbau onward (ibid):
Throughout the work from the 1928 project to that of 1932, Carnap has 
been trying to combine the logical, the epistemological, and the 
psychological. The structure of experience is conceived of as a logical 
structure, and hence the philosopher can and must use the tools of modem 
logic. But this structure is also meant to provide the key to the answer to 
a general epistemological question about the possibility of objective 
knowledge.... Finally, it is meant to be a psychological structure and to 
be uncovered in the researches of psychology.
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The problem is that Carnap answers the epistemological question regarding the 
possibility of empirical knowledge by emphasizing the structure of experience. 
Epistemology then consists in the logical assessment of such structures to 
formulate the links between protocol languages and the physicalist language. But 
the structure of experience is known only empirically through psychology. And 
the question of the possibility of knowledge -  if epistemology is a logical 
discipline -  cannot be answered by appeal to empirical facts of psychology. 
According to Richardson (ibid, p. 205), the problem, Carnap comes to realize, is 
that to speak of the logical structure of experience is to conflate epistemology, 
logic and psychology.
Moreover, given Carnap’s distinction between formal and material modes 
of speech and his notion that epistemology is formal, empirical aspects of 
protocols -  i.e. reference to “experience” -  cannot be part of the epistemological 
programme. Epistemology must have nothing to say about experience and 
therefore cannot, by Carnap’s formulation, have anything to say about protocols. 
Carnap’s solution, according to Richardson is to drop the project of epistemology 
(ibid, p. 206): “the project of the reconstruction of the sciences in formal 
languages can and should go forward,” but it is not motivated (as it was in the 
Aufbau) by the epistemological concern of moving from “subjective experience 
to objective knowledge.” Further, Richardson writes (ibid): “In the end, he 
cannot succeed in finding a place for an epistemology separate from 
metaphysics, logic, and psychology. Metaphysics is rejected; psychology is left 
to the psychologists. What is left to the philosopher is the logic of science.” By 
the mid-1930s Camap sees the project of philosophy as the logical analysis of 
languages.
One thus can characterize two features of the development of Carnap’s 
thought. First, he responds to Neurath’s worries about the status of protocol 
sentences: he eventually drops reference to both a phenomenal language that falls 
outside physicalism and any reference to a subject. For Camap, this move both 
appears to address key worries that launched the public stage of the debate and to 
push the developing tension with respect to Carnap’s desire to distinguish
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between formal and material aspects of the structure of science. Second, he 
addresses those internal tensions within his programme indicating the way in 
which, given the ‘indispensible’ distinction between logical and psychological 
aspects of a logical empiricist methodology, he finds it necessary to reject 
epistemology altogether, which he takes to conflate the two.
Thus Richardson argues (ibid) that by the mid 1930s, Carnap had rejected 
epistemology “in no uncertain terms.” At the Paris Congress in 1935 Camap 
outlines three stages in the philosophical development discussed in the Vienna 
Circle: first was purging the language of science of metaphysics; second was the 
move to epistemology as the problem of how to account for the connection 
between subjective experience and intersubjective language. This “involved a 
rejection of the synthetic a priori and the consequent adoption of empiricism in 
epistemology.” Third is the move from epistemology to the logic of science 
(ibid).10
This third stage for Carnap (ibid) is to “purify” epistemology and classify 
its “constituent parts”: the psychological and the logical. According to Carnap, 
former projects of the Vienna Circle, and notably his own Aufbau can be 
characterized as having conflated these parts. The new characterization of his 
philosophical programme is the logic of science, which examines the logical 
connections among statements within adopted language forms. Philosophy for 
Carnap becomes the logical analysis of any specified language forms.
Camap had seen the success of logic in bringing clarity to languages. 
Now he wants to “develop a method for the construction of ... sentences about 
sentences” (Richardson ibid, p. 209). The point of the formal syntax language is 
to “provide a precise tool for defining important logical notions such as ‘logical 
consequence’ or ‘analyticity’ for the object languages under consideration” 
(ibid). Such definitions provide the means to distinguish between aspects of 
language that follow from the rules of the framework and content statements 
made with the framework (ibid).
10 See Camap (1936a, p. 36).
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Richardson states (ibid) that distinguishing between types of statements is 
necessary to understand the “rational structure of science.” It indicates which 
parts of scientific language give the logical framework for meaning within that 
framework. Once the framework has been adopted, one then can -  and only then 
-  examine content statements within the framework to see if they are supported 
by evidence, which itself will be, “sentences expressed in that language.” 
Richardson writes (ibid),
Thus on Carnap’s view, any question of the justification of (or the 
rationality of belief in) a sentence requires a linguistic system within 
which that sentence is couched and that provides the inferential relations 
requisite to make sense of claims about justification or confirmation.
Questions of the justification or confirmation of a statement thus are raised 
within an adopted framework. One can read Carnap’s conventionalist approach 
to the adoption of one framework or another: with respect to a class of basic 
observation statements, no question of the justification of the employment of 
those statements can arise until one specifies the framework which gives the 
rules of their employment. No epistemologically relevant question can arise for 
Carnap’s methodology regarding whether those are the ‘right’ statements to use 
as a starting point. However this does not amount to a naive scientism. For 
Camap, philosophy constitutes the analysis of the structural relations among 
observation statements and higher-level statements in the edifice of physicalism. 
Clarification can indicate the extent to which the constitutional system in 
question is pragmatically viable.
Moreover, Carnap’s principle of tolerance holds that the logic of science 
may use any number of object languages and not just the one actually employed 
in science. Richardson (ibid, p.209) cites Carnap’s account of that principle from 
Logical Syntax (1934b, p. 52):
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In logic there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own 
logic, i.e. his own form of language as he wishes. All that is required of 
him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, 
and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments.
Thus, Richardson (ibid, p. 210) writes that “the standpoint of a formal 
syntax language” is that from which one specifies employed syntactical rules, as 
opposed to rendering a philosophical argument. This highlights a key to the 
distinction employed in the present thesis between answering questions of 
knowledge with philosophical arguments and specifying a methodology with 
which to answer such questions. Given this distinction as demonstrated in 
Carnap, he may remain ambivalent about which syntax, or formal framework is 
employed. He merely requires that any such framework be specified. Richardson 
writes (ibid), “As such, the standpoint of logical syntax provides an infinite 
variety of new projects in logic for Carnap’s bold antimetaphysical and amoralist 
logicians.”
Thus there is no question of the “correctness” of a given logical language 
as assessed against some logic of the world. One may adopt any formal system 
desired so long as the syntax with which one makes claims is specified. The 
correctness of any claims made within a particular logical framework will be 
relative to the syntactical properties specific to it.11
11 One might wonder why one should not think that some structures will not 
admit concrete sentences, but nevertheless can correctly describe the world -  i.e. 
why say any will do rather than ‘more than one may work’? However, Carnap’s 
claim that any formal framework will do does not preclude the notion that formal 
frameworks absent content statements may correctly describe the world once 
applied to it: it is not clear to Camap at this stage the extent to which formal 
models might afford empirically adequate statements. But this locates the 
problem with which Camap is engaged: how far can formal developments 
fruitfully account for the world. The formal frameworks themselves might be 
developed in order to clarify less precise notions like “correctly describe the 
world.” The formal tools are enlisted to render such notions precise, but formal 
developments are not constrained by empirical considerations every step of the 
way.
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Tying this development to Carnap’s position in the protocol sentence 
debate around 1934, Richardson notes that it leads to certain features of the 
changes in Carnap’s position. First (ibid, p. 211) he has “dropped his attempt to 
express the motivating epistemological point of the relation between the protocol 
language and the language of science as showing the relation between the 
subjective and the objective.” Second (ibid),
There are no facts about the structure of experience to which the protocol 
language is meant to be true. Thus, in Carnap’s eyes, the protocol 
sentence debate is no longer a debate that involves any facts whatsoever. 
There is no fact about how the protocol language must look. Rather it is a 
matter of proposals for formal languages within which to cast the findings 
of the sciences and thereby render the question of the confirmational 
status of scientific claims a genuine question.
Thus (ibid) the structure of protocol sentences need not be constrained by 
“material investigations.” Carnap is sympathetic with Popper’s proposal merely 
to select a class of physicalist propositions for any given inquiry that may serve 
as protocol sentences. The question of the correctness of the propositions as 
related to the structure of material claims does not then arise for Camap. He 
considers there to be pragmatic advantages to it (ibid, p. 212): one need not 
specify a distinct protocol language outside the physicalist language and it is 
relatively simpler than Neurath’s rather more bewildering account. Richardson 
writes further (ibid, p. 213) that the,
reconstructive task cannot possibly wait for and rely on an empirical 
account of the structure of human experience (or the nature of the 
primitive language we first learn). The independent epistemological 
notion of experiential structure is nonsense; the empirical notion is beside 
the point.
Given Carnap’s position on the logic of science, Richardson (ibid) 
remarks that it was understood by some contemporaries to be an abandonment of
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empiricism, but for Camap the opposite was the case: “Only with his adoption of 
the syntactic perspective does Camap fully endorse ‘logical empiricism’ as an 
appropriate moniker for his view.” His assessment of syntactic languages is not 
based at all on empirical research, since only logico-mathematical resources “are 
of particular interest to him” as “he is principally interested in these languages as 
candidates for syntax languages, and only mathematical richness matters for 
that.” Empiricism for Camap thus is not a “thesis expressed in some language or 
other ... [nor] a universal constraint on the possibility of well-formed language. 
It is, rather, a proposal to use certain languages as the languages into which to 
cast empirical science.” Camap (1937, §27) writes, “As empiricists, we require 
that descriptive predicates are not to be admitted unless they have some 
connection with possible observations, a connection which has to be 
characterized in a suitable way” (in Richardson 1998, pp. 213,4).
The requirement for an empiricist notion of the suitable connection is that 
(ibid, p. 214) “primitive predicates of the language be observable.” An 
observable predicate is not a syntactical or semantic predicate, but is drawn from 
empirical science -  in particular in this case from behavioral psychology. 
‘Observable predicates’ provide “the starting point for confirmation -  the basic 
sentences of these predicates are accepted independently of any other sentences” 
(ibid). ‘Confirmation’, then, is defined “on the basis of observation” (ibid). A 
statement is confirmable when it can be reduced to a class of “observable 
predicates.”
Comparison and contrast of Neurath and Camap, 1932
The above discussion moves beyond current considerations of the protocol 
sentence debate in 1932. However, it indicates the direction that Camap moves 
and provides material to consider in examining both the points of convergence 
and the important distinctions between Camap and Neurath’s views. After the 
1931 Unity paper, Carnap had begun to move toward his construal of the logic of 
science.
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Friedman (2000, p. 45) notes that the 1932 discussions are precisely 
where one can locate the “fundamental difference” between Neurath and 
Carnap’s “antimetaphysical stance.” The debate itself develops into a question, 
not just of the status of protocols, but of the approach one takes to the problem of 
metaphysics. In Carnap’s case, one overcomes metaphysics by adopting (ibid), 
“the metalogical standpoint of logical syntax... relative to which a plurality of 
alternative forms for the total language of science is possible and legitimate.” For 
Neurath, one does this by not presuming to go outside the universal language of 
physicalism. For Carnap, the logic of science (ibid),
is a fully precise and rigorous subdiscipline of mathematical logic, where 
our task is not to describe actual linguistic behavior... but rather to 
investigate in a fully precise way the consequences of adopting one or 
another proposal for logical form of the total language of science.
However it is worth clarifying the way in which the views of Camap and 
Neurath can be distinguished for it is important to emphasize that though 
Friedman locates the ‘fundamental difference’ in their anti-metaphysical views, 
that distinction is not necessarily ‘fundamental’. That is, it is not a fundamental 
philosophical difference as much as a difference in the methodological approach 
to formulating a language of science purged of metaphysics. This, of course, will 
not be to obscure that there are indeed differences between Neurath’s naturalism 
and Carnap’s logic of science, but conceiving of their positions against the 
backdrop of Carnap’s emerging distinction between psychology and logic 
indicates that they may be viewed rather as different aspects of the same project. 
And this will inform an understanding of the subsequent trajectory of Hempel’s 
thought, since Friedman (ibid, p. 39) notes Hempel’s later ‘turn’ from Carnap’s 
project to some form of Neurath’s in his later life. Given the distinction at hand 
between such aspects, that turn may not seem so substantial, which provides a 
less disjointed account of the corpus of Hempel’s work.
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Thus, it is worth questioning Friedman’s brief rendering of the distinction 
between Camap and Neurath’s antimetaphysical stances. Friedman (ibid) 
suggests the following:
Carnap thus hopes to overcome traditional metaphysics by reinterpreting 
its ‘theses’ as logico-linguistic proposals. Neurath, by contrast, will have 
none of this reinterpretive project but aims rather at a complete dismissal 
of the metaphysical tradition on behalf of empirical science
Carnap’s proposal that the formal analysis of language would give form to any 
range of protocols might entail that ‘metaphysics’ can be eliminated by 
reinterpreting its theses in a formal framework. However, Carnap’s stance, as has 
been indicated, is far stronger, since he is skeptical that any such reinterpretive 
project is possible. Metaphysics can find no place in the language of physicalism, 
since its theses cannot be given a formal representation.
Moreover, it will be helpful to be clear on Neurath’s view, since he does 
not propose to dismiss metaphysics “on behalf’ of empirical science, as 
Friedman puts it, so much as to reject any notion that statements lying outside the 
language of physicalism (which gives the framework for meaning to the 
statements of empirical science) can be given meaning. As Neurath (1931b, p. 
59) writes, “No new world-view is contrasted with an old one, nor is some old 
world-view replaced by clarification of concepts, but rather now ‘science without 
a world-view’ confronts all world-views”. Which is to say, that one does not 
weigh the language of science against metaphysics and opt for empirical science, 
as might be understood from Friedman’s formulation. Rather, with the 
framework of physicalism one confronts world-views in order to determine 
whether they provide meaningful factual statements: one uses the framework to 
give an account of the possibility of knowledge -  knowledge that is understood 
relative to the framework within which it is couched.
It is possible now to provide some comparison and contrast between 
Carnap and Neurath’s views. This chapter began with a survey of Carnap’s
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Aufbau and follows with the dynamics of the protocol sentence debate. The 
traditional understanding of the point of the debate obscures what was at stake 
for its participants. The point of the debate was not to argue that scientific 
knowledge might be justified via logic on the basis of a reduction to an 
epistemically privileged language of subjective experience. Rather, the question 
centered on the very possibility of objective knowledge, given the starting point 
of statements about experience. Since the Aufbau provides the motivation for the 
discussions in the first place, it has been important to indicate the way in which 
the received view of its intentions misses the point of the epistemological project. 
The language of sensation is taken to be the conventional starting point for any 
empiricist epistemological project -  the question then being whether and the 
extent to which one can formulate connections between subjective experience 
and the intersubjective language of science.
This feature of the Aufbau indicates the following. The protocol sentence 
debate was not over the justification of the language of sensation as a foundation 
for knowledge: that role is taken based upon conventional decision. Neither was 
the debate over whether one may successfully reduce all of science to basic 
protocols -  this point was taken to be open and answerable based upon further 
research. Rather, the debate centered on how to formulate a methodology with 
which to account for knowledge -  on the form of conventionally adopted basic 
protocols that serve as a basis for science. It then raised the question about the 
extent to which tools of logic could connect protocols to non-protocols.
Neurath’s principal worry about protocols is that Carnap, in the Aufbau 
attempts to formulate two languages: the phenomenal (subjective experience) 
and the physicalist (intersubjective science). For Neurath there can be no 
meaningful sentences outside the language of physicalism and any such attempt 
smacks of traditional metaphysics, which must be rejected from the start. The 
form of protocols therefore cannot be taken to be independent from one 
individual phenomenal language to another and neither can they be distinct from 
the language of physicalism.
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For Neurath, an assessment of protocols begins with ordinary statements 
purged of metaphysics. Ordinary statements are always given to ambiguity: they 
consist of clusters of precise and imprecise elements (Ballungen). Scientific 
statements are ordinary statements that are rendered more precise, but all 
protocol statements consist of both scientific and ordinary elements, which 
means that no protocol can be primitive or atomic. Ambiguity always remains, 
but Carnap’s attempts to formulate protocols as precise atomic statements 
obscures this fact and thus is not a tenable means of building up from protocols 
to higher level scientific statements. Moreover, suggesting that protocols are 
primitive and atomic might give way to metaphysics since they could be taken to 
be irrefutable building blocks for science. There simply can be no irrefutable or 
unrevisable starting points for a language of science purged of metaphysics.
Carnap’s view demonstrates some significant changes that bring his view 
closer to Neurath’s (and in his mind puts some of their issues to rest). In the 
Aufbau he stated the domain of epistemology as the problem of moving from 
subjective experience to an intersubjective language. By 1931 after three years of 
discussions in the Vienna Circle meetings, he published (in the same issue as 
Neurath’s first publication on the issue) “The unity of science” wherein he comes 
to suggest that phenomenal languages can be viewed as distinct from 
physicalism, but as sub-languages within it. In 1932 he removes reference to the 
first-person point of view, indicating a further concession to Neurath. By the 
mid-1930s, Camap has given up on the epistemological project initiated by the 
Aufbau altogether, acknowledging that epistemology itself cannot be given an 
adequate formulation within physicalism, since it conflates its tasks with logic, 
psychology. He thus turns his view toward formulating a logic of science 
wherein the sole task of philosophy is the logical clarification of concepts of any 
language. The class of statements consisting in the language under consideration 
is given by behavioral psychologists.
Neurath’s naturalism holds that any protocol statement must include a 
broader context of the agent’s role in formulating such a statement. There can be 
no precise atomic statements because any statement within the language of
62
physicalism cannot be given meaning without any such inclusion. This leads to 
his persistent worry about Carnap’s project of the logical clarification of any 
languages on the grounds that any such methodological approach might be 
misunderstood to provide some irrefutable building blocks to the edifice of 
science. Science for Neurath can never be purged of imprecision and to suggest 
such a notion that the building blocks of science might be conceived as primitive 
gives way to giving some statements unwarranted status in the system of science. 
Furthermore, purely logical statements can never say anything about the world: 
thus a logically reconstructed protocol can never be about statements made in 
science. It is only when the context of a perceiver is introduced with all its 
imprecision that one can be talking about scientific statements.
Carnap’s logic of science on the other hand takes the task of philosophy 
as the logical analysis of language. His principal of tolerance allows for the 
presentation of various forms of protocol sentences that can be assessed based on 
pragmatic considerations. He takes it as an open question, to be determined 
through further inquiry, which system one intends to take up. Moreover his 
emerging distinction between material and formal modes of speech and the 
subsequent psychological/logical distinction wherein the division does not fall 
within factual statements -  but between the factual and formal, suggests that the 
developing division between them breaks down into different aspects of inquiry 
into the language of science.
Lest this point be taken to miss the significance of their differences it can 
be made more fully in the discussion on their views of Tarski’s theory of truth in 
the next chapter. However for the point of the present intentions, one may say 
that on the face of it, their differences might be understood to be getting 
evermore deeply entrenched -  Neurath continued to criticize Carnap’s view 
throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s. Nevertheless, as will be seen below, the 
emerging distinction articulated by Carnap regarding the psychological and 
logical aspects of the analysis of science necessitates and vindicates their two 
methodological approaches to developing an adequate account of science.
63
The next chapter will serve to introduce Hempel into the discussion. 
Schlick’s contribution to the debate (1934) will remind readers that the Vienna 
Circle was not unified on what was at stake for their interests. In particular he 
worries that the entire protocol sentence debate obscures what is really at issue: 
the foundations of scientific knowledge. He thus raises the question of the 
connection between language and the world. Hempel (1935) marks his first 
publication and his response to Schlick’s objections. Notably it is a paper about 
which Hempel came to hold some regret.
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Chapter Three: Truth and confirmation: Carnap’s distinction in the 
protocol sentence debate
In 1935, Hempel weighed in on the protocol sentence debate, attempting to 
synthesize Camap and Neurath’s respective positions. Two difficulties with 
particular historical readings of the development of Hempel’s thought should be 
considered. First, Richard Jefferey suggests that Hempel regretted his 1935 
publication because of the scom poured over it by Russell (1940). Second, 
Friedman (2000) notes that he saw Hempel’s last two public statements wherein 
he “joyfully described his own conversion from the point of view of Camapian 
‘explication’ or ‘rational reconstruction’ to the point of view of Kuhnian 
historical sociocultural naturalism as a return to Neurath’s original of the 
ineliminable necessity of ‘Ballungen’” (p. 45). Neither of these views are 
intended to amount to developed philosophical arguments and it is surely the 
case Hempel both regretted his 1935 paper (he redresses his [1935] reading 
nearly 50 years later in Hempel [1983]) and moved from Carnapian analysis to 
something more akin to Neurathian historico-sociological naturalism. However, 
the important question is, how ought philosophers understand this regret and this 
move?
The worry is that, though Jeffrey and Friedman make minor points, they 
indicate a subsequent disjointed trajectory of Hempel’s thought. That disjointed 
trajectory could be understood to vindicate the attitude that Hempel’s philosophy 
of science, though an important historical moment in the development of 20th 
century philosophy, is not a resource to be taken seriously in contemporary 
philosophical questions. Since a key point of this thesis is to indicate, conversely, 
that an appropriate understanding of Hempel’s thought may fruitfully change the 
way in which certain contemporary philosophical questions are posed, and
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consequently what sorts of answers one might expect, it will be helpful to 
suggest the more consistent development from the protocol sentence debate to 
Hempel’s D-N account of explanation.
Rendering Hempel’s view as such will afford the means to reformulate 
the problem confronting the logical empiricists. As has been discussed, the 
protocol sentence debate arose over the status and form of protocol sentences. 
Protocols are adopted by a conventional decision, are revisable and are taken as a 
starting point from which to analyze the language of science. Early on, the 
principal difference between Camap and Neurath is, roughly, that protocols are 
either basic, atomic and primitive for the former or consist of Ballungen for the 
latter- they are ever-reducible and always contain ambiguous concepts. Initially 
the distinction Camap sought was between protocol sentences and non-protocol 
sentences: that the former could be neatly specified and provide the building 
blocks for the edifice of science which consists of both basic sentences and non- 
basic sentences derivable from them. Throughout the protocol sentence debate, 
that distinction became less and less formulable until by the mid 1930s Camap 
had moved his view closer to Neurath’s in terms of the character of protocol 
sentences. One consequence was that protocols themselves were understood to 
be no different in status from any other statement in science.
Yet Carnap’s distinction between formal and material modes appears to 
be emerging as entirely necessary for his (and arguably Neurath’s as well) 
philosophy of science. Once he embraces Tarski’s theory of truth the distinction 
comes to be drawn between factual statements and their formal structure. 
Neurath’s worry with Carnap’s logic of science then comes to be whether any 
such formalization of a factual statement might come to be understood as 
somehow immutable and an unrevisable foundation for factual statements. 
Furthermore, the question is whether one can bridge the divide between logic and 
observation -  whether formalizations can be linked adequately to empirical 
observation. Neurath’s metaphysical worries aside, one may be able to 
reformulate what becomes the problem to be dealt with once the strict distinction 
between logic and psychology is assumed. How can a formalization of the
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structure of factual statements have any connection to a particular factual 
statement? How can Carnap’s logic of science say anything about empirical 
science? If one takes the formal features of a protocol sentence as a starting 
point, how can those formal features logically connect to the empirical 
statements to which they are intended to refer? Or put another way, how can an 
idealized representation of a statement be about an actual statement? These 
appear to be the relevant questions once one avoids conflating factual statements 
with their logical features (which Carnap understood much Vienna Circle 
philosophy to have done). They present a reformulated understanding of the 
philosophical problem confronting logical empiricism by the late 1930s. And 
they provide a launch point from which to understand the point of Hempel’s 
subsequently developed D-N account of explanation.
The next chapter addresses Jeffrey and Friedman’s remarks and the 
question of whether the protocol sentence debate can find resolve (in Hempel’s 
work in particular). The present chapter looks at Schlick’s reply to Neurath in 
1934 and Hempel’s emergence into the public form of the debate. It will show 
that the Vienna Circle was by no means in agreement about what was at issue in 
the problem of scientific knowledge. Moreover it will indicate just what the 
problem was for Hempel’s (1935) rendering of the issue. It considers Russell’s 
1940 critique of what he calls the Neurath/Hempel view, suggesting that Russell 
really misses a key point of the protocol sentence debate and the views that 
emerged from it. Moreover, this chapter examines the role of Tarski’s theory of 
truth and the way in which that motivates, for the left wing of the Vienna Circle, 
Carnap’s strict distinction between the logical and psychological that is arguably 
shared by Camap, Neurath and Hempel toward the end of the 1930s. This 
analysis will suggest the context within which to formulate the present reading of 
Hempel’s D-N account of science in the final chapter.
Schlick’s criticism of the protocol sentence debate and Hempel’s response
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Schlick’s response in 1934 to the protocol sentence debate indicates that the 
Vienna Circle was by no means unified over what was at stake in the debate and 
the problem of scientific knowledge more generally. Schlick holds that the 
dispute itself obscures what is crucial in the problem scientific knowledge, 
arguing that it fails to articulate some foundation in truth or certainty. The 
problem with the way the left wing of the circle addresses the issue is that their 
view amounts to a coherence theory of truth that would allow any fairy tale that 
exhibits a coherence of its statements the same status of alleged knowledge 
produced in science.1
Friedman (2000, p. 46) writes that Schlick (1934) worries that the 
Neurath/Carnap conception leads to a coherence theory of truth, the problem for 
which is that any logically consistent set of sentences can stand equally as a 
candidate for a ‘true’ set of sentences. He argues that empirical science requires 
some fixed statements rooted in immediate experience. Otherwise statements 
deemed true in science that nevertheless contradict one’s own view, would have 
to be accepted over more certain subjective experience. However, argues Schlick 
(ibid, p. 379), “It is theoretically conceivable that the statements made by 
everyone else about the world should be in no way confirmed by my own 
observations.”
Schlick (ibid, p. 370) writes that radical empiricism considers the 
function and structure of protocol propositions as “the ultimate ground of 
knowledge.” Originally the notion, ‘protocol propositions’ meant basic factual 
propositions of the simplest form and on which more complex propositions could 
be based. If it is possible to produce (ibid) “raw facts quite purely in ‘protocol 
propositions’, then the latter seem to be the absolutely indubitable starting-points 
of all knowledge.” However, inquiring after the foundation of knowledge is to 
inquire after a criterion of truth (ibid). Protocol propositions thus are meant to be 
able to provide a set of basic foundation points from which to construct the 
language of science, while the truth of these propositions could provide a 
“yardstick” by which to measure the truth of all other propositions. But
1 For a discussion on and defense of Schlick’s position, see Oberdan (1996).
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according to the “Neurath camp,” this yardstick is itself relative (ibid): “And that 
view with its consequences has been commended, also, as an eviction of the last 
remnant of ‘absolutism’ from philosophy.” The problem is that one is left with a 
coherence theory of truth (ibid, p. 375), in which propositions derive their ‘truth’ 
status in their “mutual agreement ... with one another.” Schlick argues this 
“doctrine is wholly untenable” because non-contradiction among propositions 
determining truth is inadequate as an account of material truth (ibid, p. 376).
Schlick argues, conversely, that when one assents to knowledge claims in 
history or the natural sciences, this is done based not on the coherence of the 
statements in question with a broader body of statements, but because “we know 
precisely in what way such factual statements ordinarily come to be made, and 
this way inspires our confidence” (ibid, p. 378). We consequently order the 
propositions according to their origin. One should always test the truth of a world 
picture against one’s own experience: “What I see, I see!” (ibid, p. 380). 
Immediate experience -  ‘affirmations’ in Schlick’s terminology -  is afforded 
prime status among propositions.
Friedman (2000, p. 46) remarks that Neurath (1934) is a response to 
Schlick in which he rejects any demand for “fixed and absolutely certain 
assertions against which all others are to be tested”; he rejects any talk of 
“affirmations,” or a comparison of statements with notions like “experience” or 
“reality” on the grounds that these concepts simply cannot be given any 
meaningful formulation. For Neurath, unified science necessarily is a 
“comparison, and consequent mutual adjustment, involving sentences with one 
another” (Friedman, 2000, p. 46). According to Friedman (ibid, p. 47), for 
Neurath all meaningful terminology is historically and sociologically conditioned 
such that any use of terms needs to be fleshed out according to how they are 
understood at their point of application. For example, the terms “sentence” or 
“language” are not compared with “reality,” but need to be understood against 
the system of statements in which they have been employed. Practical constraints 
then limit the options of alternate logically consistent systems, which for Neurath 
indicates that Schlick’s problem of mere logical coherence of a system does not
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arise: protocols are established in scientific practice, which, it will be seen, 
suggests a notion of causality underlying Neurath’s conception. However any 
such notion of causality is pragmatic and not philosophical for Neurath. This can 
be understood as a result of Neurath’s view on the limits of methodology. 
Certainly one would want indubitable foundations for scientific knowledge, but 
Neurath rejects the notion that any such foundation is available. Simply 
appealing to notions of ‘truth’, ‘subjective experience’, or ‘reality’ cannot serve 
its task because these terms, for Neurath, resist any meaningful interpretation. 
This does not amount to faulty formulation of the foundations of knowledge, but 
is indicative of Neurath’s skepticism regarding the extent to which one can 
establish certain or indubitable foundations: it is the state of human knowledge 
and the question surrounds not how to change that state, but how to proceed with 
a positive account of the structure of science in light of limits restricting human 
knowledge.
Lest one misread the orientation of Neurath’s view, it should be clarified 
that he does not presume to impose limits on scientific knowledge. His is not a 
restrictive programme lacking in creativity. Rather, he intends to be clear about 
what exactly the expansion of scientific knowledge amounts to. And for Neurath, 
the growth of knowledge points to the ever-expanding domain of physicalism, 
which consists, in widest sense, in everything that can be meaningfully asserted 
about ‘reality’. Suggesting that somehow the advancement of science 
underwrites claims to capturing reality is fiction and a vestige of what he takes to 
be the conceptual bonds of theology and meaningless metaphysics.2 Human 
knowledge is bound by certain limits. The wider concern of the protocol sentence 
debate is about how to formulate an empirically grounded and systematic 
methodology employed in science to characterize the nature and limits of that 
knowledge.
However Friedman (ibid) argues that Schlick has rejected “such a 
historico-sociological perspective on science” since he would never be willing to
2 The point here for Neurath is to emphasize science as affording the scope of 
‘everything that can be meaningfully asserted’, rather than emphasizing it as 
‘capturing reality’.
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give up his own observations in light of a radically different logically consistent 
set of sentences adopted by a given community of scientists. Friedman (ibid) 
writes,
And it is in this essentially individualistic conception of science, 
according to which all demands of intersubjectivity can, at least in 
principle, be sacrificed on behalf of one’s ‘own’ subjective experience, 
that Schlick’s version of ‘empiricism’ fundamentally diverges from both 
Neurath’s sociological naturalism and Carnap’s logico-linguistic 
pluralism.
Schlick’s worries could be adapted into the Neurath/Hempel framework. 
Employing the body of scientific statements -  that Neurath holds is adopted for 
practical reasons -  could be backed by the fact that it does not require individuals 
within the scientific community to reject its observations (or more precisely 
statements regarding those observations). As will be indicated below, this 
effectively amounts to the way Hempel replies to Schlick’s criticism: that as a 
matter of empirical fact, individuals are not forced to sacrifice their own 
affirmations. Of course, since this is a foundational question, Schlick’s worry is 
that the Neurath view allows for the possibility that it can.
From Schick’s perspective, of course, it would not be possible to 
incorporate his view into the Neurath/Hempel framework since it is precisely 
one’s individual experience that provides the foundation for a developing system 
of science. However, given the Neurath/Hempel view that statements are 
checked only against statements, Schlick’s position could be interpreted in their 
terms as follows: one may hold up one’s statements regarding personal 
experience against the larger body of physicalistic statements to determine the 
way in which they relate to that body. If one’s own experience does not line up 
with that larger body, it is of course possible -  in principle -  to reject the current 
body of scientific statements, but it may be more prudent to consider that one’s 
own claims regarding personal experience are problematic. This point was
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illustrated in the example in the previous chapter of the man whose idyllic life 
unravels in a day.
A further illustration might prove helpful. A relatively recent popular 
movie series echoes a classic philosophical thought experiment. “The Matrix” 
serves as a similar, but more developed example of Putnam’s brain, in a vat 
thought experiment.3 One principal difference between the two is that Putnam’s 
example is meant to illustrate that we cannot determine the veracity of our 
experiences, since we may be a brain in a vat, stimulated by various probes in a 
scientist’s laboratory. Putnam’s example likewise echoes the classic Cartesian 
doubt about whether our experiences are authentic or whether we are being 
deceived by an evil demon. The movie itself presents pop-philosophical 
questions regarding authenticity and identity. However it also presents for 
current consideration an example to illustrate a Neurathian response to Schlick’s 
critique. The movie starts from the assumption that the matrix is a computer- 
simulated world in which humans experience their lives. They are, in ‘reality’, 
being farmed by a race of computers for their energy. Neo, the protagonist of the 
story is offered a choice to be removed from the matrix and live an authentic 
existence in reality or go back to his life in the matrix with his memory erased of 
the experience of his exciting offer. His choice is to take the green pill to escape 
the matrix or a blue one to return.
Now the movie presupposes that Neo is presented a choice over 
authenticity or constructed experiences. However, and this ties now to the 
question of the protocol sentence debate, Neurath would argue that there is no 
such position outside the scenario in which the protagonist finds himself from 
which to make such a decision. Neo has no position outside his set of 
experiences in which his life consists. He sits in a room across from the Laurence 
Fishburne character. He is presented two pills. The movie gives this as a choice 
between a real and fabricated set of experiences. However, what more does the 
character have to go on to base his decision other than precisely the experiences 
he has had up to that point? Those subjective experiences include his alleged life
3 See Putnam, H. (1982).
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in the matrix and the very experience of being presented the choice to leave it. In 
the story the context presupposes a standpoint from outside his own experience 
by which to make the choice. But it is precisely that standpoint to which he has 
no access. In Putnam’s example, the brain in a vat can be understood, in part, to 
indicate epistemological worries about using experience as a basis for 
knowledge. In the movie’s rather more pedestrian motives, it is about human 
authentic existence. For the present purposes, it indicates the way in which one 
can argue that there can be no reference to any world outside the language of 
science (which functions as a systematic set of statements about our experiences) 
by which to make a decision between authenticity and fabrication. The decision, 
according to Neurath, falls to convention.
One should clarify of course, that the example as presented has referred 
to one’s ‘experience’ in a subjective sense. Neurath, as has been indicated, can 
find no way meaningfully to formulate ‘subjective’ notions of experience. So to 
be more precise the example should be construed as “Neo has been presented 
with a choice between pills.” What is at stake according to a physicalist 
formulation is that Neo cannot make a decision about outcomes of the pills based 
on any account outside the framework of statements with which he, or anyone 
else, can formulate an account of this experience. Moreover, there is no 
systematic way for him to make the choice between authentic and inauthentic 
existence because there is nothing in the system of statements about the world 
that would afford him a criterion to determine what is authentic and what is not. 
To be cynical, the green pill, after all, offers him escape from his mundane world 
of nine-to-five computer programming into one where he plays a Christ figure 
saving all of humanity, beloved by a beautiful action-engaged woman and 
respected and admired by his male colleagues. If anything, the premise sounds 
like a comic-book lover’s dream.
Thus, a Neurathian reply to Schlick might be that there is no criterion 
outside the language of physicalism with which to determine the authenticity of 
one’s own experience. Schlick of course would appeal to the immediacy of the 
experience itself, but that immediacy can only be understood in light of the
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framework with which the broader community of scientists operates. ‘Immediate 
experience’ cannot tell Neo whether his normal life or his potential life as a 
Christ-figure is ‘true’ because that experience gains meaning only in the 
intersubjective realm of the language comprising physicalism (even as a rejection 
of the conclusions of that language -  any such rejection raises the question of 
how to interpret the distinction between one’s own experience and that described 
in the statements of physicalism, which echoes the claims Putnam used the brain- 
in-a-vat example to make vivid.)
Hempel (1935) is his response to Schlick. Friedman (2000, p. 47) notes 
that it is a “hqrriedly condensed” version of a talk Hempel gave at the request of 
Susan Stebbing in London. It marks his entrance into the public forum of the 
debate and proves problematic within the canon of his thought. Clarifying the 
problem indicates how to understand the development of his subsequent thought 
and the overall nature of the trajectory of his body of work. Hempel’s paper 
agrees with Schlick’s coherence characterization of Camap and Neurath’s theory 
of truth, though he notes that it is a coherence theory of a restrained sort. He 
traces the development of Vienna Circle discussions away from the 
correspondence theory of truth in the Tractatus to a coherence theory based upon 
Carnap’s emerging distinction between material and formal modes of speech, 
thereby indicating that Schlick’s worries, which are provided in the material 
mode of speech, are pseudo problems.
Hempel (1935, p. 9) asserts that the Camap/Neurath position amounts to 
a coherence theory, but of a “restrained” sort. And he (ibid) appeals to Carnap’s 
distinction between material and formal modes (logic of science) of speech as an 
“explicit statement... of the coherence theory of truth.” Given this distinction 
between modes of speech, the logic of science is to be differentiated from 
empirical science. The former consists in statements about formal features of 
scientific statements -  about “certain properties and relations of scientific 
propositions only” -  thereby affording a crude concept of truth as the “sufficient 
agreement between the system of acknowledged protocol-statements and the 
logical consequences which may be deduced from the statement and other
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statements which are already adopted” (ibid). Empirical science consists of 
statements in the material mode of speech. These latter statements comprise the 
domain of empirical inquiry, while the logic of science makes assertions 
regarding the formal structure of those statements and their relations to one 
another. The logic of science thus exhibits an ambivalence regarding questions of 
the truth of empirical statements except insofar as may be characterized in the 
formal mode of speech. Which is to say that questions of the truth of statements 
are not answered by appeal to statements corresponding to the ‘world’, but by 
their logical relations to the body of statements (protocol and other) against 
which the question of truth is raised.
Hempel replies to Schlick’s main worry over mutually incompatible, yet 
internally, logically consistent (“true”) systems of sentences in science -  which 
Friedman notes amounts to an attempt to synthesize Carnap and Neurath’s 
respective views. Hempel (1935, p. 18) writes that there is “no logical difference 
between ... two compared systems.” The difference is “an empirical one” (ibid). 
As an empirical fact, protocols generated by various scientists contribute to a set 
of coherent statements and theories. Certain protocols, as an empirical fact, are 
called ‘true’ insofar as they are “sufficiently supported by that system of actually 
adopted protocol statements” (ibid).
Hempel (ibid) thus classifies, roughly, Schlick and Neurath as advocating 
a correspondence theory of truth and a coherence theory of truth, respectively. 
For the former, truth arises from a correspondence between statements and facts 
(or “reality”). For the latter, truth [ibid] “is a possible property of a whole system 
of statements (i.e., a certain conformity of statements with each other)”; worries 
about an absolute foundation for truth amount to pseudo problems -  as discussed 
below.
Hempel then indicates the way in which the logical positivists developed 
their theory out of the correspondence notion in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1922). 
That text marks the “logical and historical starting point” of discussions in the 
Vienna Circle (Hempel, 1935, p. 10); it is “characterized by a correspondence
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theory of truth.”4 A statement is called ‘true’ in the Tractatus if “the fact or state 
of affairs expressed by it exists.” The theory of facts takes facts of the world “to 
consist ultimately of certain kinds of elementary facts [atomic facts] which are 
not further reducible to other ones.” The logical form of molecular facts, which 
are made up of atomic facts “reflects the formal structure of facts,” so that the 
existence of molecular facts depends on the existence of its atomic constituents -  
and likewise the truth or falsity of such facts. “That is to say: each statement is 
conceived to be a truth-function of the atomic statements” (ibid).
Hempel remarks that early on the Vienna Circle adopted Wittgenstein’s 
view (ibid), but Neurath, and shortly after, Camap came to challenge the 
correspondence theory of truth. The chasm between theory and facts, or scientific 
statements and some ‘reality’ renders the formulability of that ‘reality’ 
impossible. For Neurath one can only compare statements with other statements, 
which for Hempel (ibid, p. 11) implies a coherence theory.
The first stage in the development of Vienna Circle thought away from 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus was to reformulate atomic facts as protocol statements. 
This represents the notion that the domain of scientific discourse does not extend 
past statements to some notion of the ‘world’ or the ‘real’. The second stage 
(ibid, p. 11-12) was to reformulate the “formal structure of scientific statements.” 
For Wittgenstein, “laws of nature” were not statements, since they cannot be 
“entirely verified,” but give only instructions for establishing meaningful 
statements. Carnap considered Wittgenstein’s criterion for meaningful statements 
too narrow, recognizing that scientific language includes empirical laws and 
singular statements, the combination with which one may derive predictions. 
Empirical laws are “general implicative statements” and are tested through an 
examination of “singular consequences.” However, since one can derive an 
infinite number of singular statements from a general law, and therefore the law 
cannot be fully verified, the latter cannot be taken to be a function of the former 
(in the way the molecular facts are taken to be a function of atomic ones). Rather
4 The protocol sentence debate emerged over discussions of Carnap’s Aufbau, but 
as Hempel notes here, the early Vienna Circle meetings discussed Wittgenstein, 
among others.
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(ibid) it “has in relation to [singular statements] the character of a hypothesis” 
Thus because one cannot deduce a general law from a finite set of singular 
sentences -  each set “allows an infinite series of hypotheses” -  the selection of 
hypotheses falls to a conventional decision (ibid).
Moreover, singular statements themselves exhibit the character of 
hypotheses: “even the singular statements, which we regard as true, depend upon 
which of the formally possible systems we choose” (ibid, p. 13). That 
conventional choice is “logically arbitrary,” but is “practically restricted by 
psychological and sociological factors” -  a point made by Neurath. Thus, since 
singular statements themselves are seen to be hypotheses based upon 
conventional decisions, rather than truth-giving atomic sentences, one cannot 
determine the truth of a statement based on the correspondence theory advocated 
in the Tractatus.
Thus there is a relaxation of the concept of truth: “In science a statement 
is adopted as true if it is sufficiently supported by protocol statements” (ibid, p. 
13). At this stage, he remarks that there is still agreement between the Vienna 
Circle view and that of Wittgenstein, which is “the principle of reducing the test 
of each statement to a certain kind of comparison between the statement in 
question and a certain class of basic propositions which are conceived to be 
ultimate and not to admit of any doubt.” This principle itself is rejected 
subsequently since one can always reject a protocol statement. He writes further 
(ibid, p. 14), “there may be attached to any empirical statement a chain of testing 
steps in which there is no absolute last link. It depends upon our decision when 
to break off the testing process....” Science is not likened to a pyramid of 
knowledge wherein all concepts are reducible to a set of basic propositions, but 
to a boat in Neurath’s famous metaphor. Thus, the effective synthesis of 
Carnap’s and Neurath’s respective views is that protocol statements are always 
revisable, determined based on a decision and are understood as historico- 
sociologically determined. Their coherent ‘fit’ within the broader intersubjective 
system of protocol and non-protocol statements -  that is, their acceptance as
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‘true’ -  is clarified by the logical explication of the form and relations among 
statements.
Hempel employs Carnap’s distinction between formal and material 
modes of speech to suggest that Schlick’s worries amount to pseudo problems. 
According to Hempel (ibid, p. 16), Schlick argues that abandoning the notion 
that certain basic statements remain “unalterable,” leads to relativism by 
depriving science of “the idea of an absolute ground of knowledge.” Hempel’s 
reply is that “syntactical theory of scientific verification” cannot provide an 
account of anything that does not exist within its system: “And indeed, nowhere 
in science will one find a criterion of absolute unquestionable truth.” Thus in 
order to be meaningful, propositions must be formulated within the logic of 
science -  that is, in the formal mode of speech, but “absolute truth” can not be so 
formulated and must be understood to be meaningless. Schlick’s worries are thus 
pseudo problems. Any degree of certainty will require one to look to the set of 
selected protocol statements, but those statements are revisable. The argument 
that one must start from “absolute truth” as a criterion therefore “starts from a 
false presupposition.”
According to Hempel, Schlick’s principal objection (ibid, p. 17) is that in 
abandoning a notion of an absolute starting point, one may construct any number 
of systems of cohering statements: “For any fairy tale there may be constructed a 
system of protocol statements by which it would be sufficiently supported; but 
we call the fairy tale false and the statements of empirical science true, though 
both comply with that formal criterion.” The problem then is how to distinguish 
between true and false protocol sentences. For Carnap and Neurath there is no 
formal way to make this distinction, but, according to Hempel, there is an 
empirical one. Protocols attributed the status of ‘true’ are those that are accepted 
as true in practice and there is “fortunately” widespread agreement among 
scientists about what is empirically accepted as true. “True” protocol sentences 
are those that are accepted by convention (ibid). He writes (ibid, p. 19) that the 
“evolution of the concept of truth we considered is intimately allied to a change 
of view concerning the logical function of protocol statements.”
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However, Hempel’s argument is factually problematic. Neither Carnap, 
nor Neurath endorsed a strict coherence theory of truth. Moreover it came to be 
understood that this discussion of truth conflated formal properties of a notion of 
truth with a criterion of acceptance of statements within the language of science.
Hempel redresses a problem
The problems in Hempel (1935) were significant enough that he redressed the 
issue almost fifty years later (Hempel 1983, p. 181). In particular, the problem 
dealt with is “the question under which conditions -  given which reasons -  
should we accept empirical statements, especially the statements of the empirical 
sciences.” And that problem is addressed, in part, by emphasizing the 
indispensability of the distinction between truth and acceptance -  a distinction 
Hempel obscured in his (1935).
Hempel (1983) outlines the views of Schlick and Neurath, attempting to 
indicate how their respective positions are both informed by a causal element to 
the “advancement of protocols” -  that is, protocols are advanced based on 
experience. Though it retraces some features of the debate already covered 
above, it will be prudent to cover the development of his argument. Neurath held 
a roughly coherence theory of acceptance, but his theory neither pertained to a 
definition of truth, nor precluded the source of protocols as lying outside the 
edifice of science. It allows that experience plays a role in the production of 
protocol sentences. This feature renders Neurath’s view -  given appropriate 
clarifications regarding whether he provided a theory of truth or one of 
acceptance -  immune to Schlick’s charge that he relied exclusively on coherence 
with the rest of that which is accepted by science for the admissibility of basic 
observations.
Schlick and Neurath are empiricists (ibid, p. 182): knowledge comes 
from experience, based on the “immediately given. This sets the limit for the
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content of legitimate science.” Hempel notes that this statement is “vague and 
programmatic” and Schlick and Neurath give two different interpretations of that 
principle. The disagreement can be discovered in Schlick (1934) and Neurath 
(1934), but (Hempel 1983, p. 183) writes, “the disagreement between these two 
basic approaches has not been clearly resolved.”
Schlick sought an account of facts rooted in certainty or truth. The 
criterion of truth (ibid) “referred to the data of immediate experience.” One 
deduces (with a hypothetico-deductive model of testing) consequences from 
hypotheses. Deductions yield statements about observable events that can be 
checked against results in relevant experiments, “like the position of the indicator 
on a measurement instrument or the change in color in some chemical reaction.” 
Conflict between hypothetical deductions and “directly advanced observation 
sentences” indicates the deduction is falsified. Agreement yields a partial 
confirmation, though not verification.
Since Schlick (1934, p. 370) is looking for a criterion of truth or falsity of 
observation sentences Hempel (ibid, p. 183) writes, “the question suggests itself 
whether the testing of scientific hypotheses can be founded on a certain class of 
observation sentences that, once advanced, were immediately certain” 
Determining this class of sentences provides a basis on which to have all other 
scientific statements agree. Error may always be present, but one may order 
sentences based on a level of certainty. The most certain of these would form a 
subclass and are called ‘affirmations’ by Schlick: they express individual 
perceptions or experiences. For Schlick, affirmations are not protocol sentences, 
which can be written down. The latter have the status of hypotheses, while the 
former motivate the formulation of them. Affirmations provide the foundations 
of protocols (Hempel 1983, pp. 185-6): the question of foundations will 
transform to affirmations and the (Schlick 1934, p. 387), “unshakeable points of 
contact between knowledge and reality.”
Hempel (1983, p. 186) argues that Schlick’s view conflates “two 
incompatible views of ‘affirmations’.” First, he takes them to be observation
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sentences and attempts to justify the notion that they are true by virtue of their 
being one’s immediate experience. However, second, he argues that they cannot 
be written down or put into words, which makes it difficult to grasp how they 
could be construed as true or false. An affirmation in this sense is a 
“psychological event,” but either “it occurs or it does not.” There is no sense in 
which the event can be said to be true or false. Hempel (ibid) notes that such an 
event can play a “causal” role in the expression of a protocol sentence.
Hempel writes that Neurath asserts that one never tests scientific 
statements against facts or the “experiences,” but against other statements, which 
stems from his stance against metaphysics (ibid, p. 187): notions like “reality” 
lead to “subjectless pseudoproblems.” Neurath’s empiricism then is that pursuing 
knowledge is not that of a certain link between knowledge and reality, but a 
pursuit of “agreement between the statements of science and as many protocol 
sentences as possible” (ibid). Though protocol sentences are the basis for testing 
empirical statements, all accepted statements, protocol and non-protocol alike, 
are subject to revision. Non-protocol sentences are revisable on the basis of 
Duhem’s thesis: no hypothesis can be tested in isolation. Hempel (ibid, p. 189) 
notes that Neurath takes this further in regards to protocol sentences themselves, 
which are revisable and have the status of hypotheses as well. This amounts to 
Neurath’s holism, which Hempel notes (ibid), “even if he did not always 
formulate or justify it with the utmost precision ... by now has pretty much 
succeeded.... To an individual scientific hypothesis, we can assign neither 
unequivocal testing methods nor a definite empirical content.”
According to Hempel (ibid, p. 190), Schlick took Neurath’s to be a 
coherence view, which can amount merely to “logical consistency.” However, 
logical consistency is not the sole criterion for scientific acceptability. Neurath’s 
version of empiricism plays a role -  namely that non-protocol sentences must be 
in agreement with as many protocols (that is, with as many observation 
statements) as possible. Thus one accepts a non-protocol sentence based on the 
scope of agreement with accepted protocols. Simplicity may also play a role. 
Schlick’s worry, as mentioned, is that Neurath’s view admits the possibility of a
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fairy tale as much as scientific claims rooted in observations, but Schlick’s worry 
would appear to be unfounded given that Neurath would argue acceptance of a 
class of scientific observations would agree with a larger class of accepted 
protocols.
Though Neurath’s additional criteria indicate the way Schlick’s worry is 
misguided, his view nevertheless admits of many different sets of systems of 
hypotheses that are equally acceptable. For Neurath this indicates the role of 
decisions within the scientific community: at some level there is no systematic 
way to determine which system of hypotheses to adopt. Moreover, Hempel (ibid) 
notes in Neurathian fashion, that there is no “one true picture of the world.”
Neurath characterizes sentences as true, not in virtue of their agreement 
with facts, but when they can be incorporated into the larger body of scientific 
statements. Hempel notes that this confuses the semantic notion ‘truth’ with the 
epistemological notion ‘acceptability’. That is, a statement is not ‘true’ by virtue 
of its agreement with a body of statements, but it is ‘acceptable’. Neurath put 
forward his account in response to a correspondence notion of truth, but ‘true’ 
seems to have been a term he rather accepted reticently and felt that the business 
of inquiring after scientific knowledge could have been carried on without it. 
Hempel notes that logical positivists considered the term “either superfluous or 
metaphysical.” That view changed, he (ibid) notes, upon the consideration of 
Tarski’s theory of truth.
Hempel argues that the differences between the semantic notion of truth 
and epistemological notion of acceptability are as follows (ibid, p. 192). First, a 
sentence is true or false “timelessly” and “independent of whether it will ever be 
tested or not.” Confirmation or acceptance of that sentence depends upon 
existing test results at any given time; confirmation and acceptance can thus 
change. Second, true sentences may in principle not be acceptable, or only 
“weakly” so, while false sentences may be acceptable depending on existing 
evidence in support of them. Third, for any sentence, it may be said to be true or 
false, but both a sentence and its negation may be not well supported by testing.
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Hempel (ibid) notes that the “semantic notion of truth is indispensable in logic” 
and cannot be supplanted by an epistemological notion. Neurath’s sociological 
description of the acceptability of hypotheses cannot be regarded as a theory of 
truth, but rather a “pragmatic interpretation of the acceptance and the 
acceptability of scientific systems of statements.”
According to Hempel, the principle problem for Neurath then is the 
concern over how to choose a scientific theory. He argued (ibid, p. 193) there can 
be “no precise methodological rules” suggesting the contrary of any such 
assertion to be ‘pseudo rationalism’, which ties to his criticism of Carnap’s logic 
of science and its connection to empirical statements. The logical analysis of 
languages can proceed successfully, according to Neurath, in the domain of 
mathematics, but when confronting the choice between two empirical theories, a 
strictly logical analysis cannot determine the outcome (ibid, p. 193): “two 
scientists can rely on different considerations that will not lead to clear 
agreement.” Hempel notes that Neurath advocates the notion that “procedures of 
empirical science” can fall under a precise set of rules, but such rules may apply 
over a more narrowly specified domain.
Is Neurath’s view then limited to descriptive theory or can there be a 
normative element? Could it (ibid) “establish norms for correct and rational 
scientific procedures?” If ‘true’ statements on Neurath’s view are those accepted 
by scientists as agreeing with the body of scientific statements, can one “criticize 
behavior of scientists” if they make up results of experiments (ibid, pp. 194-5)? 
No theory of scientific knowledge can be restricted to description.
Hempel argues that Neurath emphasizes the descriptive aspect of 
scientific methodology (ibid, p. 196), but that he “builds certain epistemological 
norms into his description of empirical science.” For instance, he argues that 
acceptable systems of sentences must be “logically consistent and deductively 
closed.” Thus, acceptance of a statement is based upon whether it agrees with the 
larger body of statements. (As stated, even that large body of statements may in 
principle be rejected.) The problem, however, is that Neurath does not specify
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what that agreement relation is. Strict deductive connections among statements 
would appear to be too strict, given the problem of connecting logical structures 
of statements to the empirical statements they are intended to represent. So 
something must be said about the connection between formal representations of 
statements and the actual empirical conditions within which such statements are 
made, which presents the need to formulate more clearly Carnap’s distinction 
between logical and psychological aspects of science. And this presents the 
further problem of when they can be understood to be connected. Neurath’s 
opinion is that there is no systematic means by which to determine when that 
connection is sufficient, but it will rely on a decision. Furthermore, it might be 
argued (with Carnap) that such a formal representation of the structure of 
statements is indispensible to begin to formulate the question of agreement 
between statements at all. Neurath locates the role of decision in accepting a 
connection, but is rather ambiguous about what acceptable connections will look 
like. Carnap’s formalizations can be understood as an attempt to render 
suggested connections more clearly.
Hempel questions whether Neurath may be considered a coherence 
theorist. As mentioned, he argues that Neurath’s theory is not a theory of truth, 
but of acceptability. Part of the problem of understanding Neurath’s view is that 
(ibid, p. 197) “he himself used the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ in the statement of his 
view,” which conflates the question of truth with that of acceptance. In so far as 
Neurath might be understood as a coherence theorist, he gives a coherence theory 
of acceptance, not of truth.
However, Hempel (ibid) argues that Neurath is not even a strict 
coherence theorist of acceptability if the coherence view were that “the only 
demand on an acceptable system of hypotheses is that the sentences of this 
system stand IN certain sorts of agreement-relations to each other.” As 
mentioned, the notion of ‘agreement’ is vague in Neurath’s work (ibid). In 
addition to agreement with existing statements, Neurath advocates his empiricist 
maxim that sentences within a system should agree with as many protocols (the 
basic building blocks for the system) as possible. The upshot is that, although,
the nature of relations among sentences is left ambiguous (ibid), “It just demands 
that the whole system contain sentences that are advanced under appropriate 
circumstances by competent observers.” Protocol sentences must be included in 
any system and protocol sentences cannot be characterized based on their 
relations to other sentences -  “at least not exclusively.” Hempel (ibid) proposes 
thus that there is a causal element to Neurath’s advancement of protocols. 
Moreover, he compares these features with the causal element found in Schlick: 
affirmations are “occasions for framing protocol sentences.” Experience affords 
occasion to formulate protocols by which one makes meaningful assertions about 
that experience. Hempel concludes that both these views “go beyond” coherence 
because they intend to emphasize the role that experience plays in the generation 
of protocol sentences. The causal element in experience behind the occasions to 
put forward certain protocols indicates that Neurath is not a strict coherence 
theorist: his empiricism indicates that. Hempel (ibid, p. 198) states furthermore,
In order to take the empirical character of Neurath’s protocol sentences 
into account, one has to support and to refine the idea of directly 
advanced protocol sentences using an .empirical theory of human 
observation and concept formation. Studies that go in such a direction 
have been undertaken for some years now. Neurath, without doubt, would 
have heartily welcomed these more recent attempts toward a ‘naturalized 
epistemology’.
It will be fruitful to return to Hempel’s (1935) misconstrual of Carnap 
and Neurath as coherence theorists in light of a consideration of Tarski’s theory 
of truth. Hempel (1983) has argued that he and Neurath conflated notions of truth 
with those of acceptance and this can be understood more clearly with attention 
to how Tarski’s theory of truth impacted the protocol sentence debate.
Tarski, truth and confirmation
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By the mid 1930s the protocol sentence debate had brought about the centrality 
of the distinction between formal and material aspects of an analysis of the 
structure of science. Although Neurath still worried about the possibility of 
application of formal representations of material statements in scientific practice, 
he had influenced Carnap away from attempting to formulate protocols in terms 
of a subjective language situated outside the language of physicalism. Carnap, 
for his part however, did not retreat from his view that a distinction between 
formal and material modes of speech was crucial for assessing the structure of 
science: it marks an indispensible distinction. Rather he sought to push that 
distinction further and utilized Alfred Tarski’s definition of truth to underwrite 
his own developing view.
Friedman (2000, p. 49) notes that Carnap invited Tarski to deliver a paper 
(Tarski, 1936) on the semantic definition of truth at the Paris Congress in 1935. 
Carnap understood Tarski to provide a definition that clarifies certain confusions 
related to the protocol sentence debate and epistemological worries more 
generally. Camap himself took Tarski’s definition to afford the expression of the 
practical importance of distinguishing between logical and empirical aspects of 
science.
According to Tarski (1936, p. 401), semantics is the domain addressing 
connections between languages and the objects or states of affairs referred to by 
expressions within languages. For example (ibid), concepts like ‘denotation’, 
‘satisfaction’, ‘definition’ or ‘truth’ are all semantic concepts. ‘Truth’ is a 
semantic concept in its classical interpretation, wherein truth (ibid), “signifies the 
same as ‘corresponding with reality’.” Though semantical terms can be 
understood with relative ease informally, any precise rendering of such concepts 
has in previous discussions led to paradox (ibid). Here and in particular with 
reference to the protocol sentence debate, by Tarski’s account, ‘corresponding 
with reality’ would be understood informally.
According to Tarski, semantical concepts must be related to a linguistic 
framework and are not in that framework (ibid, p. 402). Thus there ought to be a
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distinction drawn between the “language about which we speak” and the 
“language in which we speak.” Because any language understood as containing 
its own semantics leads to inconsistency, semantical concepts must be provided 
by a metalanguage -  some linguistic framework external to the object language 
that provides the semantic rules governing the application of that language to its 
objects of reference. One starts with observation language and formulates a 
meta-language to make explicit the way in which that observation language is 
intended to apply to events or facts.
Tarski writes (ibid) that to lay the “foundations of a scientific semantics” 
one must follow certain steps: “characterizing precisely the semantical concepts 
and [...] setting up a logically unobjectionable and materially adequate way of 
using these concepts.” First, one must describe the language (ibid): “enumerate 
the primitive terms of the language and give the rules of definition by which new 
terms distinct from the primitive ones can be introduced into the language.” 
Second, one must separate axioms from the rest of the deduced sentences, and 
third, “formulate rules of inference,” that indicate which theorems may be 
derived from the axioms.
Once a description of the language is provided, one must construct the 
meta-language that provides “logically unobjectionable,” semantical concepts for 
application of the original language (ibid): “The most important point in this 
construction is the problem of equipping the metalanguage with a sufficiently 
rich vocabulary.” That vocabulary must furnish the semantical concepts with 
appropriate references to relations between the object language and the objects to 
which it is intended to refer. Tarski thus writes that (ibid), “The metalanguage 
which is to form the basis for semantical investigations must thus contain both 
kinds of expression: the expressions of the original language, and the expressions 
of the morphology of language” (the description of the structure of the language 
couched in the terms of that language).
One then needs to indicate the conditions under which the semantical 
concepts can be understood as “materially adequate and in accordance with
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ordinary usage” (ibid, p. 404). Tarski articulates this with reference to the 
concept ‘truth’ in so far as that concept is understood as ‘correspondence with 
reality’. ‘Corresponding with reality’ is itself vague, but can be specified in 
Tarski’s definition as follows (ibid): “the sentence ‘it is snowing’ is true if and 
only if it is snowing.” More generally, Tarski gives this phrase the form, “the 
sentence x is true if and only if p, where ‘p’ is to be replaced by any sentence of 
the language under investigation and ‘x’ by any individual name of that sentence 
provided this name occurs in the metalanguage” (ibid). If the metalanguage is 
robust enough to account for the expression, ‘the sentence x is true’, “in such a 
way that every statement of the form discussed can be proved on the basis of the 
axioms and rules of inference of the metalanguage” then one can establish the 
material adequacy of the truth claim. If such a concept of truth can be introduced 
as a (partial) definition, then the partial definition itself can be understood as 
‘materially adequate’. (Further conventions may be established regarding usage 
of the materially adequate concept, which Tarski notes [ibid, p. 405] is 
formulated in the metametalanguage; this follows from his notion that no 
language can provide its own rules of application without leading to 
inconsistency.)
Given these foundations, a clear and exact characterization of a language 
is only possible within formalized languages, in which one can specify all the 
statements within the object language formally and all the semantical concepts 
specifying how the object language applies to the objects it is about. Tarski (ibid, 
p. 403) writes that a clear characterization is possible “if we employ in it only 
those concepts which relate to the form and arrangement of the signs and 
compound expressions of the language.” But not all features of a given language 
(like those used in science) can be so formalized (ibid), which raises the question 
of how far one can construct an exact characterization of the language of science.
Thus Tarski sets up the machinery with which to deal with the “chief 
problem” (ibid): how to establish “a materially correct way of using the 
semantical concepts in the metalanguage.” He notes that one of two procedures is
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thus required. One possible procedure is semantical concepts are introduced to 
the metalanguage as basic concepts, the properties of which are established 
axiomatically. Moreover, certain axioms give the materially adequate usage of 
the concepts of the object langauge. There are certain challenges to this 
procedure. Namely semantical concepts are chosen “accidentally” and based 
upon “inessential factors” like the current state of knowledge. There are further 
difficulties regarding the consistency of the semantics and the appropriateness of 
adopting concepts used in ordinary language that led to inconsistency and 
misunderstandings in the past (ibid, pp. 405-6). In addition there would be a 
problem of fitting this semantical conception in with the unity of science, since 
science employs concepts that are “neither logical nor physical” (as in the case of 
unobservable entities).
The second procedural option is that (ibid, p. 406), “the semantical 
concepts are defined in terms of the usual concepts of the metalanguage and are 
thus reduced to purely logical concepts.” Thus the semantical concepts are 
formally construed -  as part of the “morphology of language.” Tarski notes (ibid) 
that the question then arises regarding whether the method may be at all 
applicable (since the semantical rules are given in purely formal terms), but this 
question he takes to be answerable. A metalanguage can provide materially 
adequate and methodologically correct definitions of semantical concepts for the 
language in question “if and only if the metalanguage is equipped with variables 
of higher logical type than all the variables of the language which is the subject 
of investigation.” Thus the metalanguage can provide sufficient semantical 
definitions for the language in question if it contains additional variables about 
the variables of the language in question. However, Tarski argues that no 
justification of this claim is possible. Rather, it can serve a useful purpose for a 
number of reasons. For example, starting with the concept of ‘satisfaction’ 
provides “few difficulties” (ibid), and “the remaining semantical concepts are 
easily reducible to it” (ibid, p. 407). Moreover one may derive general theorems 
from such definitions of semantical concepts. From the definition of truth, one 
can (ibid), “prove the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle.” Thus the 
metalanguage is adopted on pragmatic, not justificatory, grounds.
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Having thus established scientific semantics, Tarski leaves open the 
extent to which it may contribute to epistemological considerations, but he is 
optimistic. Importantly for Carnap, Tarski’s definition of truth clears up certain 
ambiguities that have traded in epistemological considerations and worries about 
establishing a sufficient account of the structure of science. For example, 
Tarski’s definition of truth motivates for Carnap (1936b, p. 119) the notion that 
there is an important distinction to draw between ‘truth’ and ‘confirmation’ and 
that the failure to draw such a distinction leads to confusion with regards to 
epistemological questions and those over the structure of science. ‘Truth’ is a 
“time-independent” term such that what is true is always true. It can be 
established within formal languages in which all the constituents of the object 
and meta-languages can be specified. ‘Confirmation’, has two conceptual types. 
The first is the pragmatic conception, which is time-dependent and says, “such 
and such a statement is confirmed to a high degree by observations ... at such 
and such a time.” The second is the semantical concept of degree of 
confirmation, which is, like the concept of ‘truth’, time-independent. It is 
understood, “with respect to other statements which formulate the evidence” 
(ibid). Using the concept in this way asserts an analytic truth such that the status 
of the degree of confirmation of a statement follows from the “presupposed” 
definition of the ‘degree of confirmation’, which is given in light of evidence of 
related statements.
Thus, Carnap outlines three terms with respect to this distinction (ibid):
1. Semantic definition of truth: time-independent -  the statement x is true if 
P-
2. Pragmatic confirmation: time-dependent -  a statement is confirmed to a 
certain extent at a given time.
3. Semantic confirmation: time-independent -  asserts analytic truth in the 
logical relations of statements given a definition of degree of 
confirmation.
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Semantic confirmation provides the means to understand how, for Carnap, the 
semantic view can introduce notions of truth to empirical claims.
Like Tarski, Carnap argues that although the concept of truth largely can 
be understood when used informally “in conversational language,” it 
nevertheless can lead to contradictions. Some, therefore, have avoided its use 
altogether, while others, given the difficulty in defining truth, have conflated it 
with the concept ‘confirmed’. Using the concept ‘truth’ in the latter way leads to 
abandoning conventional applications (ibid): “Thus one would find it necessary 
to abandon, e.g., the principle of the excluded middle.” That principle would 
hold that for any statement, it is either true or false, but in science there are many 
statements that are neither confirmed (accepted) nor denied (rejected).
However, Tarski’s definition of truth (ibid), “explicates adequately the 
meaning of this word in common language.” That definition makes it clear to 
Carnap that ‘truth’ ought then to be distinguished from ‘confirmation’ because 
the definition of the former is limited in its range of application to formalized 
languages in order to avoid contradiction. Consequently, acceptance criteria for 
empirical statements pertains, not to notions of truth -  since truth can only be 
defined in a fully formalized language, but to degree of confirmation. 
Epistemological notions like justification can only be articulated based on 
criteria of confirmation. This is to say that the definition of truth cannot be 
understood to contribute to a criterion of confirmation in epistemology: the 
definition of truth cannot provide the basis for a theory of knowledge, since the 
definition gives ‘truth’ only trivially (ibid, p. 120) -  it “consists in the statement 
itself.” Carnap therefore states that Tarski’s definition, ‘the statement, “snow is 
white” is true if and only if snow is white’, establishes a definition of truth, but it 
does not thereby answer the question of confirmation -i.e. the degree of 
confirmation with which one can say snow is, in fact, white.
This distinction between truth and confirmation is crucial for Carnap to 
indicate what, exactly, one might be after in a theory of knowledge. When one 
claims to know something, this may be understood in two ways. First, one could
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mean (a) ‘perfect knowledge’, which could never be refuted. Second, one could 
mean (b) ‘imperfect knowledge’, which asserts a degree of (but not absolute) 
certainty. Carnap employs knowledge in the imperfect sense (ibid).
To indicate the distinction between truth and confirmation he lists four sentences.
1. The substance in this vessel is alcohol.
2. The sentence ‘the substance in this vessel is alcohol’ is true.
3. X  knows (at the present moment) that the substance in this vessel is 
alcohol.
4. X knows that the sentence ‘the substance in this vessel is alcohol’ is true.
He remarks that statements (1) and (2) are logically equivalent because (ibid, p. 
121) “they are merely different formulations for the same factual content” -  as 
are (3) and (4). Statement (1) refers to the “object part of the language” and (2) 
refers to the “meta-part” (semantical). Thus, making the statement in the object 
language is logically equivalent to making the statement in the meta-language, 
even though it is in a different form. Carnap insists however that because of the 
ambiguities of natural language -  in this case the term ‘true’ -  logical 
equivalence can “only be made with certain qualifications.” So, logical 
equivalence of (1) and (2) can be understood to hold true in the semantical sense 
(the object statement is included in the semantical version, which states that the 
object sentence ‘is true’) and it is this sense which Carnap and Tarski understand 
to be assumed in everyday and scientific use. He adds that whether it is actually 
used, however, is a “psychological or historical question” and not relevant to the 
establishment of his semantic methodology. He simply uses the notion of truth in 
the semantical sense. However the content of statements (2) and (3) is distinct, 
which, Carnap notes, has not been adequately appreciated by authors like Peirce, 
Dewey, Reichenbach and Neurath (ibid): this “seems to be the source of many 
misunderstandings in current discussions on the concept of truth.”
What is the difference, then, in the ‘content’ of the truth statements and 
the knowledge statements? Since, assuming the semantic definition of truth,
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sentences (1) and (2) are logically equivalent, as are (3) and (4), Carnap notes 
that one might be led to conclude all true propositions just are those which are 
accepted (Neurath). If one argues, as Carnap does, that knowledge of the truth of 
propositions may be reversed with future inquiry, then what is deemed true 
effectively would be what is accepted. But Carnap argues that it is crucial that 
the content of (1) and (2) and of (3) and (4) is distinct. The former pair is about 
‘the substance in the vessel’, while the latter is about ‘X’s knowledge’. That is to 
say that the definition of truth of a proposition is distinct from knowledge of the 
truth of the proposition: one would claim truth of a proposition based on the 
semantic definition of truth and knowledge of the truth of a proposition when one 
accepts it as true.
To expand on this point, Carnap addresses Felix Kaufmann’s criticism of 
his own view.5 On Carnap’s account (ibid, p. 121), Kaufmann argues that 
Carnap’s view is not compatible with the constitutive principle of empirical 
procedure that “rules out invariable truth of synthetic propositions.” That is, 
empirical propositions are always subject to revision and therefore cannot be said 
to be true invariably at any time. Empirical procedure would indicate that one 
can never confirm “invariable truth of synthetic propositions” because 
‘invariable truth of synthetic propositions’ is a contradiction of terms. Carnap’s 
reply has two aspects: first that this reasoning incorrectly identifies truth with 
perfect knowledge; second, ‘invariable’ should be understood more adequately 
as ‘time-independent’ or ‘non-temporal’.
First of all he writes (ibid, p. 122), “Kaufmann’s reasoning seems to me 
based on the wrong identification of truth with perfect knowledge, hence, in the 
example, the identification of (2) with (3) in interpretation (a).” (Recall that 
interpretation (a) asserts perfect knowledge; interpretation (b) asserts imperfect 
knowledge.) What does this mean? Kaufmann wants to deny the admissibility of 
(4) which is a claim about knowledge of the truth of a sentence. For Kaufmann 
no synthetic sentence can be ‘invariably’ true and therefore, one cannot have any 
degree of confirmation of such a true sentence. By extension, one can never have
5 See, Kaufmann (1942) and (1943).
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knowledge of true synthetic statements because ‘true synthetic statements’ is a 
contradiction.
Carnap agrees that scientific procedure rules out perfect knowledge, but 
he refers to imperfect knowledge (b), not perfect knowledge (a), as Kaufmann’s 
criticism suggests. Nevertheless, scientific procedure does not rule out truth, 
since the semantic form of the object language statement is logically equivalent 
to that statement. And one can admit such object language statements. To assert 
(2) is the same as to assert (1), and (1) is understood to be empirically 
meaningful. If the observational statement is taken to be empirically meaningful, 
then the semantic formulation is also empirically meaningful. To assert (2) is 
merely to assert an object statement (1) according to adopted semantic rules. One 
cannot, of course, confirm perfect knowledge of truth with scientific procedure, 
but to confirm imperfect knowledge of truth is to arrive at a degree of 
confirmation for acceptance or knowledge of the semantical version of the truth 
statement in question.
Carnap writes (ibid), “When Kaufmann declares that even imperfect 
knowledge of truth is unobtainable, then this means that even imperfect 
knowledge of (2) is unobtainable and hence that an event as described in (4), 
even in interpretation (b), cannot occur.” However, he notes that no one thinks 
that sentence (3) is inadmissible. So when (3) occurs, (4) is said to occur also 
since these two are logically equivalent and both describe, “a certain state of 
knowledge of the person X.” To repeat, the scope of the claim of (3) for Carnap 
is bounded by an imperfect knowledge that may be revised: it is a knowledge 
claim based on, and relative to, a specified degree of confirmation.
So, Kaufmann’s objection, as Carnap understands it, denies that one can 
have knowledge of truth. He denies the admissibility of statement (4). However, 
since (3) is admissible and, given the semantic definition of truth, (4) is logically 
equivalent to (3), Carnap argues that one can meaningfully employ the terms 
‘knowledge of truth’. That knowledge, as has been pointed out, is not given by 
the notion of truth itself, but is understood relative to a degree of confirmation.
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So, “X knows that the sentence ‘the substance in this vessel is alcohol’ is true” 
can be meaningfully asserted because the truth of the claim follows from the 
form expressed in the object language. “Knowledge” is understood relative to the 
specified degree of confirmation of the true sentence in object language: it is 
assessed against existing sentences that provide the framework with which to 
assign a degree of confirmation.
Second, Carnap proposes to discuss the problem another way to examine 
the underlying presupposition of the objection. Kaufmann uses ‘invariable’ truth 
to indicate an independence of truth from persons or states of knowledge, “and 
hence of time” (ibid, p. 122). Kaufmann thinks the semantical conception of truth 
should be abandoned with regard to synthetic statements about physical things 
because one can never determine the truth or falsity of a synthetic statement with 
absolute certainty. Carnap agrees, but argues that it does not follow that the term 
‘truth’ is not admissible. That inference would be based upon the premise that a 
term should be rejected if one can never decide with absolute certainty whether 
the term applies in a given instance. However, if one accepted this premise it 
would rule out use of all physical terms -  i.e. the term ‘alcohol’ since one could 
never determine with absolute certainty whether the term applies or not in an 
empirical situation (that is, whether a substance is alcohol or not). No physical 
term can be determined to apply with absolute certainty, which would rule out all 
physical terms as inadmissible.
Camap acknowledges that of course no one actually accepts this principle 
formulated as such, but rather some milder version of it: a term is a legitimate 
scientific term if it can be determined to some degree whether it applies or not in 
a given instance. Statement (1) can be confirmed to some degree and therefore so 
can statement (2). Thus it is admissible. Meanwhile, articulating a criterion of 
confirmation involves both a description of scientific testing procedures (ibid) 
and the specification of the conditions in which a statement can be said to be 
confirmed to varying degrees -  “i.e. scientifically accepted or rejected” (ibid, p. 
124). Description of procedure in this sense is not a logical matter, but an 
empirical one, and therefore the domain of psychology and sociology. This, in
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part, is to say that scientific procedure is not systematically deduced exclusively 
within logic, but is motivated by decisions of inquirers themselves.
Carnap (ibid) distinguishes two types of statements relevant to 
confirmation, the directly and indirectly testable. Though he argues that they 
differ not in principle, but in degree, the distinction can serve to indicate two 
sources for testability of statements. Directly testable statements are those, which 
would be accepted or rejected “outright” on the basis of a few observations. 
Thus, the conditions for the statement ‘the key is on the desk’ would be those in 
which one sees a key on the desk (ibid). Indirect testing would involve testing 
statements that “stand in specifiable logical relations to the statement in 
question” (test-sentences). One may confirm indirectly testable statements by 
testing the set of statements from which the statement is deduced -  for example, 
Carnap (ibid) notes existential sentences -  i.e. ‘there is a key’. Scientific laws on 
the other hand can only be confirmed to an ever-larger extent since one cannot 
deduce laws from particular occurrences.
Two operations are relevant to directly testable statements: (1) 
“confrontation of a statement with observation;” and (2) “confrontation of a 
statement with previously accepted statements.” For the former, Carnap writes 
(ibid), “If, e.g., I see a key on my desk and I make the statement: ‘There is a key 
on my desk,” I accept this statement because I acknowledge it as highly 
confirmed on the basis of my visual and, possibly, tactual observations.” The 
second operation (ibid, p 125) relates to the system of statements against which 
the first operation is held. An observation statement will be accepted if it satisfies 
the first operation and if it does not contradict statements that have been 
established by confirmation. In this case, either the observation statement in 
question, or one of the previously accepted statements must be abandoned, the 
decision of which is determined by established methodological rules. The first 
operation is crucial for confirmation; the second one is “auxiliary” and functions 
regulatively to eliminate inconsistencies within the body of scientific statements 
(ibid).
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This assessment of the two operational procedures suggests a position in 
the question of whether statements can be compared with other statements, or 
must be compared with facts. Carnap states that if ‘comparison with a fact’ is 
understood in terms of the first operation, then statements can indeed be 
compared with facts, although he argues that ‘confrontation’ is more appropriate 
than ‘comparison’. The latter suggests a comparison between two objects in 
terms of colour, size or other properties, whereas the former (ibid) “is understood 
to consist in finding out as to whether one object (the statement in this case) 
properly fits the other (the fact).” That is to say, ‘comparison of a statement with 
a fact’ is to ask whether the statement is (semantically) true -  i.e. whether the 
“fact is such as it is described in the statement.” ‘Confrontation’ indicates that 
the relation between a statement and the event or fact is established through the 
conscious effort of the observer. Moreover, he (ibid, p. 126) suggests formulating 
the relation in terms of a ‘comparison’ with ‘facts’ or ‘reality’, “easily tempts 
one into the absolutistic view according to which we are said to search for an 
absolute reality whose nature is assumed as fixed independently of the language 
chosen for its description.” One would not understand the relation as somehow 
revealed between an object and a sentence, but that the sentence is constructed 
according to an assumed structural framework and then used to confront the 
‘object’ to determine the degree to which formal relations can be established 
between that structure and the object. Carnap writes (ibid),
The answer to a question concerning reality however depends not only 
upon that ‘reality’, or upon the facts but also upon the structure (and the 
set of concepts) of the language used for the description. In translating 
one language into another the factual content of an empirical statement 
cannot always be preserved unchanged. Such changes are inevitable if the 
structures of the two languages differ in essential points.
Thus, the notion ‘confrontation’ indicates the role of the inquirer in formulating a 
statement and articulating the structural connections intended to hold between 
the statement and the object or fact: the causal antecedent leads one to formulate 
the statement about it.
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However, Carnap’s argument is not against the “content” of the 
expression ‘statements therefore may be compared with facts’. Rather he argues 
against the form of that expression. Consequently, he is not to be understood as 
denying the claim that some relation between statements and facts can be forged 
-  as denying the operation of confronting observation with statements (ibid): 
“Nor must the significance and indispensability of such confrontation be 
overshadowed by exclusive attention to the second operation.” On the contrary, 
confrontation of a statement with observation is crucial for Carnap’s empiricism.
He sums up his argument by emphasizing two points. First, one must 
distinguish questions regarding the definition of truth from those pertaining to a 
criterion of confirmation. Second, there are two operations relevant to 
confirmation: formulating observations and confronting statements with each 
other (ibid, p. 127).
Tarski’s theory of truth had an impact on Carnap’s work and facilitates 
the point at which Carnap rejects the sort of synthesis sought by Hempel (1935): 
‘coherence’ for Carnap in 1934 could not characterize the scientific philosophy 
with which he took himself to be engaged. Friedman (2000, p. 48) notes that in 
1934, - prior to Tarski’s theory of truth -  Carnap denied that, “the concept of 
truth, as applied to empirical propositions, is a meaningful component of 
Wissenschaftslogik.” ‘True’ for Carnap was not a syntactic concept and could not 
be characterized formally (ibid): “Better so: there is no theoretical criterion of 
truth in the domain of synthetic sentences.” For Carnap a coherence theory of 
truth is one in which coherence is the sole criterion of truth. Also, Carnap at the 
time writes (1934a, pp. 268-9; in Friedman 2000, p. 49),
Truth and falsehood are not genuine syntactic properties; whether a 
sentence is true or false cannot generally be seen by its design, that is, by 
the kinds and serial order of its symbols. (This fact has usually been 
overlooked, because one has normally been dealing not with descriptive, 
but only with logical languages, and in relation to these ‘true’ and ‘false’
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in fact coincide with ‘analytic’ and ‘contradictory’, respectively, and are
thus syntactic concepts.)
Carnap effectively “undercuts” Hempel’s synthesis as the science of logic being 
a coherence theory by stating that ‘true’ is not a syntactic concept.
However, by 1936 Tarski provided a sufficient definition of truth for 
Carnap. Though Hempel’s (1935) notion of coherence misapprehended Carnap 
and Neurath’s views in this respect, Carnap reformulated his account to indicate 
the way in which ‘truth’ functions within his methodology. As mentioned above, 
Carnap (1936b) distinguishes ‘true’ from ‘confirmed’ or ‘scientifically 
accepted’: ‘true’ is a logical (“timeless”) concept, while ‘confirmed’ is empirical. 
Friedman (ibid) writes, “From this point of view, the Neurath-Hempel 
characterization of ‘true’ as applying to those sentences currently accepted by the 
community of scientists, is thus seen to rest on a fundamental confusion.”
Friedman (2000, p. 51) notes moreover that Neurath’s initial response to 
the Tarskian definition of truth at the Paris Congress of 1935 was that it was not 
reconcilable with an anti-metaphysical, properly empirical stance because of the 
notion of “timelessness” of that concept that separates scientific statements from 
those accepted at any given time. Nevertheless, a short time later Neurath 
advocated the legitimacy of Tarski’s definition. However according to Friedman 
(ibid), in a letter to Hempel, Neurath suggested it is not clear that Tarski’s 
definition “captures the unambiguous meaning of the traditional conception of 
truth” and Neurath’s own characterization of true sentences agreeing with the 
body of scientific statements “is also a perfectly acceptable clarification of the 
traditional conception—which, moreover, has perhaps even better claims to 
historical continuity.” Neurath, and likewise Hempel, considered Carnap’s 
defense of the “semantic concept rather as a suggestion” (ibid). Hempel goes on 
to consider notions of truth in terms of confirmation or verification (ibid). The 
problem with the early Hempel view is precisely that he conflates of a notion of 
‘truth’ with confirmation. He later acknowledged that Tarski’s concept itself 
ought not be equated with confirmation, but is timeless. However each concept,
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‘truth’ and ‘confirmation’, locate certain distinct aspects of a “rather vague 
notion of truth” (ibid and Hempel 1937, p. 227). The notion of a timeless 
(semantic) truth appears acceptable at that stage by both Carnap and Neurath. 
The question at stake then is over the material adequacy of such a definition in 
the actual practice of science.
For Carnap in 1936, this notion of truth is not merely a suggestion: one 
must sharply distinguish between these two concepts in order to clarify the 
structure of scientific statements (Friedman 2000, p. 52). This distinction leads to 
Carnap’s articulation of the distinction between logical concepts, like ‘truth’, and 
psychological concepts like ‘confirmation’. As Friedman states (ibid), “The main 
point of Carnap (1936b) is that such a sharp distinction between logical and 
psychological considerations is absolutely central to fully clarifying the nature of 
properly scientific philosophy, especially as it has been practiced within the 
Vienna Circle.” Friedman (ibid, p. 53) notes that Carnap in 1936 insists on the 
importance of this distinction to clarify epistemological issues. ‘Directly testable’ 
is linked to his definition of ‘observation’ in his first English publication and 
both of these are psychological concepts. ‘Indirectly testable statements’, or 
assessing statements against the body of scientific statements marks a logical 
function.
It is at this point that Friedman (ibid, p. 54) notes, “the fundamental 
tension between Carnap’s conception of Wissenschaftslogik and Neurath’s has 
become intolerable.” For Neurath there is “no room ... for a metalanguage or 
syntax language describing the process of empirical testing from some idealized 
point of view outside the language of empirical science itself.” The semantic 
definition of truth is not materially adequate.
Friedman writes that the emphasis for Neurath is as follows (2000, p. 54):
we describe how science, considered as an actual social system, operates 
with empirically and factually given real sentences and utterances (as 
opposed to mere ‘serial structures’ belonging to ‘pure syntax’).... there is
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a limit to the precision that can be required or attained in the actual 
historical-social process. We can certainly introduce logical precision into 
our actual scientific methods, by axiomatization, for example, but it 
makes no sense either to represent or to replace our actual procedures by 
a fully precise logical version.
One simply cannot eradicate language of Ballungen and it is that language 
actually employed in science -  not syntactical formalizations -  that must be 
assessed.
Friedman’s narrative of the features of the debate at this stage place 
Hempel in October 1935 as tom in the middle between Neurath’s ‘naturalism’ 
and Carnap’s Wissenschaftslogik. That Hempel is tom at this stage may suggest a 
way to understand his subsequent stance. By 1938, Hempel seems resolutely on 
the side of Neurath, while Friedman (ibid, p. 55) indicates Neurath’s view is 
motivated, in contrast to Carnap, by Tarski. Citing a letter of Hempel to Neurath, 
Friedman indicates the source and nature of this motivation (ibid):
T[arski] thought, of course, that the Wittgensteinian idea of complete 
verifiability for empirical hypotheses is entirely naive; but also that, in his 
opinion, Carnap’s logical theory in Testability] and Meaning, based on 
much more liberal principles, did not achieve what was desired: in fact he 
is acquainted with no single example of a reduction-sentence that actually 
reduces a concept, say of physical theory, to concepts of observation- 
language in materially correct fashion (i.e., so that the empirical 
investigator would agree).
Hempel notes that Carnap provides something like schematizations (ibid), which 
are empirically inadequate -  i.e., Carnap’s example of solubility is not adequate 
because “in fact it can happen that a material is put in water does not disappear 
and yet is soluble.... ‘exceptions’ are always thinkable.” The worry here then is 
over the logical connection between theory and observation. Tarski’s view is that 
no logical connection may be constructed, but Camap and -  indeed -  Hempel
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himself are at this stage holding out that one may be constructible (ibid): “it is at 
the very least not excluded that no such bridge can be forged in an adequate 
matter.”
Here then is a glimpse at how to understand Hempel’s view. He aligns 
himself with the Neurath position that empirical knowledge is historically- 
sociologically oriented, but holds out that the logical aspects of inquiry may 
provide some bridge between theory and observations -  at least it remains to be 
discovered whether any such formulation can be constructed. Put another way, it 
remains to be developed how far one can push the limits of logical constructions 
toward material adequacy.
Friedman remarks that some of Hempel’s defining papers of the 1940s 
(ibid, p. 58),6
show Hempel as the master of Camapian ‘explication,’ dedicated, above 
all, to finding a precise and explicit characterization in purely formal- 
logical terms of the crucial relationship between scientific theory, on the 
one side, and observational statements, on the other. Whether we look at 
this relationship in terms of confirmation (of theory by observational 
evidence) or explanation (of observational statements by theory), the 
central ambition is that it be reconstructed as perfectly precise and 
explicit, and, therefore, as ‘objective’.
Given the survey above, one may locate keys aspects of Tarski’s view and 
orient Carnap, Neurath and Hempel with respect to that view.
1. Semantics articulates connections between languages and objects; all 
semantical concepts for a given object language must be given by a meta­
language, which, to be complete, must contain all terms of the object 
language plus semantical concepts telling how object terms apply in order 
to avoid inconsistency.
6 Hempel (1942), (1945), Hempel and Oppenheim (1948).
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2. The goal of developing the foundations of semantics is to establish 
logically unobjectionable and materially adequate ways of using these 
concepts; this involves specifying the object language and its rules of 
application in a metalanguage:
a. Describing the terms of the language, giving rules of definition.
b. Locating axioms from which all other sentences can be deduced.
c. Formulating rules of inference for all deduced sentences.
d. Specifying a metalanguage which gives rules of application for 
the terms in the object language.
3. The goal of semantics can only be achieved informal metalanguages and 
with regard to formal object languages, wherein a metalanguage may be 
formulated that provides all rules for the application of terms in an object 
language. One problem is that not all features of a language can be 
adequately formalized.
4. The biggest challenge is formulating a metalanguage with a sufficiently 
rich vocabulary to indicate how the object language applies to the objects 
it is about.
Thus the semantic definition of truth can be given only with respect to formal 
object languages, and only when a sufficiently robust metalanguage can be 
formulated that adequately encompasses the terms of the object language and 
rules of its application to objects or events.
One thus can map the respective positions of Carnap, Neurath and 
Hempel in light of Tarski’s work. For Camap, definition of truth can be given 
only in formal languages. A sufficiently robust metalanguage then can be 
understood to be provided only in formal mode so that all of the variables in the 
object language and the semantic variables in the metalanguage are contained 
within it. Problems in epistemology make assertions in natural language, the 
variables of which are too ambiguous to formalize, which leads to the confused 
notion that ‘truth’ (ambiguously asserted) necessarily informs questions of 
knowledge. Distinguishing between ‘truth’ and ‘confirmation’ indicates the way 
in which the semantic definition of truth (the most compellingly sufficient
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definition of truth at the time for Carnap) can have nothing to say about 
knowledge. That distinction does, however, bring Carnap back to the connection 
between theory and facts at the point of directly testable observations. If one can 
produce an adequate definition of confirmation with directly testable 
observations -  that is, if one can produce a sufficiently robust metalanguage 
consisting of the relevant variables of statements in the observation language and 
the semantic rules telling how they can apply -  then one can have a criterion of 
empirical truth. Neurath, of course, will reject this notion outright, as will Tarski 
express skepticism -  but Carnap and Hempel believe that this remains a question 
for which the answer is yet to be determined. How far can one enlist the formal 
tools of modem logic to forge connections between scientific theory and 
observation statements?
Neurath’s principal worry is that no formalization can adequately render 
the statements of science. Ballungen are always present and any attempt to 
overly constrain scientific statements with what came to be understood as 
“schematizations” would misrepresent the “congestions” of concepts present in 
any of the even basic statements of science. This is to say that Neurath rejects the 
notion that one may construct a sufficiently robust metalanguage that will 
account for the Ballungen present in the observation language. Put another way, 
if Carnap produces schematizations, or idealized models of object language, 
Neurath is worried that Carnap’s formalization will employ the wrong models.
Hempel’s corpus can be seen as developing the logical aspects of 
Camapian analysis, while he remained explicitly cognizant of Neurath’s worries. 
As will be discussed in the final chapter, schematizations -  as Carnap has 
employed the term -  can be understood as idealizations in Hempel’s D-N 
account of scientific explanation. They are not directly about empirical science, 
but provide a framework with which to make statements about it. Is Hempel’s 
methodology the right one? Like Tarski, one might be inclined to suggest that 
this is the wrong sort of question. Is it fruitful? Can one recommend it 
pragmatically? Yes.
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Chapter Four: The outcome of the protocol sentence debate and Hempel’s 
emerging philosophy of science
This thesis surveys the protocol sentence debate in order to explore the roots of 
Hempel’s thought. Chapter Two examined the catalyst for the debate and 
Neurath’s subsequent criticisms: Carnap’s Aufbau. Richardson argues that 
Carnap’s programme needs to be distinguished from Russell’s external world 
programme on the grounds that Carnap did not share a commitment with Russell 
to the notion that causality, with respect to basic observation statements, was an 
epistemological notion. However, Carnap’s ambivalence with respect to 
ontology or epistemology outside the framework of science does not reflect a 
naive scientistic approach to the foundations of scientific knowledge. Rather, it is 
because he takes skepticism as a legitimate starting point for an inquiry into the 
structure of science, that Carnap believes his constitutional system, which Quine 
dubbed ‘the best attempt to reduce scientific statements to observation’, can have 
nothing meaningful to say about ontological or epistemological commitments 
prior to its adoption. According to Carnap, it is only in virtue of assuming any 
such constitutional system that epistemological questions can be raised at all. 
Basic observation sentences are adopted on the basis of convention. Thus, the 
second part of Chapter Two considers that the protocol sentence debate was not 
over justification of adopting one or another set of basic observation statements. 
Rather, given that protocols are taken, by convention, as the starting point for an 
empiricist system, it centered on the form and status of those protocols. The 
question of the extent to which one could derive all other concepts in science 
remained a problem to be worked out for Carnap and Hempel (Neurath denied 
this was possible).
Chapter Three examined Schlick’s criticism of the left wing of the Circle 
and Hempel’s subsequent reply. It indicated that all Vienna Circle members were 
not unified in the debate. Schlick believed that the debate missed what was
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crucial for scientific knowledge -  namely, that it must be rooted in certainty or 
truth. Meanwhile, Hempel’s attempt to synthesize Carnap and Neurath’s views 
attributed to them views that they did not hold. Furthermore, the third chapter 
indicated the way in which Carnap’s move to draw a distinction between formal 
and empirical aspects of science came to be of central concern in the debate. He 
argued that failing to distinguish between them led to much confusion in the 
assessment of the structure of science. To be sure, Hempel and Neurath 
themselves conflated these two notions until Hempel’s recognition of its point in 
1938 (Neurath’s acceptance of it is less clear, but that will be addressed more 
thoroughly in the latter part of the present chapter).
The development of the debate raises two points for consideration that are 
taken up in the present chapter. First, there is a question of the credibility of both 
Hempel’s emergence in the debates and his subsequent development of logical 
empiricism from the 1940s onward. Richard Jeffrey (2000, p. 7) writes, “In 1955 
Hempel had still found it excruciating to recall those essays [1935], which were 
then twenty years old -  perhaps because of the scorn and ridicule Bertrand 
Russell had heaped upon them fifteen years earlier [1940].” This may be so. 
However an analysis of Russell’s paper indicates that, in so far as Hempel may 
have been bothered by the way in which his contribution to the debate influenced 
what came to be the mistaken received view of the Vienna Circle discussions, he 
need not have been bothered by the substantive criticisms given by Russell. As 
discussed, two key problems for Hempel’s (1935) account are that he claims 
erroneously that Carnap and Neurath espouse a coherence theory of truth and, 
moreover, in doing so he (and as well as Neurath) conflated notions of empirical 
confirmation and logical truth. However Russell’s own criticisms do not 
adequately address these problems as they fit within the philosophical project 
that the Vienna Circle took themselves to be engaged. Second, the examination 
of the protocol sentence debate begets the need to grasp how, if at all, the debate 
can be understood to have been resolvable. The protocol sentence debate 
provides a cornerstone of the history of logical empiricism, but, with a few 
notable exceptions, a general understanding of its outcome has been, as yet, 
rather oblique.
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If Camap and Neurath’s views are understood as irreconcilable then one 
can frame two philosophical stances that emerge from within the left wing of the 
Vienna Circle. Friedman (2000, p. 39) has stated that it was interesting to watch 
Hempel turn in later life from the project of Camapian explication to a form of 
Neurathian socio-historical naturalism. This claim somewhat obscures what may 
be viewed as a coherent development of Hempel’s thought: it suggests that 
somehow the logical investigations into explanation, with which he largely made 
his name in the mid-twentieth century, were abandoned in favor of a more 
historical bent later on. Accounting for the conceptual resources emerging from 
the debate suggests that Camap and Neurath were not at philosophical odds by 
the end of the 1930s, but that they attended to different methodological aspects 
of a common philosophical project. Against this backdrop Hempel’s thought in 
his logic years can be understood to relate rather coherently with his later 
emphasis on Neurathian (and Kuhnian) ideas of the importance of historical 
investigations for understanding the structure, scope and limitations of scientific 
knowledge. Indeed, without obscuring his distinctive attentions to logical and 
historical aspects of science at different points in his career, one can see in 
Hempel’s overall body of work a unifying methodology indicating the role of 
both technical (or formal) aspects and historico-sociological aspects of science.
This chapter examines the Russell/Hempel issue and attempts to flesh out 
resources for understanding the outcome of the protocol sentence debate. Those 
resources indicate that in spite of a lack of resolute conclusion to the debate, 
Carnap and Neurath need not be understood as engaged in distinct philosophical 
programmes. It considers, first, the problem with Russell’s assessment of 
Hempel (1935). Second, it examines Hempel (1939) on vagueness and logic to 
indicate the way in which Hempel employed Carnap’s distinction between 
formal and empirical aspects of a philosophical methodology. Third, it assesses 
the possibility of a resolution between the Carnapian and Neurathian approaches 
to philosophy of science.
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Hempel and Russell’s ‘scathing’ commentary
Russell (1940) treats the Hempel/Neurath view in critical and even denigrating 
terms. It can be broken down into three parts: (1) his statement of the problem of 
basic propositions; (2) his account of the Neurath/Hempel view of basic 
propositions; and (3) his criticism of their view. Russell (1940, p. 137) argues 
that basic propositions (protocol statements) are a “subclass of epistemological 
premises,” which “are caused, as immediately as possible, by perceptive 
experiences.” He suggests there are two parts to a discussion of basic 
observations (ibid, p. 138): first, “it is necessary to argue, as against opposing 
opinions, that there are basic propositions;” and second, “it is necessary to 
determine just what sort of thing they can affirm, and to show that this is usually 
less than common sense asserts on the occasions on which the basic propositions 
in question are epistemologically justifiable.” A basic proposition has two 
properties (ibid): 1. It is caused by a perception. 2. It cannot contradict other 
basic propositions. Regarding the notion of ‘cause’, Russell (ibid) appeals to a 
loose conception of that term, suggesting that a proposition is caused by a 
perception if “it will be defended by the argument ‘why, I see it!’ or something 
similar.”
Russell gives what he calls an epistemological definition of a basic 
proposition (ibid, p. 139): it “arises on occasion of a perception, which is the 
evidence for its truth, and it has a form such that no two propositions having this 
form can be mutually inconsistent if derived from different percepts.” For 
Russell this is an epistemological definition because the truth of a basic 
proposition is based on its being caused by a perception. The perception and the 
proposition to which it gives rise provides an epistemological foundation for a 
system of knowledge based upon it. Recall from the discussion on Carnap in 
Chapter Two above, that in the Aufbau and Carnap’s subsequent work neither 
basic propositions, nor the perceptions that cause them to be formulated are 
epistemological notions. Rather, they are pragmatic and are adopted 
conventionally: they must be in place within a constitutional system before 
epistemological questions can be raised meaningfully at all. This difference is
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important for considering the effectiveness of Russell’s criticisms of Hempel and 
Neurath, but it will be helpful to continue a survey of Russell’s paper to identify 
this distinction more clearly.
Russell (ibid, p. 137) argues against the notion that no knowledge can be 
gained from a single event. That view would hold that knowledge can only be 
arrived at based on “inductions from a number of more or less similar 
experiences,” which Russell argues, “makes history impossible and memory 
unintelligible,” since one would not have any origin for a set of basic 
propositions against which to assess the introduction of new propositions. The 
truth of a basic observation can and must be dependent upon a single perception.
Thus, according to Russell there are such things as basic propositions, 
which are caused by singular events. The subjective experience of a perception is 
evidence for the truth of the basic proposition. Truth is not determined based on 
the coherence of a basic proposition with a body of statements. It is crucial for 
Russell’s perspective that basic propositions are understood to be empirical, 
since they are not determined logically, and epistemological, since their truth is 
determined on the evidence of singular perceptions and that truth affords an 
epistemological foundation for what one can claim to know. Logical rules are 
then formulated to ensure that basic propositions do not contradict one another.
Russell (ibid, pp. 139-40) remarks that Neurath and Hempel “deny that 
any set of propositions can be singled out as ‘basic’, or as in any important 
epistemological sense premises for the remainder.” ‘Truth’ in their sense is 
strictly syntactical and not semantic: “a proposition is ‘true’ within a given 
system if it is consistent with the rest of the system.” Moreover, a proposition 
deemed ‘true’ in one system can be deemed false in another. One cannot derive 
‘truth’ from experience or perception of the world: according to Russell (ibid), 
for Neurath and Hempel, “the world of words is a closed self-contained world, 
and the philosopher need not concern himself with anything outside it.”
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Russell (ibid, pp. 140-41) lists what he takes to be key ideas found in 
Neurath (1934) and Hempel (1935).
• An assertion is called right when we can fit it in.
• Assertions are compared with assertions, not with ‘experiences’.
• There are no primary Protokollsatze or propositions needing no 
confirmation.
• All Protokollsatze should be put into the following form: ‘Otto’s 
protocol at 3:17: [Otto’s word-thought at 3:16 (In the room at 3:15 
was a table perceived by Otto)]’.
He notes that in mathematics and logic, truth is a syntactic concept because 
“syntax guarantees the truth of tautologies.” However, by espousing a coherence 
theory of truth, Neurath and Hempel conflate notions of empirical and logical 
truth. The problem with a coherence theory of empirical truth is that one is led to 
the view, “so it is, if you think so.” In short, it gives way to a radical relativism 
that needs to be rejected if one is to account for objective aspects of scientific 
knowledge.
Most of these statements of the Hempel/Neurath view are wrong. More 
gracefully, one might say that certain Neurathian or Hempelian replies may 
suggest themselves. Before attending to those, it will be fruitful to consider 
Russell’s criticism of what he takes to be their views.
Russell argues that Neurath is not a scientist; all knowledge begins with 
subjective experience; and Neurath’s coherence view amounts to a basis in 
memory of past perceptions, rather than in immediate perceptions. Russell writes 
(ibid, p. 143),
I think Neurath and Hempel may be more or less right as regards their
problem, which is the construction of an encyclopaedia. They want public
impersonal propositions, incorporated in public science. But public
110
knowledge is a construction, containing less than the sum of private 
knowledges.
By Russell’s interpretation (ibid), Neurath is not an empirical researcher so he 
can attend to compiling the research of “the best authorities.” His encyclopedia 
can attend to opinions, but he does not address direct-observations because that is 
not the scope of his interest. Russell writes (ibid),
The individual men of science, however, whose opinions are the 
encyclopaedist’s premises, have not themselves merely compared other 
investigators’ opinions; they have made observations and conducted 
experiments, on the basis of which they have been prepared, if necessary, 
to reject previously unanimous opinions.
Russell argues further that “all theory of knowledge” starts from the question, 
‘what do /  know’? It does not start with ‘what does mankind know’? The only 
way one can determine intersubjective knowledge is via “personal observation of 
what it says in the books it has written” and assessing evidence for the truth of 
claims in those books (ibid). All my knowledge must be based on my 
observations “through which alone I can ascertain what is received as public 
knowledge” (ibid, p. 144).
Further, according to Russell, Neurath’s account of protocols is based 
upon memories of past events and that one must check the protocol against what 
others say. He writes (ibid, p. 146-47) that for Neurath,
all empirical knowledge is based upon recollections of words used on 
former occasions. Why recollections should be preferred to perceptions, 
and why no recollections should be admitted except of thought-words, is 
not explained. Neurath is making an attempt to secure publicity in data, 
but by mistake has arrived at one of the most subjective forms of 
knowledge, namely recollection of past thoughts.
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Thus, Russell allows that for the project with which Neurath is engaged, 
observations are not necessary. Neurath in this sense is not a scientist and is 
therefore not dealing with observations. By not dealing with observations, he 
ironically promotes an entirely subjective knowledge.
Moreover, any notion that empirical truth is based upon the coherence of 
basic observations with existing statements renders empiricism meaningless and 
history impossible. Russell examines a number of statements made by Neurath 
and Hempel (ibid, pp. 140,1):
1. Statements are compared with statements, not with experiences (N).
2. A protocol-statement, like every other statement, is at the end adopted or 
rejected by a decision (N).
3. The system of Protokollsatze we call true ... may only be characterized 
by the historical fact, that it is the system which is actually adopted by 
mankind, and especially by the scientists of our cultural circle (H).
4. Instead of reality we have a number of mutually incompatible but 
internally coherent bodies of propositions, choice between which is not 
logically determined (logisch ausgezeichnet) (N).
Russell then outlines objections to these claims (ibid, p. 147). How can 
one know that a claim like ‘Neurath says so-and-so’ is true? It could be that one 
knows it by reading words on a page, but this cannot be the ground for such 
knowledge on the Neurath/Hempel view, since, according to Russell (ibid), one 
first must know “the opinion of mankind, and especially of my cultural circle, as 
to what Neurath says.” How does one know that more general opinion? If one 
asks opinions of other scientists, how does one know the truth of these opinions 
about the truth of whether ‘Neurath says so-and-so’ is true? One would have to 
ask further of opinions of other scientists and so on without ever having some 
account from which to assess the truth of not only the original claim in question, 
but all the claims after which one seeks answers regarding their truth status. 
Russell writes (ibid), “If eyes and ears do not enable me to know what Neurath
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said, no assemblage of scientists, however distinguished, can enable me to 
know.”
Given the coherence view that Neurath is understood to hold, he writes
(ibid),
If we choose to attribute to him opinions completely different from those 
which he in fact holds, it will be useless for him to contradict, or to point 
to pages in his writings; for by such behavior he will only cause us to 
have experiences, which are never a ground for statements.
Hempel notes that Carnap and Neurath do not intend to say that there are only 
propositions and no facts, but that protocols are themselves facts, but Russell 
remarks (ibid, p. 148) that this “makes nonsense of the whole theory,” since it 
suggests that empirical facts can have a different truth status for different bodies 
of statements: “owing to this, Neurath is an exile. He remarks himself that 
practical life soon reduces the ambiguity, and that we are influenced by the 
opinions of neighbours. In other words, empirical truth can be determined by the 
police.” This fact is evidence for Russell that Neurath has abandoned empiricism 
altogether (ibid), “of which the very essence is that only experiences can 
determine the truth or falsehood of non-tautologous propositions.”
Consequently, on Neurath’s interpretation empirical statements are 
reduced to meaninglessness, but for Russell empirical propositions are about 
things other than just words. The meaning of an empirical statement cannot be 
understood merely as it fits in with a class of other statements, but refers to 
something external to language (ibid): “If I go into a restaurant and order my 
dinner, I [... want...] to bring about the presence of food.”
Absent some grounding in perception there just is no connection between 
propositions and the world, for Russell. There is no way in which to account for 
the formulation of any basic propositions. So one has no propositions to start 
with against which to assess a new basic observation statement.
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Russell seems to be making two points. Clearly he intends his argument 
to be about the causal origin of basic propositions in the world. However his final 
example indicates something slightly different (though related). We want our 
statements (and not just basic statements) to be true or false of the world. We 
want them to be about the world and not merely constructed relative to some 
system of statements. The epistemological concern regarding basic propositions 
then is how to secure some notion of truth of these propositions. On the other 
hand, the restaurant example is not about basic propositions but is couched in a 
more complex framework wherein one orders food. This scenario incorporates 
any number of basic and non-basic propositions. Russell wants his example to 
indicate what (he takes that) Neurath and Hempel’s view cannot do: it cannot 
assess the truth of empirical sentences because they do not have an adequate 
basis for which to account for the truth of such sentences, since they hold a 
coherence notion of empirical truth. So Neurath and Hempel cannot make 
empirical claims at all, much less have a criterion of truth against which to assess 
if a basic proposition is true or not. Implicit in Russell’s argument is that, absent 
epistemological worries about the relation between basic propositions and 
experience, Neurath and Hempel can have no criterion by which to assess basic 
observation.
There appear to be two principal arguments in Russell’s conception of the 
problem of protocols. First, the basis for basic propositions is in perception and 
second, we want our basic propositions to be true about the world. If we 
articulate his worry in everyday language, we want our statement, ‘it is warm 
out’ to be true or false based on whether or not it is -  loosely speaking, in fact, 
warm out. And it is precisely our experience that it is warm out that causes us to 
utter ‘it is warm out’. When Russell orders dinner at a restaurant, he wants it to 
result in bringing food to the table for him to eat; he does not want to assess the 
way in which it fits into a coherent system of statements that could equally result 
in him getting a new car.
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Perhaps the following example in support of Russell’s worries might 
seem compelling. Children provide great illustrations. Assume your eight-month 
old has had a series of ear infections over the past few months and you want to 
be sure there has been no damage to the ear drum. You go in for tests at the Ear, 
Nose and Throat hospital on Gray’s Inn Road. Your child sits in your lap facing 
a mirrored window and is fed audible and visual stimuli. When the child 
responds appropriately -  that is, when the child’s behaviouristic responses map 
to those taken to indicate that the child has heard the sound -  a box in the 
direction of the sound illuminates a toy that dances around, providing a form of 
reward for looking in the right direction. Sometimes the sound precedes the 
illumination of the boxes, sometimes it is at the same time, sometimes it follows 
and sometimes there is no corresponding sound to the light. A series of tests may 
indicate that the child’s behaviouristic responses do not map appropriately to 
behaviour that indicates he can hear and the technicians determine that there may 
be a problem and the child should come back for more tests.
On the other hand, as an engaged parent you may have constructed 
auxiliary hypotheses indicating a different explanation for why the behavioral 
responses did not indicate a proper correlation -  that is, they suggest your child 
cannot hear. You might suggest that your son is curious and was not looking in 
the direction of the sound because he was anticipating that he was going to see a 
light come on from the other side. He therefore ignored the sound because he did 
not really care about it. You might feel that he is a bit nervous because he is in a 
strange environment and responds to your movements more readily since he is 
aware that you are a comfort to him. Perhaps he cares more about your approval 
as an indication that he is safe so he ignores all the stimuli around him, sucks on 
the plastic toy and looks back at you. Furthermore, he is only 8 months old and 
the behavioral indications he provides cannot be analyzed against responses of 
older children.
In this example, what one wants to know is whether the child can really 
hear. One does not want an interpretation of his behaviour that is assessed 
against a set of existing statements that might suggest he cannot hear, when in
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fact he can. This is one aspect of Russell’s worry: without a causal account in 
perception of the origin of a basic proposition, one could conceivably make a 
statement deemed true within a language system, but empirically false.
This example is considerably more rich than worries about basic 
observations like “red, here, now” and presents a more complex scenario in 
which to consider the problem. In addition, the question posed by Russell 
surrounds the causal relation between one’s own subjective perceptions and 
corresponding propositions about them. This example therefore might appear to 
be not entirely relevant because the concern is over whether the statement ‘the 
child can hear’ is true or not, and not any basic statement caused by a subjective 
perception. Nevertheless it illustrates an important aspect of Russell’s worry and 
underscores why one might share the sorts of epistemological worries expressed 
by him.
Another aspect of the Russellian point is that one will not deny one’s own 
experience in the face of the scientific experts challenging that experience -  that 
the child is exhibiting behavior inconsistent with publicly acknowledged 
correlations between behavior and attributed physical occurrences inside the 
child’s body -i.e. he can’t hear. Furthermore, what one is worried about is 
whether the child can hear. You want to know if his hearing is actually 
functioning properly.
Two comments might be made about Russell’s criticisms of Neurath and 
Hempel. These comments indicate why Russell’s claims about Hempel and 
Neurath are incorrect. First, he seems to have missed a key point of the protocol 
sentence debate by failing to recognize that their empiricism does employ a 
notion of causality to generate basic observation statements. But that causality is 
in no way an epistemological notion for them because perceptions are not 
utilized to undergird claims to epistemic privilege of protocols. Second, though 
Russell is correct to argue that their conception of truth conflates notions of truth 
and acceptance, by 1940 when his paper was published, that error had been 
rectified in virtue of the development of the protocol sentence debate itself.
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Hempel repudiated his confusion explicitly and, as will be seen in the subsequent 
section, employed the distinction between logic and psychology in his 
philosophical arguments in 1939. Russell’s paper, at best, arrives too late. At 
worst, it is beside the point.
It will be helpful to expand on these points. First of all, as noted, Russell 
claims he must argue that there are basic propositions. Moreover these 
propositions must employ a notion of causality. And that notion is an 
epistemological one: perceptions that give rise to basic propositions are evidence 
for the truth of those propositions, which undergirds Russell’s empiricism as a 
justification for scientific knowledge rooted in sensation. On the other hand, in 
the protocol sentence debate, basic propositions are adopted conventionally, and 
as part of their empiricism are causally rooted in experience. But there is no 
attempt to justify rooting scientific knowledge in sensation, or to legitimate, on 
the basis of some prior epistemic commitment, the primacy of the selected class 
of basic protocols. As a conventional fact, selecting experience to generate 
protocols characterizes their empiricist inclination when constructing a system of 
knowledge. As identified in Chapter Two above, this distinction is one of the key 
features brought about by Richardson who distinguished Carnap’s from Russell’s 
epistemological programmes. For the Vienna Circle, one could not give meaning 
to worries outside an adopted framework. Epistemological concerns thus could 
not be raised until a framework was in place that included a class of basic 
protocols and a system of logic, which would give rules of inference for non­
protocols in the scientific language.
Neurath and Hempel, following Camap, deny that the domain between 
experience and the basic sentences one might form about that experience is in 
any way an epistemological domain, but a pragmatic one. As discussed above, 
Hempel (1983) clarifies that a causal element is necessary in the generation of 
protocols, but that any causal connections employed between experience of 
objects in the world and protocol sentences are adopted on the basis of 
convention. Experiences come from somewhere (the ‘world’), but Neurath and 
Hempel deny the claim that there is anything meaningful to be said about the
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world beyond what can be formulated within the framework of physicalism. 
There is no question for Hempel and Neurath whether there “are” basic 
propositions. The entire protocol sentence debate is premised on the notion that 
there are protocols. The question they were interested in centered on the form 
and status of those propositions. Any question in the example of whether the 
child can hear cannot be answered with respect to appeal that he “really” can or 
cannot hear. Assessment is given by weighing empirical statements for or against 
the claim in light of the larger body of evidence.
Second, as is now evident, one of the issues of the protocol sentence 
debate was Carnap’s developing distinction between logic and psychology -  and 
the distinction between truth and acceptance that results from distinguishing 
formal from empirical questions of scientific knowledge. Between 1935 and 
1940, it became clear that Hempel and Neurath had conflated truth and 
acceptance. Hempel came to share Carnap’s explicit employment of the 
distinction. Although Neurath did not share Hempel’s explicit recognition of 
Carnap’s distinction it was clear that he was happy to do without using a notion 
of ‘truth’ at all, except that to employ it was an attempt to do justice to how he 
understood the term to have been used traditionally. As discussed above, Tarski’s 
definition of truth came to be a pivotal feature of the developing logical 
empiricism at the time. Thus, Russell’s criticism of Neurath (1934) and Hempel 
(1935) appears to have arrived late, since Hempel, certainly, would have agreed 
that he and Neurath had been formulating a theory of acceptance, rather than a 
theory of truth.
Moreover, the protocol sentence debate was a vehicle by which logical 
empiricism came to formulate the distinction between truth and acceptance. If 
one takes Carnap’s view seriously, then Russell himself appears to continue to 
conflate truth and acceptance by ascribing epistemological relevance to the 
causality underlying the source of basic propositions. For the Vienna Circle, 
causes that bring about protocols reside in the domain of psychology: 
psychologists describe a class of statements that are employed to account for that 
causal connection. (For example, in general individuals say the colour of an
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object is ‘red’ when they see an object exhibiting certain colour characteristics.) 
Assuming, via convention, that class of statements and a logical framework, one 
then worries about the form of those statements and how they relate to non­
protocols in the physicalist language.
For these reasons, Hempel cannot have been troubled by Russell’s paper 
-  at least he had no reason to be troubled based on the paper itself. To be sure, 
Russell was correct that Hempel’s view in 1935 was problematic, but his 
criticisms came long after those problems had been made explicit within the 
protocol sentence debate itself.
Hempel on Vagueness and Logic
In 1939 Hempel published a paper entitled “Vagueness and Logic,” wherein he 
aimed to examine what follows from the presence of vagueness in scientific and 
everyday concepts with respect to questions of logic. He lays out three goals 
(1939, p. 163): (1) outline the meaning and logical status of the concept 
‘vagueness’; (2) question whether logical terms are free from vagueness, and 
whether vagueness influences the validity of logical principles; and (3) look at 
the possibility of reducing vagueness of scientific concepts with appropriate 
logical tools.
Examining this paper will serve two purposes for the present interest. 
First, it indicates the way in which Hempel’s work already by 1939 embraces 
both Carnapian logic of science and Neurath’s notion of Ballungen. It embraces 
the former in the sense that it confronts the question of precision in employing 
tools of logic, and the latter by endorsing that all statements of science are 
necessarily imprecise, or vague, on some level because of the different usage of 
terms among various user groups. Hempel looks at the question of imprecision in 
logic as a tool, while asking how logic itself can be used to reduce imprecision 
(problems of the logical aspects of science). And he indicates the source of ever­
present vagueness in concepts by accounting for the role of users of those terms
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(problems of the historico-sociological aspects of science). Under Hempel’s 
employment, one can argue that Carnapian and Neurathian programmes are not 
two fundamentally different philosophical standpoints, but different 
methodological aspects of an inquiry into science. Second, it vindicates the claim 
that Russell’s scathing criticisms in 1940 could (or at least should) not have 
bothered Hempel terribly because those criticisms both missed a key point of the 
protocol sentence debate and wildly failed to acknowledge the dynamics of the 
debate that took members of the left-wing of the Circle far beyond the question 
of whether theirs was a coherence theory.
This section first surveys Hempel (1939), and second, discusses its 
relevance to the Camap and Neurath positions that emerged from the protocol 
sentence debate.
Hempel takes his cue from Max Black (1937) as his starting point for a 
definition of ‘vagueness’, where that concept is distinguished from (Hempel 
1939, pp. 163) “generality and ambiguity.”1 A symbol for an object is vague 
when it is not possible to determine whether or not that symbol applies to an 
object in a given instance. Vagueness (1939, pp. 164) arises from different 
usages of a term among various user groups of a language. Thus, he notes (ibid), 
a deep-sea organism not clearly belonging to plants or animals may be 
designated either category depending on members of user groups asked: “If 
several observers are asked whether the term ‘plant’ does or does not apply to 
that object, there will be a certain number m of affirmative answers and a certain 
number n of negative ones.”
Hempel (ibid) notes that Black attempts to formulate a “numerical 
determination” of a term’s relative vagueness through the “consistency of 
application” of a term T to some object x [C(T,x)]. Briefly, the term ‘plant’
1 For Black (1937, p. 430), ‘generality’ is characterized by the application of a 
symbol to a number of objects, while ‘ambiguity’ is characterized by a symbol 
having a number of meanings. Vagueness thus differs since a vague symbol will 
have only one meaning, but it is not clear when that symbol applies or not to a 
particular object.
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applies to an object with a relative consistency that can be defined by the “limit 
of the ratio m/n, when the group of observers is more and more extended, and the 
number of decisions made by its members is indefinitely increased.” When a 
symbol T may be applied to several objects, then these objects may be ordered 
along an axis according to the decreasing consistency of application of T -  
instances in which groups affirm T on the left (assign ‘plant’) to those denying T 
(assign ‘animal’) on the right of the horizontal axis. This produces a curve that, 
according to Hempel (ibid), Black “calls the consistency profile for the 
application of the vague symbol T to the given series of objects.” The steepness 
of the curve in the middle of the ordering gives the relative consistency (ibid, p. 
164): “the steeper the drop, the smaller the number of doubtful cases, and 
therefore the smaller the vagueness (the greater precision) of the symbol.”
Hempel (ibid) notes a gap in Black’s designation of ‘vagueness’ because 
the notion of steepness of curve has no metrical scale against which to place the 
axes of the system: for the horizontal axis, “the objects of the series have simply 
been put into what may be called a topological order.... But there is no additional 
criterion stipulating under what conditions two objects in the linear arrangement 
are to represented as equidistant.” One knows only that one object precedes the 
other and not the extent to which the vague term is applied to each relative to the 
others. Steepness therefore cannot function to determine vagueness in Black’s 
account.
However Hempel’s worry is not over the general idea of Black’s 
designation, but his particular technical expression. Hempel (ibid) claims to 
avoid the problem with Black’s account by modifying the initial definition of C 
(T,x) as the “(limit of the) ratio m/m+n.” C is thereby restricted to values 
between 0 and 1, with vagueness of a symbol falling around Vi. Hempel defines 
precision (pr) then as the extent to which a symbol differs from Vi and vagueness 
(vg) therefore is, according to his definition, 1 -  pr. Hempel’s expression of 
precision as applied to a series S is not important for the present discussion. 
However, for the initiated it looks like the following:
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pr =  ^E  (C(T, x.) -  *]’.
Hempel (ibid, p. 166) argues that the study of vagueness belongs to a 
general theory of “the process in which something functions as a sign” -  or 
‘semiotics’. He (ibid) notes that according to C.W. Morris (1938), ‘semiosis’ is 
the process in which something comes to function as a sign and involves three 
correlates: “the sign, the subject matter it refers to, and those who use the sign or 
respond to it.” Branches of semiotics may involve exclusive aspects -  i.e. syntax, 
which refers to the formal properties of a language, or semantics, which 
examines rules for the relations between symbols and designata. However, a 
consideration of a concept like ‘vagueness’ must “take into account all the 
correlates involved in semiosis.” ‘Vagueness’ thus does not designate merely 
formal syntactic properties of a language, nor rules that link symbols to objects, 
but designation of such concepts requires (Hempel, 1939, p. 166), “reference to 
the symbols, their users, and their designata.”
Hempel (ibid) argues that ‘vagueness’ is thereby an empirically grasped 
concept, since it is an empirical question how user groups apply a term (ibid, p.
167): “Statements about the degree of vagueness with which a term is used by a 
certain group of persons, are obviously empirical in character; they refer to the 
speaking or writing behaviour of certain individuals; their establishment requires 
empirical investigation.” This feature is important to emphasize in Hempel’s 
paper because it aids to clarify certain aspects of the protocol sentence debate.
It will be fruitful to consider Hempel’s example of weight and vagueness 
and examine whether logical symbols are characterizable as vague. He suggests 
that a set of balances indicating weight can function as an analogy, but also count 
as a case of genuine vagueness. A set of balances produces cards indicating 
weight -  one weighs an object and the scales print a card giving the measured 
weight. Hempel (ibid, p. 167) writes, “These balances may be regarded as a 
group of individuals speaking a very simple common language. The terms of this 
language are vague, just like those occurring in any historical language.” They 
are vague in two ways: first, if a scale uses sufficiently small units of
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measurement, and a load is weighed several times, there may be random 
variations. Second, if a load is weighed by different scales in the set, there will 
be likewise a variation in results. Taking the scales as an analogy he writes 
(ibid),
Some of the ‘speakers’ of that group will perhaps ‘apply to the given load 
the term “60 kgs’” , others, by yielding a different statement, will ‘assert 
that that term does not apply’. Thus, a certain number m of positive and a 
certain number n of negative ‘answers to the question as to whether the 
term ‘60kg’ applies to that load’ will be obtained....
Vagueness in this analogy is exhibited by deviations of results, which is (ibid, p.
168), “common to all measuring instruments, including living organisms.” The 
point one might take for the present concern with respect to the protocol sentence 
debate is that ‘60 kg’ may be defined precisely. Moreover, rules of application 
may likewise be formulated that tell precisely when an object weighs 60 kg 
(when it is placed on an accurate scale under certain conditions etc.). However, 
to articulate the precision of a particular statement ‘this bag of flour weighs 60 
kg’, one must account for the context within which the statement has been 
applied according to specified semantic rules. That is, to account for random 
variations of measurement among various scales, one must account for the 
conditions within which the scale was used etc. Consistency of application of the 
term ’60 kg’ as spelled out by Black and clarified by Hempel will indicate the 
extent to which ’60 kg’ is a vague term applied in a given context.2 If the scales 
are taken to be an analogy for human individuals, the degree of vagueness of a 
concept applied in a given context, one needs to articulate the conditions under 
which some term T has been applied to an object. This will of course involve an 
account of (what Carnap calls psychological aspects of) beliefs and assumptions 
of individuals employing that concept.3
2 One may also put it in terms of precision: consistency of application of the term 
’60 kg’ renders it more or less precise in its particular application.
3 Hempel is not attempting to argue the Neurathian line that vagueness is present 
in all scientific statements. That ineliminable Ballungen are present throughout 
science (via the employment of an unclear mix of vague and precise terms) is a
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Can logical symbols be characterized as vague or do they constitute a 
class of precise symbols? Are descriptive symbols the only sort that exhibits a 
relative degree of vagueness? Hempel proposes that one must examine 
vagueness further to provide an answer (ibid, p. 169). He has characterized 
vagueness to this point as variations in use of a term: sometimes it will be 
applied to an object and sometimes not. Certain variations of use would depend 
upon (ibid) “observers’ perceptual apparatuses.” For example two individuals 
under the same circumstances may apply the term ‘yellow’ to different objects, 
but this is not an instance of vagueness because the individuals may have 
different perceptual apparatuses. On the other hand, he notes (ibid, p.170), 
‘yellow’ may be employed as a vague term if one has learned to apply it “in a 
rather liberal way so as to cover, say certain shades which the other observer has 
been to term ‘green’.” Vagueness here arises in the “speaking habits” of users, 
since there is no strict line distinguishing yellow from green.
Descriptive terms assigned to objects would fall into this latter category, 
since they are mostly learned by “ostensive definitions” which allow for 
variations in the application of defined terms. Moreover (ibid), for the same 
reasons, logical terms like, “not,” “and,” “if—then,” are not “absolutely precise.” 
Usage of these terms are learned with examples and “illustrative comments 
which do not prevent the occurrence of variations in their application” (ibid). No 
terms therefore in interpreted languages are free from imprecision.
However, Hempel (ibid, p.171) remarks that artificial languages4 are 
immune from such vagueness because they have not been given any 
interpretation: “the question of vagueness does not even arise since one of the 
correlates of the semiotic relation of vagueness is missing, namely the designata 
of the linguistic terms.” Thus artificial languages are immune to vagueness, but
starting point. The question for Hempel (ibid) is the extent to which “suitable 
logical devices” can reduce vagueness.
4 These artificial languages would be of the sort developed by Camap in his 
attention to logical relations within formally constructed languages.
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also they are not about anything empirical. To be empirical they must be 
interpreted in one form or another, but that is to introduce vague concepts to 
these languages. The vagueness of the interpreted language does not entail the 
vagueness of the abstracted, artificial language (ibid, p. 176): there is,
no place for a purely semantical concept of vagueness.... Thus the 
question as to the influence of vagueness upon the validity of the 
principles of logic does not arise on the purely syntactical and semantical 
level of investigation, and no modification of the logical symbolism is 
necessary.
Can modifying the logical structure of a given language decrease 
vagueness? Hempel argues ‘yes’ (ibid, p 177): by the introduction of gradable 
concepts (“harder than”), which are more precise than natural language terms 
like “hard.” Names which designate properties, like ‘hard’, can be replaced by 
those which designate relations, like ‘harder than’. Such concepts exhibit a 
different logical structure than those designating properties. Hempel writes (ibid, 
p. 178), “This is the sense in which vagueness may really influence logic: it may 
suggest (though not require) a modification of the logical structure of scientific 
concepts.”
In this section Hempel notes that ‘vagueness’ is an empirically grasped 
concept because it belongs to the domain of semiotics, which involves syntax, 
semantics and an account of user groups’ applications of terms applied according 
to the semantical rules. This underwrites both Carnap’s claim of the 
indispensability of the formal/empirical distinction and Neurath’s claims about 
ineliminable imprecision of scientific statements at their point of application. 
Hempel (ibid, p.174) assumes for his analysis Carnap’s crucial distinction: “the 
question of logical principles arises, strictly speaking, only on the abstract level 
where language is dealt with as a theoretical semantico-syntactical system; the 
questions concerning vagueness, on the other hand, refer to language as a form of 
behaviour.” It is because of this distinction that one may accept Tarski’s theory
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of truth, while indicating Neurath’s point that its usefulness to actual scientific 
practice is negligible.
Hempel’s scale example demonstrates the point of the formal/empirical 
distinction. The weights printed onto cards by the scales indicate vagueness, 
since given small enough units of measurement they will produce varying 
results. From a contemporary perspective a scale example may seem rather 
primitive, since it is now possible to make incredibly precise measurements of 
weight. However, this is perhaps the point: how can one make existing tools 
more precise? Can one expand the systematic power of technical tools to attempt 
a broader application of their conclusions? Carnap’s attention to the logical 
aspects of science can be understood in precisely this fashion: refining the logical 
machinery to indicate how much can be done with it. Thus, Carnap can start 
from Neurath’s view that all statements consist of Ballungen and leave an open 
question the extent to which one may continue to clarify those Ballungen.
As an instance of refining technical machinery, Hempel (1939) asks 
whether logical statements themselves can be vague and whether the introduction 
of vague concepts affect the validity of logical operations. His analysis suggests 
that logical structures are not vague: that vagueness only emerges upon the 
interpretation of those structures into the empirical domain. Thus, according to 
Hempel, validity itself is not affected by vagueness, but logical formulations may 
aid in reducing vagueness of empirical statements on the grounds that it provides 
a precise inferential framework with which to clarify the structure of empirical 
statements. One can never be rid of vague statements in empirical science, but in 
the attempt to clarify them, Hempel argues that vagueness does not reside in the 
inferential framework.
Hempel’s analysis indicates a further way in which he might contribute to 
an understanding of Carnap and Neurath’s rather confusing connections at the 
end of the protocol sentence debate. Carnap, of course, was interested in the 
extent to which one might construct a robust formal language to highlight the 
structural dynamics of empirical science. One can see an application in Hempel’s
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1939 paper: if one can establish a consistency of application of a term to an 
object to a relative degree of precision, one may be able to systematize that 
application in a purely formal structure, and thereby afford an objective criterion 
for its application. The structure would, of course, be revisable given subsequent 
empirical studies of usage. However, in this sense a term T may be applied to an 
object x with a high degree of consistency such that it is fruitful to systematize 
this application by representing it formally. In the formal language one may call 
Tx a true statement. The robustness of semantical language (which gives rules of 
application for the object language) will determine the extent to which the true 
statement may be applied empirically. However, the formal representation of the 
application of the concept T to object x, would be generated from its consistency 
of empirical application among various user groups.
Resolving the protocol sentence debate
One may now consider the outcome of the protocol sentence debate. This section 
takes up Thomas Uebel’s claims that the dispute between Neurath and Camap 
can be resolved -  or at least a resolution is not ruled out in principle. This affects 
how one understands the difference between their views. Thus this section will 
have three parts: (1.) survey Uebel’s attempts to reconcile Carnap and Neurath’s 
disputes; (2.) assess Uebel’s claims; (3.) suggest a reading that builds on Uebel’s 
work to understand the relation of their respective views.
Uebel (2001, p. 211) writes that the emerging differences in the debate 
between Neurath and Carnap call into question whether they ought to be 
considered as still sharing a common programme. For Uebel (ibid) this is an 
important question, not as “a case of sweeping a particularly dusty and obscure 
corner in the ramshackled mansion of logical empiricism that might as well 
remain undisturbed,” but because he is interested in the nature of the legacy of 
logical empiricism. For the present inquiry, this appears to be a crucial question 
for which to forge some clear answer because the historical legacy of Hempel 
and its reinterpretation in the following chapter rides on both the relative
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connections one can locate between the Neurathian and Carnapian views and 
how Hempel may have understood those connections. Uebel’s exemplary paper 
provides occasion to articulate how Neurath and Camap can be understood as 
connected, without glossing their important differences.
Uebel examines three differences between Carnap and Neurath’s views 
(ibid). First, the rational reconstruction of Camap “recognized no bounds,” other 
than logical incoherence, to conceptual considerations, while the naturalism of 
Neurath restricted inquiry to “humanly realizable languages and schemes of 
inference.” Second, he notes that the “hierarchical model of the relation of the 
individual sciences” employed by Camap stood in opposition to Neurath’s 
encyclopedic model, which emphasized the interconnectedness, and consequent 
incompleteness, of the whole of individual sciences. Third, Uebel points out a 
distinction between “Carnap’s enthusiasm for Tarski’s theory of truth” and 
Neurath’s “increasing scepticism” regarding both the possibility of semantics 
(given Tarski’s definition of truth) and formalism in general.
Uebel (ibid) contrasts Carnap’s rational reconstructionism from Neurath’s 
naturalism. First however, he notes that the latter’s view is distinguishable from 
Quinean naturalism, which is characterized in part by a rejection of the analytic- 
synthetic distinction (ibid, p. 212): “Neurath accepted Carnap’s treatment of 
analyticity in [Camap (1937)], going on to deny both that analytic statements are 
epistemologically foundational or ‘certain’ and that we ourselves could ever 
reach a ‘final verdict’ about whether a statement was analytic or not.”5 Uebel 
(ibid) concludes that Neurath then accepts the analytic-synthetic distinction “as a 
concept of logico-linguistic analysis.” For Neurath it was not understood as a 
concept meant to bolster a foundationalist epistemology, as it was for Quine.6
5 See Neurath (1934, p. 104).
6 In the same passage, Uebel notes that Neurath embraced the notion of 
analyticity in Carnap’s syntax definition, holding it to be methodologically 
sounder than Carnap’s own later semantic definition. What this suggests is that 
Neurath perhaps did not understand the problems with Carnap’s syntactical 
programme as discussed above. Moreover, even though Neurath eventually 
accepted Tarski’s semantic definition of truth as correct, he failed to recognize
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Uebel (ibid) thus raises the question about what sort of naturalism 
Neurath espoused, noting more precisely some differences with Quine. First, in 
rejecting a hierarchical conception of the sciences, Neurath rejects the primacy of 
physics, taking the “social sciences seriously.” Quine, Uebel (ibid) notes, sided 
with Camap. Second, Neurath, in agreement with Carnap, “does not subscribe to 
the realism that typically characterizes Quine’s, even more so the contemporary 
correspondentist naturalism.” Third, as mentioned, in contrast to Quine, Neurath 
accepts the Camapian notion of analyticity as a codification “of linguistic 
conventions.” Uebel (ibid) remarks that this is a “carefully circumscribed 
acceptance of apriorism.”
As Uebel (ibid) notes, Neurath’s naturalism thus may be characterized 
(perhaps remarkably) by an acceptance of apriorism, since there must be some 
set of initial concepts from which to launch a methodology of analysis of 
science. Those concepts are given ultimately by a decision: there are no 
ontological commitments to reality underwriting any such selection. The present 
thesis indicates that for logical empiricists the decision to select a methodological 
approach to the analysis of science must be based, first on the formulation of a 
language purged of metaphysical concepts and second, on practical 
considerations for the fruitful application of such a methodology. How well does 
the methodology do justice to the concepts employed in the sciences? Is it 
governed adequately by logical constraints given according to the logical 
framework within which the methodology is applied? Does it lend itself to 
metaphysics (a step backward in the developments of the logical empiricism, 
according to Neurath)? There is no claim in Neurath’s philosophy of science that 
a priori principles are underwritten by appeal to any ontological commitment 
regarding the state of the world. For Neurath, there can be no ontologically 
justified claim to such a relation between the selection of a methodology (and the 
a priori principles therein) for analysis of science and any commitment to the
(or, perhaps, simply rejected) the way in which that definition leads to the 
semantic programme developed by Carnap.
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way the world is.7 Nevertheless, it is evident that a starting point is necessary, 
and although that starting point may be revised, it is taken to be a priori in the 
methodology within which it is employed. Protocol statements just are the basic 
building blocks for a logical empiricist methodological approach to analysing the 
structure of science. This is perhaps a contentious claim and, as seen in Uebel, 
raises the question of whether Neurath’s view would even count as naturalist. 
Neurath certainly does not advocate naturalism of the Quinean sort. Uebel writes 
(ibid), “Just as it is a mistake to read Carnap as an epistemological 
foundationalist and more or less traditional empiricist, so it might accordingly be
7 One might argue, as Nancy Cartwright (2007) does, that one’s methodology 
cannot be separated from one’s metaphysics -  or that metaphysics and 
methodology ‘go hand in hand’. However, the present statement of Neurath’s 
view need not contrast with such a view, given that ‘metaphysics’ is a rather 
ambiguous term. To assert that metaphysics goes hand in hand with the selection 
of a methodology could be to argue one of three things. First, it could be to argue 
that one cannot have methodology without metaphysics: that one simply cannot 
be without metaphysical commitments and purport to construct a methodology 
without acknowledging that there are commitments that influence such a 
methodology. This view is rather strong and would fail to recognize that refining 
a methodology of analysis may be akin to sharpening a tool. One may sharpen an 
ax, and be very good at it, without necessarily being committed to the notion that 
it is necessarily the right tool to be using in a given scenario. The second 
conception might be to say simply that insofar as metaphysics must inform 
methodology, there are reasons one has for selecting one methodology or not and 
those reasons cannot be given justification by the methodology itself (or in the 
particular historical debate with which this thesis thus far has been concerned, by 
the physicalist language employed in science). However, this is not to disagree 
with Neurath or Camap, but to employ the notion ‘metaphysics’ in a different 
manner. For the Vienna Circle philosophers, ‘metaphysics’ indicated a domain of 
concepts that could not be given adequate formulation in the language of 
physicalism, but traded as though such concepts provided explanatory import 
within physicalism. To argue that metaphysics and methodology go hand in hand 
in the sense that there must be reasons for adopting one’s methodology is to 
point to the psychological aspects of theory acceptance. For example, one may 
in fact have realist commitments about science, but those commitments cannot 
explain the success of science for Neurath and Carnap. Rather they can explain 
why a given set of individuals accepts the explanatory adequacy of a scientific 
theory over certain domains (even as yet unempirical domains). A third argument 
might be more generally that one cannot justify the employment of a 
methodology without philosophical reflection upon the grounds for such 
employment. Philosophy in this sense would involve an exploration of the limits 
of employed methodology in science. As such it characterizes a significant 
aspect of Carnap, Neurath and Hempel’s approach to scientific knowledge.
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a mistake to read Neurath’s naturalism as a mere anticipation of Quinean, even 
less of contemporary philosophical naturalism.”
Uebel (ibid) is quick to note that though Neurath accepted Carnap’s 
notion of analyticity, it “does not mean, of course, that Neurath’s own theorizing 
made much use” of it. On the other hand, Uebel notes that Neurath’s view leads 
one to see the difference between his naturalism and Carnap’s rational 
reconstructionism “more along the lines of a division of labour than as an 
outright opposition.” Whereas Carnap focused on the construction of logico- 
linguistic frameworks and constraints the rules of such frameworks might place 
upon acceptance of a given theory within them, Neurath “explored patterns of 
theory acceptance,” in the history of scientific practice -  the historical (cultural, 
sociological) conditions under which a particular theory actually came to be 
accepted. That is, Camap attended to the logical aspects of science, while 
Neurath to historico-sociological aspects. And Uebel (ibid) reminds the reader 
that both Neurath and Camap explicitly stated the need “for both types of 
metatheoretical approaches to science.”
One may wonder still how ‘naturalism’ might be an appropriate moniker 
for Neurath’s thought -  that perhaps to emphasize an a priori element in his 
thought is to miss a defining aspect. However Uebel (ibid, pp. 212-13) points out 
that in Neurath’s appeal to a priori concepts of a methodology, “no substantive a 
priori determinations of the nature of any subject matter are involved.” Neurath 
rejects metaphysics and (ibid), “the Kantian project of proving the possibility of 
knowledge from some transcendental condition,”8 arguing (in a familiar phrase in 
Neurathian literature), “The possibility of science becomes apparent in science 
itself’ (ibid, p. 61). There are no substantive first principles from which to assess 
science. One elects to utilize certain principles on the grounds discussed above. 
Moreover (ibid, p. 213), any epistemological questions cannot be assessed from 
“substantive a priori determinations of what justification and knowledge are 
supposed to be” [italics added].
8 See Neurath (1931a, p. 67).
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In short, both Neurath and Carnap accepted the latter’s concept of 
analyticity and “his related conception of the relativized a priori,” but these 
concepts related to conventions, to which “the attributes ‘true’ and ‘false’ do not 
properly apply” (ibid). Uebel writes (ibid), “Neurath’s acceptance of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction thus pertained to a tool for the analysis of scientific 
theories, not to some set of unrevisable conceptual truths.” He concludes, 
“Joined with the denial of ontological realism, naturalism in Neurath’s hands 
retains much of the conventionalist impulse that also characterizes Carnap’s 
famous principle of tolerance in language construction. What we find so far is 
not so much opposition than potential for the fruitful division of labour.”
According to Uebel (ibid), the second difference between Neurath and 
Camap was their views concerning the hierarchy of the sciences: “all-important 
for [Neurath] was the connectability of theories of different disciplines for 
purposes of prediction,” while Uebel attributes to Carnap a more hierarchical 
view.9 Thus, unity for Carnap was understood to be characterized by the 
reduction of empirical statements to a formalized metalanguage robust enough 
sufficiently to account for definitions and semantic rules involving those 
statements. For Neurath unity was characterized by the encyclopedia: joint 
efforts of all the natural and social sciences operating under a universal jargon,
9 One needs to be clear here on Carnap’s view: in what way did he advocate the 
“primacy of physics?” Does Uebel adequately characterize Carnap’s view? For 
example, if Carnap’s was a conventionalist view, he might be seen to take the 
structure of successes in physics and attempt to see how they work in the 
sciences more generally. In that sense his ‘hierarchical’ view may be understood 
as adopted for pragmatic reasons. There is a clearer methodological structure in 
physics and the way logic and mathematics have been successful there, they may 
likewise function in other aspects of science with an adequate metalanguage 
detailing the rules of syntax and semantic rules of application of that syntax. 
Also, Uebel cites Camap (1995), which is a reprint of Camap (1934a), but that is 
not the middle-to-late Carnap to whom Uebel is comparing Neurath. Richardson 
has shown that Carnap changed his view substantially after the 1934 publication 
and after accepting Tarski’s theory of truth. By the late 1930s Camap had 
rejected epistemology in favor of the logic of science, but how does this rejection 
connect to his alleged view of the primacy of physics? Perhaps it is that physics 
provides a domain wherein one can determine the successful application of the 
logic of science. The fruitful application there provides a basis from which to 
construct a robust metalanguage that possibly can apply to ever-expanding 
domains within science.
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wherein all concepts could be given physicalist expression. The difference here 
ties to their respective views on the explanatory power of formalized languages 
to explain theory acceptance in science. Of course, Camap held out that the tools 
of mathematics and logic, given a sufficiently robust metalanguage, could 
possibly account for the language of science generally (and thus the acceptance 
of theories in the development of empirical science). Uebel (ibid, p. 214) points 
out that for Neurath, Carnap’s logic of science was too counterfactual to account 
for empirical science. For Neurath, to account for empirical science, one can 
never appeal to primitive exact formalizations: science in practice always 
operates with some level of imprecise concepts that will be missed by precise 
formalizations.
The difference thus is tied to their respective conceptions of unification of 
science: Carnap’s in a potential reduction of the sciences to mathematics and 
logic employed in physics, and Neurath’s (ibid), “via the partially procedural 
conventions of theory acceptance.” Thus, Uebel claims that Carnap and Neurath 
may not be understood only as differing methodologically, but over their 
fundamental conceptions of unity in science. Uebel (ibid, p. 214) writes that 
given Neurath’s view, unity is not to be found via mathematical and logical 
formalization of natural language, but in both coherence of a statement with the 
body of scientific statements and the behaviour of scientists, who provide the 
“conventional determinations of the epistemic goals for the theory in question” 
(ibid).
It should be noted here that both Camap and Neurath emphasized the 
constructive nature of their methodologies. As Uebel writes (ibid), “the point of 
their conventionalist take on theory construction was the denial of 
epistemological realism, the pre-givenness of epistemic norms and standards.” 
Unity is not given by some pre-existing state of the world. It is found in the 
constructed methodologies with which they attempt to account for the world. 
Moreover, they both held that their programmes were subject to change, revision 
or rejection. As Uebel points out (ibid, p. 215), “Neither of them would have to 
claim that the features they were concentrating on were the ones that really
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accounted for [unity of science] all along, nor that they would hold with equal 
weight of all scientific disciplines.”
Uebel here suggests that their different approaches “threatens to be a 
serious faultline” between their respective projects (ibid, p. 214). However, he 
responds that because they were not attempting to find a pre-given notion of 
unity, but rather are understood as formulating criteria “that we might be 
persuaded to accept,” there is no principled objection to viewing them as part of 
the same project (ibid, p. 215).
Uebel’s argument is worth clarifying here. He clearly lays out the way in 
which Carnap’s programme is neither appealing to, nor available to Neurath 
given the latter’s emphasis on procedural conventions of science. Uebel lays the 
two views out as distinct, but then holds that they are not incompatible because 
of the open-endedness of their viewpoints and the notion that what they were 
doing was attempting to construct a methodology. On the other hand one might 
argue that they are focusing on different aspects of the same notion, but Camap 
is searching for a systematic approach that, among other things, could render 
Neurath’s holistic orientation more precise. In a Carnapian vein one might ask 
whether one can locate formal properties of the social and pragmatic conditions 
of adopted procedural conventions in science. If so, can these properties be 
generalized to apply across a sufficiently wide domain, such that one may take a 
systematic approach to the analysis of those conventions? The answer here 
should be a qualified yes: yes because Carnap believes it is not ruled out in 
principle, and qualified because it is determined based on the successful 
applications of the formal frameworks in empirical domains.
Thus one might argue something slightly different from Uebel. He 
suggests their views are compatible-in-principle because Carnap and Neurath are 
open to revising their positions. On the contrary, one might not worry about 
compatibility at this level: about whether the Neurath and Carnap views can be 
brought together -  as a historical fact, Uebel agrees, they were not. Rather one 
might argue that they are compatible because they attend to different aspects of a
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common philosophical programme. Carnap is working on a “more systematic” 
account of something like Neurath’s social and pragmatic aspects of science 
(more systematic in virtue of his attempts to formalize the social and pragmatic -  
for better or for worse).
Uebel (ibid, p. 215) locates a third difference around “Carnap’s 
championship of Tarski-truth and Neurath’s vehement opposition.” According to 
Uebel, the differences here would preclude seeing them as working on two 
aspects of the same programme. And Uebel argues that it is not enough to 
“rectify” Neurath’s “blunders” (i.e. his conflation of ‘truth’ and ‘acceptance’) to 
overcome their differences. The issue of Tarski’s theory of truth has been 
discussed above, and the view argued in this thesis has been spelled out there. 
For the moment it will be prudent to continue the present survey to indicate how 
Uebel treats the issue so as to facilitate an assessment of it.
Uebel is sympathetic to certain revisions of Neurath’s thought that do 
justice to his position (ibid). However Uebel does not think such revisions 
necessarily serve his task of forging reconciliation between their apparent 
disparate views on truth and consequent views regarding the nature of an 
appropriate methodology to assess the language of science. He suggests that on 
the basis of their alleged stances on Tarski’s theory of truth, their views may not 
be reconcilable after all. (Of course, Camap endorsed Tarski’s definition of truth 
from 1935, while as has been seen, Neurath initially rejected it outright.) Uebel’s 
question then regards Neurath’s first worry regarding the programme of 
semantics (whether he accepted Tarski’s theory of truth) and concludes that he 
was worried principally about a retreat to metaphysics.
Next Uebel locates Neurath’s second criticism that semantic terms apply 
to “precise logical calculi” but not to the language used in empirical science. 
Carnap’s semantics cannot apply to actual scientific language, since the rules of 
the formal construction (of an idealized representation) of a language, are 
routinely violated in the empirical domain. Thus, Carnap’s logic of science 
cannot tell about empirical science. Of course, as discussed above, this reflects
135
their respective views on the usefulness of formalizations: Carnap held that the 
potential success at representing empirical science formally was not ruled out in 
principle.
Uebel (ibid, p. 216) confronts a third worry that their two views reflect 
different conceptions on the nature of language: as a calculus or a “universal 
medium.” Neurath would be understood to have held the latter view, holding that 
one cannot step outside language to assess it. Carnap’s semantic view on the 
other hand would hold that one could apply a given language via a metalanguage 
that gives both all the definitions and rules internal to the language in question 
and further rules for how that language is meant to be applied. Uebel (ibid) 
writes, “The universalist view would seem to forbid metalinguistic semantic talk, 
the calculus view allows it.”
Uebel’s reply to this worry is that one may hold a mixed view. And 
Neurath appeared to. Uebel (ibid) writes that Camap was a calculist with respect 
to constructed formal languages, while Neurath was a “universalist vis-a-vis 
natural language.” On the other hand (ibid), Uebel notes that Neurath advocated 
Carnap’s logical syntax programme, which suggests he was also a calculist with 
respect to formalized languages. The “crucial question” for Uebel is whether 
Camap was a calculist with respect to natural language, to which he replies ‘no’ 
(ibid, pp. 216-17): Carnap always focused on specific formal languages. 
Moreover, notes Uebel (ibid, p. 217), Camap “shared Quine’s doubts whether 
natural languages contained anything like the precise concept of analyticity his 
explications were aiming for.... All along it was not natural languages that he set 
out to analyze in model-theoretic fashion.”
Uebel concedes that though he has forged something like the conditions 
wherein one can view a certain agreement in the respective programmes of 
Neurath and Camap, the nature of such an agreement is by no means clear: “the 
methodological demarcation of formal and empirical inquiries does not yet 
determine the strategic role and relative weight carried by either.” That is, though 
both Carnap and Neurath would recognize the legitimacy of the other’s
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programme, it is not clear the weight they give to either. Does one rely more 
heavily on the systematic attempts to forge a formal construction of languages or 
on the more general historico-sociological analysis that emphasizes the necessary 
ambiguities inherent in actual scientific practice? Moreover, Neurath may 
express worries about the point of (ibid) “producing ever more subtle edifices of 
formal confirmation theory ... when we are faced with actual contradictions 
between our best physical theories, never mind the vagaries of knowledge of the 
social world.” On the other hand, Camap may wonder about the point of 
“discouraging formal inquiries when rigorous clarity concerning our basic 
analytical tools themselves is imperative.” Any reconciliation between Carnap 
and Neurath given this assessment seems problematic at best.
Moreover Uebel still worries about Carnap’s global aspirations and the 
effect this might have on an understanding of the relative conformity of his to 
Neurath’s viewpoint. If his target was to formalize natural language in order to 
provide a deductive link between scientific theory to observation, then perhaps 
his view contradicted Neurath’s after all. Camap of course intended to apply his 
descriptive syntax to observation terms used in the practice of science. The origin 
of those terms comes simply via an appeal to the class of terms used 
conventionally in biology and psychology (ibid, p. 218). This would relativize 
the a priori nature of the formalized observation clauses, rooting them in 
convention and practice. However Neurath’s further worry would be that testing 
observation sentences requires an examination of the application of those 
sentences within the particular historico-sociological contexts that they are made. 
Any such testing cannot “be enlightened by the idealizations that Camap 
entertained” (ibid). To be sure, Uebel writes (ibid), “Carnap was far from 
denying that he traded in idealizations. Indeed, his logical reconstructions were 
‘ideal types’ precisely because they sought to approximate the calculus 
conception of language.”
Uebel (ibid) concludes then that Carnap’s “conception of scientific 
language was a different one” from Neurath’s. However he claims that there is 
nothing in his analysis that indicates Carnap intended to tell “the ‘whole’ story
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about ‘the’ scientific language.” So nothing about his view precludes their 
respective programmes being understood as different aspects of a common 
methodology. The main difference appears to be in their respective “estimation 
of how far the formalist agenda of the logic of science can help to elucidate 
science and how much of it will have to be elucidated by the contextual and 
pragmatic features investigated by Neurath’s ‘behaviouristics’ of science.”
Thus the potential compatibility between Carnap’s logic of science and 
Neurath’s historico-sociological naturalism (ibid, p. 219) “is unstable until the 
competition of priorities between the logic and the pragmatics of science is 
resolved.” That resolution, from a contemporary perspective, indicates that their 
respective views “stand in need of reformulation.” What Uebel claims is needed 
is a “systematic account of the philosophical implications of ... pragmatical 
questions of language choice.” Finally, Uebel writes (ibid),
So is Carnap’s and Neurath’s reconstituted collaborative project doomed 
to ultimate failure? It is perhaps still too early to tell: to investigate this 
would be to start down a path that was, after all, not taken in the actual 
history of logical empiricism. Yet that at least in principle it could have 
been taken is what I hope to have shown here.
For Uebel, a rapprochment between Neurathian and Camapian 
philosophy is not ruled out in principle. Though their apparent differences 
regarding Tarski-truth and semantics threatens a deep rift, Uebel attempts to 
salvage their division by suggesting that they each hold a mixed view of the 
nature of language. That is, they both, to different extents, were ‘calculists’ with 
respect to formalized languages. He argues that Camap was not a calculist about 
natural language: he did not hold that one could formalize all empirical language 
in science. This raises the need then of philosophical reflection regarding the 
extent to which one ought to rely upon the formal considerations articulated and 
pursued by Camap and the socio-pragmatic considerations of Neurath. At 
bottom, it does not rule out that they may fall under a common philosophical 
umbrella.
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However, one may take pause over Uebel’s points in the hopes of 
contributing to a still clearer and stronger reading of how Carnap and Neurath’s 
programmes may be reconcilable -  or at least how they may be related under a 
common methodological umbrella. First of all, Uebel’s claim that Camap did not 
seek to formalize all of natural language is partially correct, but the present thesis 
indicates that framing the issue this way does not suitably capture Carnap’s view. 
Certainly, his starting point was not the claim that logic could be enlisted to 
formalize all of scientific language. However, he did not take it to be ruled out in 
principle: if one can construct a sufficiently robust formalized language 
containing all definitions in the natural language and a meta-language giving 
semantic rules to apply definitions within that (conventionally adopted) 
language, then one could in principle formalize the language in question. As 
Uebel notes, Carnap traded in idealizations that sought to approximate language. 
This indicates that he did not think these idealizations encompassed all the 
features of that language, but it does not preclude the possibility that a 
sufficiently robust calculus may be so constructed. It remained an empirical 
question the extent to which such idealizations might approximate natural 
language to an ever more precise extent.
This is to say that constructing formalized idealizations of language is not 
understood as Carnap’s solution to the problem of the connection between theory 
and observation. Rather it amounts to the problem itself. And that problem can 
be addressed through an application of the formal structures one enlists to 
represent natural language. Recall the discussion above regarding the Aufbau. 
Richardson’s detailed historical analysis indicates that Carnap was not after a 
reduction of scientific theory to subjective experience as a solution to the 
problem of scientific knowledge. Rather the problem itself was, given one 
assumes subjective experience as the starting point for an empiricist 
epistemological programme (which he took to be the generally agreed upon 
starting among empiricist epistemologists), how does one go from subjective 
experience to knowledge in science? Similarly, given that formalizations
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function to clarify relations among variables in constructed languages, to what 
extent can formalizations clarify constituents of empirical statements?
So Uebel is correct to assert that Camap was not after the formalization 
of natural language in the sense that the possibility of such a task was not his 
starting point. However, given the successful application of the tools of logic and 
mathematics, the question regarding the extent to which the ambiguities of 
empirical science and the natural language utilized therein might be systematized 
through those tools was an open question. It was answerable through the 
endeavour of pushing the limits of the applications of idealizations.
Second of all, one might revise, slightly, Uebel’s characterization of the 
problem facing Camap and Neurath with respect to the ‘nature of language’. At 
the risk of being pedantic, one might argue that given their mutual rejection of 
any sort of epistemological or ontological realism and, as Uebel points out, their 
consequent aim of formulating a methodology which has no systematic roots in 
any ‘reality’, they cannot be understood as disagreeing about the ‘nature’ of 
language. To appeal to such criteria would surely count as falling back toward 
metaphysics, since it would suggest there is a ‘real’ nature of language that they 
are attempting to formulate. Rather, their disagreement was pragmatic: what was 
an appropriate starting point from which to formulate a methodology for the 
assessment of language?
Moreover, the worry about their respective conceptions of the ‘nature of 
language’ may be misplaced because Neurath came to accept that Tarski’s theory 
was an adequate definition of truth. Friedman (2000, p. 51) states that Neurath 
reversed his initial opposition to Tarski at the Paris Congress of 1935. In part, it 
is based upon this acceptance that one can understand Neurath’s receptiveness to 
Carnap’s formal endeavours. However, he continued to be worried about 
whether formal languages have anything to say about the empirical domain, 
which marks the problem left at the end of the protocol sentence debate.
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This ties to another consideration. Uebel is correct to point out that 
Neurath worried about the potential retreat of formalism to metaphysics, wherein 
formal idealizations would be taken to have some foundational role that they 
cannot be afforded given the limits of empirical knowledge. Neurath exhibited a 
consistent criticism throughout the protocol sentence debate. But one might 
argue that it is in virtue of Neurath’s constant worries about metaphysics in 
Carnap’s attention to technical issues that proved his undoing in the subsequent 
development of logical empiricism. Richardson (1998, p. 207) writes that at the 
Paris congress of 1935, Camap laid out what he took to be three stages of 
philosophy. These stages signify Carnap’s own development from epistemology 
to the logic of science and they can illustrate for present purposes the way in 
which Carnap viewed worries about metaphysics. Richardson (ibid) writes,
In this essay, Carnap invited his audience to view current developments 
as a move to a third stage of scientific philosophy. In the first stage, 
scientific philosophy had rejected metaphysics. This ushered in a 
‘transition from speculative philosophy to epistemology’. The second 
stage had involved the rejection of the synthetic a priori and the 
consequent adoption of empiricism in epistemology.
The third stage marked Carnap’s move from epistemology to logic of science, 
wherein epistemology is (1936a, p. 36), “purified and decomposed into its 
constituent parts,” which were the psychological and logical (Richardson 1998,
p. 208).
Carnap’s development has been discussed above, but the point in 
identifying his position thus is to indicate that his programme developed from the 
first stage of purging scientific language of metaphysics. It moved on to an 
attempt to “purify” and decompose the language of science into parts. A 
scientific language must certainly be devoid of metaphysical concepts that can 
find no meaningful expression in the language of physicalism, but then what are 
the positive features of formal developments in logic and mathematics that might 
be applied to formulating a methodology for the analysis of science? This sort of
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question motivated a move within philosophy to explore more technical aspects 
of philosophical analysis, while the rejection of metaphysics was taken to be a 
launch point for the move. And though Neurath supported developing logical 
calculi, his ambiguous position on how far formal pursuits may function to 
clarify some of the very features he argued for in his physicalism rendered him 
ill placed to push historico-sociological aspects within the developing logical 
empiricism. This can be demonstrated below.
George Reisch suggests how logical empiricism came to be received as 
an ‘apolitical’ and ‘trivialized’ philosophy into the 1950s and beyond. In part this 
due to the absence of Neurath. Reisch’s paper (2001, p. 199) explores Neurath’s 
ideas about unpredictability (that unpredictability-in-principle ought to be 
recognized as a constraint upon scientific endeavours). Reisch argues that, “with 
some tweaking, they amount to a principled rejection of what would become one 
of the standard (if preliminary) models of explanation in philosophy of science, 
namely, Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological model [DN] and its extension to 
history and sociology.”10 Reisch argues that his reading of Neurath’s 
unpredictability principle (ibid) “opens a window on some larger questions about 
the history of logical empiricism.” Why did logical empiricism “at first, a vital, 
creative, and politically engaged project” transform into an “apolitical” and 
“trivialized” area of philosophy? And why were Neurath’s views not recognized 
in what came to be the received view of that philosophical tradition? Reisch 
claims that the two questions are related, suggesting it is in virtue of Neurath’s 
ideas falling out of favour that logical empiricism came to be understood as it 
did.
He writes (ibid), “Assume that Hempel’s work on DN explanation stoked 
the fires of what would become the explanation-industry, a large component of 
professional logical empiricism as it thrived in the 1950s and 1960s.” Because of 
this Reisch views Neurath as trying to steer logical empiricism in a different
10 This will certainly suggest a problem for the reading of Hempel in the 
following chapter, since it is argued there that Hempel ought to be understood as 
sympathetic to Neurath’s worries. However this apparent problem will not prove 
resilient given the historical picture.
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direction than he understood Hempel to be taking it. Reisch (ibid, p. 200) shows 
that Neurath (1931) presents a “vague outline” of what would become a DN 
model of explanation: sociologists attempt to establish laws that may be applied 
to individual situations. In the end such an application may afford certain types 
of prediction. By 1943, Reisch indicates, Neurath came to re-evaluate the very 
possibility of prediction (ibid): “He came to believe that the world is much more 
unpredicatable than he had suggested earlier, and he supplies his readers with 
nearly all they need to conclude that Hempelian explanation will generally not 
work for History or historical Sociology.”
Reisch lays out a general historical context within which Neurath 
expressed his opinion regarding Hempel’s work (ibid). He lived in Oxford and 
was establishing his ISOTYPE projects there. He lectured at All Soul’s College 
and was editor-in-chief of the Encyclopedia. Moreover he developed a concern 
over the notion of unpredictability in empiricism: that unpredictability-in- 
principle -  chance -  precluded notions that one could predict empirical events at 
all. And Neurath felt that his colleagues, like Charles Morris, a co-editor for the 
Encyclopedia, were too soft on thinkers Neurath would dismiss outright as 
metaphysicians. Reisch writes (ibid), “he was surprised by Morris who published 
a book called Paths of life: Preface to a World Religion (1942) in which Morris 
used not only the R-word (“religion”) but also the S-word (“Spengler”) in 
respectful, non-dismissive ways. Neurath wrote to Morris and urged him to look 
at his own, early essay against Spengler’s mischief.”11 Neurath appears to have 
been having less an influence on the intellectual culture within which his 
colleagues operated.
Moreover, Neurath felt he was being unfairly attacked, and worse, 
ignored by fellow philosophers. To wit, he felt that Russell (1940) was unfair and 
confused. It has been argued in the present thesis that Neurath’s view is justified 
-  that, though there were difficulties with Neurath’s overall expression of his 
view, Russell did not seem to understand key points of the discussion. 
Furthermore, when Neurath rushed out his 1943 manuscript for the next edition
11 See Neurath (1921).
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of the Encyclopedia, Camap removed his name from the editorial board of 
Neurath’s submission. Reisch writes (ibid, p. 202) that because the monograph 
was rushed into production and Carnap received only the proofs, rather than a 
draft, he relinquished editorial responsibility: “Carnap’s maneuver, Neurath 
believed, signalled that Neurath was a figure whose efforts did not even need to 
be taken seriously.” Neurath complained about disregard of his philosophical 
work by other colleagues and younger scholars, being represented as “merely an 
organizer and promoter for logical empiricism” (ibid). Reisch (ibid) cites a letter 
from Neurath to Camap: “I think that I, to a certain extent, am one of the pillars 
of this movement, not only its ‘promoter’ as people sometimes like to treat 
me.”12 Furthermore, he complained that in attacking certain Neurathian views, 
others had failed to even mention the views as his own. Schlick did not mention 
Neurath by name, while Schlick’s student, Herbert Feigl listed him merely as a 
sociologist (ibid, p. 203).
Overall, Neurath appears to have become marginalized among the logical 
empiricists during the period of the early 1940s. Intellectually this surely must 
have been because he failed to identify with the shift in emphasis within 
scientific philosophy toward a technically oriented systematic approach to the 
problems of empirical knowledge. The technical aspects of Carnap’s work that 
worried Neurath so much, with respect to metaphysics, reflected the direction 
technically oriented philosophers were headed. For Camap, logic and 
mathematics proved indispensable in clarifying problems within physics and they 
presented potentially fruitful frameworks with which one might clarify the 
language of science more generally.
One should draw a distinction between two claims that might be made 
here. First, there is the historical question of the trajectory of scientific 
philosophical thought -  the direction they actually took as an intellectual 
community toward refining technical apparatuses of analysis. Second, there is a 
question about whether this direction was justified. What the present analysis
12 Cited as, Neurath to Camap, September 22, 1945, Wiener Kries Archive, 
Noord-Holland, folder 223.
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points to is the first claim: as a historical fact, Neurath seems to have been left 
out of the cultural dynamics within scientific philosophy at the time. Logical 
empiricism was emerging -  for reasons both internal and external -  as a 
technically organized discipline of the analysis science. Though Neurath has 
been shown to support the technical use of logical tools for analysis, his 
objections, and perhaps his own lack of understanding of the point of the 
technical programme (in Carnap’s work in particular), obscure his relationship to 
that programme. It cannot help that he came to be known as rather non-receptive 
to criticisms of his position (ibid).
Reisch rightly suggests that part of the reason logical empiricism came to 
be characterized as rather trivial was precisely because the historico-sociological 
worries that dominated Neurath’s thought came to be sidelined. However, 
Neurath does not appear to have placed himself in adequate proximity to the 
technical projects of logical empiricism to remind his colleagues of these broader 
contexts within which technical frameworks must be understood to have 
anything to say about the empirical domain. This, of course, is not for lack of 
trying, but Neurath’s idiosyncratic methods and modes of engagement clearly did 
not resonate in the way he intended among logical empiricists like Carnap and 
Feigl, and scientific philosophers more generally, like Russell. (Furthermore, 
Neurath died early in the development of logical empiricism -  1945 -  and 
resided in Oxford, which left him absent in the development of scientific 
philosophy in America throughout the 1950s and 60s when academics had to 
maintain a certain level of ideological discretion in the McCarthy era.)
A claim of the second nature is beyond the scope and intention of the 
present consideration. That may involve refining Neurathian views in the manner 
Uebel suggests to indicate how Neurath and Carnap’s views might be reconciled. 
However, given the historical analysis afforded by Uebel and Reisch, one may be 
inclined to forgo the sort of reconciliation proposed by Uebel and take the 
approach suggested here. Neurath and Camap shared the philosophical viewpoint 
discussed at length in the sections above. They agreed that the language of 
physicalism ought to be purged of metaphysics, which precludes any notion that
145
epistemological questions (in so far as either of them would characterize their 
endeavours as epistemological) cannot be aided by any claims regarding ‘the 
way the world is’. Scientific language is constructed from conventionally 
adopted formal frameworks (logic and mathematics) and empirical statements 
(taken from psychology and biology). Their differences lay in the extent they 
thought formalism could contribute an analysis of the empirical domain.13
Thus, philosophically speaking, Camap and Neurath can be characterized 
appropriately under the same umbrella. Methodologically speaking, their views 
appear to be distinct -  not because there is no methodological place for both 
historico-sociological and logico-mathematical aspects of the analysis of science 
-  but because, as a historical fact, they disagreed on the extent to which one can 
utilize formalizations to tell us anything about the empirical domain. That failure 
to come to such a methodological agreement, in conjunction with the broader 
social currents confronting logical empiricists, left the historical aspects 
trumpeted by Neurath sidelined.
As noted above (see p. 135), Uebel locates what appears to be crucial to 
understanding where the protocol sentence debate left off: namely that a central 
question facing Carnap and Neurath was the extent to which formalizations can 
say anything about empirical science. Any potential compatibility between 
Neurath and Carnap would remain unstable until a resolution is proposed 
regarding the “competition of priorities between logic and the pragmatics of 
science.” It is suggested in the present thesis that the question of the application 
of formalizations remains momentous for contemporary philosophical 
methodology. What answers afford themselves?
One might draw the conclusion from Uebel’s point that until one can 
establish systematically when formal and when historico-sociological 
considerations are to be employed, there remains no resolution. (Uebel does not 
make this point.) One may offer another suggestion. The question for which one
13 It is not necessary here to argue that Carnap and Neurath’s pragmatic approach 
was necessarily the right or wrong approach. However it is important to be clear 
that theirs was indeed pragmatically motivated.
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may request an in-principle answer -  how much does one emphasize the formal 
aspects of science? -  begets rather a pragmatic one. That answer would, 
moreover, be closely aligned with the pragmatic considerations embraced by 
both Neurath and Camap. The predicament facing any sort of resolution between 
the parties of the protocol sentence debate might be understood as the 
predicament of empirical knowledge more generally: sometimes formal aspects 
of science enlighten inquirers to underlying structures of empirical science; 
sometimes to assess the scope and limitations of those structures within empirical 
science one must flesh out the broader conditions within which one applies those 
frameworks to indicate how and why the frameworks function in a given 
empirical domain. Both aspects need to be assumed to varying degrees 
depending on the occasion in question. Both history and formalism should be 
allocated a functional role in any adequate account of the structure, scope and 
consequent limitations of the application of any set of scientific theories to 
empirical domains.
This feature of logical empiricism is obscured among logical empiricists 
not just because of failings of the participants themselves to come to a shared 
agreement in the protocol sentence debate. The positive developments of the late 
1930s took place, notably, under tumultuous social conditions. Lola Fleck 
(Cartwright et al., 1996, pp. 82-87) reminds readers that by the 1940s Camap had 
migrated to the US in 1937, Neurath had been in exile from Vienna in The 
Hague since 1934 and the meetings of the Congress of the Unity of Science were 
organized by Neurath (with little funds while in exile) as a means of continuing 
to forge logical empiricist principles. Moreover, Neurath lost his second wife in 
1937, again fled the Nazi invasion of The Netherlands on a fishing boat in the 
dark of night and spent seven months interned in the Pentonville Penitentiary in 
London for being an Austrian national.
Given these sorts of circumstances one might be less inclined to find fault 
with members of the Vienna Circle in their failure to find a principled agreement
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among themselves and recognize the level of agreement they achieved at all.14 
Much less so should Neurath, in so far as the present argument is correct, be 
regarded somehow as ‘missing the point’ of the technical direction taken by 
logical empiricism because he insisted on asserting certain aspects of their 
philosophy that were not central to the technical projects embraced by members 
who had migrated to the US. Peter Galison has shown the way in which America 
was far more hospitable to the technical developments than the social 
considerations tied to logical empiricism. Neurath’s early death in the 1940s and 
his location in Oxford kept him outside the philosophical developments that 
thrived in America throughout the subsequent decades.15
In spite of their failure to find agreement on a resolution of the protocol 
sentence debate, their shared philosophical commitments indicate that the 
differences between Camap and Neurath’s views lie in their respective 
methodological orientations for analysis of science. In particular, they failed to 
agree on how much formalism could contribute to an analysis of science. 
However, the question regarding the extent to which formalism might inform 
such a task begets not an in-principle, but a pragmatic answer to be determined in 
the domain of science itself -  or, rather, for the present purposes in the 
philosophical assessment of scientific practice. The tension that arises at this 
stage of the debate can be understood to be a part of the problem of empirical 
knowledge more generally. And it may answered by testing the bounds and 
applications of employed formal structures.
From a contemporary analysis, the lesson learned from the outcome of 
the protocol sentence debate could be just this point: the philosophical 
methodology characterizing logical empiricism by the mid 1940s could be the 
programme determining the extent to which one may pursue technical and 
historico-sociological aspects in given contexts. Indeed, if the problem presented 
by Carnap and Hempel is the extent to which formal frameworks can be enlisted
14 Russell’s comment in 1940 that Neurath’s philosophy renders him an ‘exile’ 
may have been better chosen, given Neurath’s circumstances over the previous 
seven years,
15 Galison (1998). See also Howard (2003) and the preface to Friedman (1999).
148
to clarify empirical statements, then the central question for a methodology 
originating in the Vienna Circle debates is how and when does one attend to 
formal or empirical aspects of an assessment of science? But, to be sure, this 
question marks the modus operandi: it does not require an in-principle answer 
but marks the catalyst for a programme of research. And it affords a tolerant 
view of the respective roles played by technical or empirical aspects of a 
philosophical inquiry into science. At times formal pursuits can be enlisted to 
clarify broader empirical considerations consisting of historical, psychological, 
sociological inquiries, while the empirical considerations can provide a general 
context for considering the extent of the application of a given formal inquiry to 
an empirical domain. Whither philosophical methodology as logic of science or 
historico-sociological naturalism? It depends upon pragmatic advantages to a 
given inquiry. But both appear to have a role.
This chapter has shown Hempel’s emerging views out of the protocol 
sentence debate. In virtue of his attention to questions of vagueness in logic, his 
1939 paper indicates the way in which he emerges as a philosopher who would 
become, in Friedman’s words, ‘a master of Camapian explication’. However, it 
also indicates that he remained cognizant throughout the 1930s of the historico- 
sociological aspects trumpeted by Neurath. It has been argued that Camap and 
Neurath can be understood to be interested in different methodological aspects of 
a common philosophical viewpoint. In addition, one can place Hempel at the 
centre of the emerging picture of the trajectory of logical empiricism. In virtue of 
the development of his D-N account of explanation, which will be examined in 
the next chapter, one can indicate how Camap and Neurath’s respective 
methodological approaches might be mutually incorporated into a fruitful 
philosophical methodology that seeks to explore, clarify and expand the structure 
and boundaries of scientific knowledge.
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Chapter Five: Reformulating an understanding of Hempel’s D-N account of 
explanation
I hope nothing which is said here will be interpreted as a claim that the 
semantic conception of truth is the ‘right’ or indeed the ‘only possible’ 
one. I do not have the slightest intention to contribute in any way to those 
endless, often violent discussions on the subject ‘What is the right 
conception of truth’? I must confess I do not understand what is at stake 
in such disputes; for the problem itself is so vague that no definite 
solution is possible. In fact, it seems to me that the sense in which the 
phrase ‘the right conception’ is used has never been made clear. In most 
cases one gets the impression that the phrase is used in an almost 
mystical sense based upon the belief that every word has only one ‘real’ 
meaning (a kind of Platonic or Aristotelian idea), and that all the 
competing conceptions really attempt to catch hold of this one meaning; 
since, however, they contradict each other, only one attempt can be 
successful, and hence only one conception is the ‘right’ one.
Disputes of this type are by no means restricted to the notion of truth. 
They occur in all domains where—instead of an exact, scientific 
terminology—common language with its vagueness and ambiguity is 
used; and they are always meaningless, and therefore in vain. (Tarski, 
1944)
The previous three chapters have examined the protocol sentence debate to 
suggest how one should understand Hempel’s D-N account. The dynamics of the 
debate suggest a conception of the orientation of the Vienna Circle logical 
positivists that is at odds with conventional interpretations of the point of logical 
positivism. And it locates a programme with which to understand the dynamics
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of a philosophical methodology: there are logical aspects and empirical aspects 
of the assessment of science. The question is how the two can serve within a 
comprehensive methodological approach to understanding the structure of 
science. As discussed, theirs was not a reductivist programme that sought to 
interpret all empirical phenomena in terms of logic and mathematics. Rather, in 
the face of skepticism about the possibility of providing ontological foundations 
for a scientific system of knowledge, they sought a positive construction of what 
one can claim to know in science using formal tools.
The principles located in the protocol sentence debate suggest 
commitments the Vienna Circle shared that, when applied to an understanding of 
the point of Hempel’s D-N account, shape what one should expect from that 
account. One can characterize the principles as 1.) conventional adoption of a 
methodology for assessing science, 2.) formal/empirical distinction employed to 
clarify the nature, scope and structure of science, and 3.) apriorism as indicating 
that, absent indubitable foundations for knowledge, one must assume some 
starting point for any assessment of science. Moreover, the grounds for 
recommending a given methodological assessment of scientific knowledge are 
pragmatic: is it empirically adequate and does it afford systematic theoretical 
development? These principles ought to shape the interpretation of the D-N 
account as a pragmatically adopted and systematically orientated methodology 
for the assessment of explanations in science. The Vienna Circle logical 
positivists were not committed to a given ontological outlook to underwrite 
science. Rather, given the limits of human knowledge, they argued that 
physicalism -  which arguably can be understood in some lights to be a 
constitutional system in the widest sense -  is characterized as adopted via 
convention. There is no prior, meaningful philosophical argument to be made in 
support of it. It amounts to a constructed and systematic methodological 
framework with which science confronts the world of empirical phenomena.
Thus locating the general features of their commitments can inform a 
grasp of the point of the D-N methodology. Carnap’s ontological ambivalence 
runs through Hempel’s adoption of the D-N account. The logical positivists were
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not after the conception of a right epistemological viewpoint that the adoption of 
the right constitutional system would vindicate. As discussed, for Carnap one 
could not meaningfully raise epistemological questions without first adopting 
some constitutional framework that gives rise to epistemological worries relative 
to the framework itself. Likewise, one does not try to find out what explanation 
really is and then construct the right account of explanation to vindicate it. 
Rather it is not until one assumes some account of explanation that one can 
formulate what explanation can be understood to be, relative to that account. As 
will be demonstrated in this chapter, the D-N account provides a general and 
basic outline of the structure of a great deal of accepted explanations in science. 
It affords a systematic backdrop against which to assess explanatory candidates. 
Moreover, given the adoption of the D-N methodology, science can be 
characterized as a highly systematic and fruitful heuristic, wherein inquirers 
attempt to specify the domain of application of employed general regularities. 
Scientists seek to establish where and when regularities apply in practice in order 
to explain the phenomena that can be said to fall under them. The subsumption of 
statements of empirical circumstances under established regularities amounts, to 
a greater or lesser extent, to an explanation (to be accepted or not) with the D-N 
framework.
As he develops his account, Hempel often explicitly states that one need 
not feel compelled to assume the D-N structure at the outset. There appears to be 
nothing about the ‘world’ that motivates its adoption. Rather, one is faced with a 
world of experience and Hempel attempts to make explicit certain aspects that 
appear to be assumed in a systematic, scientific confrontation of that experience. 
To be sure, it is the world of scientific statements that generates the basic pattern 
of what is taken to be acceptable explanations in science. Acceptability appears 
to be assumed in explanations that have a certain structure. The basic pattern of 
that structure, Hempel argues, can be represented by the D-N framework.
According to the canonical reading of Hempel’s D-N account, science 
discovers laws in the world and the D-N model is intended to give a criterion of 
adequacy of explanatory candidates, which on the account must employ those
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laws. That view centers attention on whether the D-N model is the right account 
of explanation and can stand up against counter-examples intended to show its 
inadequacy. It has motivated a vast body of work surrounding what Reisch 
(2001) calls an explanation industry in the 1950s and 60s. Though this chapter 
touches upon certain features of them, it will not attend to the wide literature on 
issues of explanation both because what is sought here is neither the ‘right’ 
account of explanation, nor as argued presently, is it what Hempel appeared to be 
after. It is not a first-principles argument that the D-N account somehow has 
scientific explanation right. Neither is it an argument that the D-N account may 
or may not have internal challenges on a more detailed logical level. Rather, it 
aims at a clear exposition of the point of the covering-law model. One may 
thereby approach explanation problems with an eye for the explicatory 
orientation of the D-N model rather than confusing that orientation with 
pragmatic considerations (as when one finds an explanation acceptable.)
To be sure, one may find difficulties with asserting conventional origins 
of methodology, or supposing the formal/empirical distinction is a justifiable tool 
for analysis, or taking any a priori starting points in an empiricist methodology. 
But one need not be compelled to agree that this is an appropriate methodology 
to understand that the historical circumstances behind the D-N account indicate 
these principles motivated Hempel’s influential philosophical explications of the 
scope and limitations of scientific knowledge. This aspect of the present thesis 
suggests the need for further research: how does such a conception of Hempel’s 
work fit with his overall corpus? How, indeed, might a reconstituted conception 
of the D-N methodology shape approaches to questions of knowledge in the 
natural and social sciences?
This thesis does not afford the scope of such a monumental undertaking. 
However, the chapter examines how such a reconstituted view appears to be in 
accord with some of Hempel’s key papers after the 1930s. Further, though 
Friedman has called Hempel of this period a ‘master of Carnapian explication’ as 
he attends to the logical aspects of scientific explanation, it is rather interesting to 
note that Hempel’s works necessitate reference to the question of the empirical
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adequacy of the D-N framework as an idealization, which points to the role for 
assessment of how the framework can be employed: articulating the beliefs and 
assumptions that underlie its application in given contexts. This feature is crucial 
both to Hempel’s intellectual legacy and for the possibility of drawing on 
Hempel and logical empiricism generally as a resource for informing 
contemporary philosophical discourse. It is hoped that the conclusions herein 
will point to a fruitful path of inquiry for those interested in the nature, scope and 
limitations of scientific knowledge.
This chapter has five sections. First, it highlights the principles extracted 
from the protocol sentence debate that underlie the adoption of the D-N account. 
Conventional adoption of a methodology, the distinction between formal and 
empirical aspects of science and the employment of a relativized a priori all 
appear to characterize the D-N account.
Second, it examines both the D-N account as an explicatory methodology 
and the distinction between logical and pragmatic aspects of explanation. The 
present appraisal is developed by attending to Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s 
seminal 1948 paper, which is divided roughly into two parts -  the first being a 
general outline of the basic pattern of explanations in the sciences and the second 
being a more precise logical definition of explanation. This thesis emphasizes the 
first part: it attempts to extract what appears to be crucial with respect to a basic 
pattern of explanation outlined by Hempel and Oppenheim and indicates how 
that basic pattern is intended to bring clarity to the basic orientation of 
explanations in science. That the D-N account is taken to outline roughly a wide 
range of explanatory candidates in the natural and social sciences is an 
assumption gleaned from the examples found in Hempel’s work. It considers the 
extent to which that account, in virtue of its emphasis on the distinction between 
formal and empirical aspects of explanation, can provide a systematic framework 
with which to clarify explanatory candidates.
Third, it considers Hempel’s categories within D-N explanation. He 
outlines further categories to facilitate a clearer classification of explanatory
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candidates, which suggests a very general conception of the nature of science as 
a heuristic in the hunt for regularities and other nomological functors under 
which to locate statements about empirical phenomena.
The fourth section looks at two examples in order to demonstrate how the 
D-N methodology can serve as a device with which to clarify explanatory 
candidates. First, it considers how to recommend one explanation over another 
by looking at a discussion surrounding Jared Diamond’s (1997), Guns, Germs 
and Steel. Diamond’s ecological explanation of societal development worries 
some critics that it obscures the more local, cultural explanations involving 
human agency. Second, it examines John Pemberton’s paper on the limited 
usefulness of idealized models in economics.
Principles underlying Hempel’s D-N account
Three general principles appear to characterize the views of Carnap, Hempel and 
Neurath in the protocol sentence debate. They should inform an understanding of 
the point of the D-N account. One can characterize them as 1.) conventional 
adoption of a methodology for assessing science, 2.) formal/empirical distinction 
employed to clarify the nature, scope and structure of science, and 3.) apriorism 
as indicating that, absent indubitable foundations for knowledge, one must 
assume some necessary starting point for any assessment of science. Moreover, 
the grounds for recommending a given methodological assessment of scientific 
knowledge are pragmatic: is it empirically adequate and does it afford systematic 
theoretical development?
The empirical aspects apply roughly to the pragmatic domain of 
explanation: empirical statements subsumed under general regularities, the 
empirical application of employed laws or other nomological functors in an 
explanation, the conditions under which explanations have been deemed 
acceptable, or what beliefs and assumptions play a role in the acceptance of
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explanations.1 The employed distinction between formal and empirical aspects of 
explanation might be understood along the lines of that between logic on the one 
hand, psychology on the other (the former pertains to the formal features of 
explanation, while the latter, generally, to empirical-psychological conditions 
within which explanations might be deemed acceptable or understood as 
accepted) and the factual truth of the explanation offered. Furthermore, the 
apriorism-principle relating to the conventional adoption of the D-N account 
follows roughly from the first two principles: the idealized structure abstracted 
from scientific practice is put forward as an a priori starting point within the 
methodology that assumes the explanatory structure for the purpose of 
explicating explanatory candidates. ‘A priori’ here is understood in a relativized 
sense -  if one elects to use the D-N framework, it is adopted conventionally as a 
tool for explicating scientific explanatory candidates, but there is no claim to 
provide an a priori justification for its adoption.
The preceding chapters presented these three principles arising from the 
protocol sentence debate. Chapter two indicated that, for the left wing of the 
Vienna Circle, protocol sentences and a logical framework are adopted via 
convention in an empiricist constitutional system. There are limits to a 
philosophico-scientific methodology grounded in empiricism: the starting point 
of statements formulated to confront phenomena, in conjunction with the logical 
framework used to articulate relations among them, provide constraints on what 
one might claim are the boundaries of science. This is why logical empiricists 
argued that appeal to notions like ‘reality’ or the ‘world’ cannot be understood as 
informing their developing methodology: for the logical empiricists the edifice of 
scientific knowledge consists in the vast number of statements formulated to 
confront the world and ‘reality’ is not a concept formulable within that edifice.
1 Empirical statements may be present in an idealization, but the greater extent to 
which an idealization contains empirical statements, the less general it can be as 
an idealization. In Neurath’s terms, the empirical statements introduce Ballungen 
into the explanatory form. The greater number of empirical factors present, the 
further the idealization moves from a general idealized status.
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Chapter Three indicated that idealization emerges as a central feature of 
the methodology. Carnap held that there is an indispensible distinction between 
the formal structures of statements and empirical statements made according to 
the structure of an adopted framework. A class of empirical statements exhibits a 
structure that can be represented formally to a greater or lesser extent. 
Formalizations may be understood to be idealizations in the sense that they 
represent an idealized form of a given class of empirical statements to be applied 
systematically across wider domains. Within a formal language, one can clarify 
connections among idealized statements, which consequently provides a 
framework enlisted to assess empirical statements. Of course, as discussed, there 
was disagreement about the extent to which formal idealizations could provide 
materially adequate models of empirical statements in science, but Carnap and 
Hempel came to see this question as their domain of inquiry. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Hempel (1939) employs Carnap’s distinction and shows the 
way in which formalizations can prove their applicability when shown to apply 
across a number of empirical domains. The logic/psychology distinction 
demonstrated the means to bring clarity to problems in philosophy of science. 
And by applying the formal idealized representations to the domain of empirical 
application, logical empiricists could attempt to explicate empirical statements 
systematically.
Chapter Four examined Hempel’s emergence in the debate in the 1930s. 
Philosophers can find in his methodology a place for, and indeed the necessity 
of, both formal and empirical aspects of an inquiry into the structure, limits and 
expansion of science (an indication of his employment of Carnap’s distinction). 
Moreover, one can locate the role of a relativized apriorism in his thought. 
Empirical phenomena are diverse and wide-ranging. One must start somewhere 
for a systematic investigation. Absent the grounding of scientific knowledge in 
‘certainty’ or ‘truth’,2 conventionally adopted basic observation statements and 
an employed system of logic provide just such a starting point. In the context of 
the D-N account, its logical form is abstracted from practicing science and
2 Recall that contra Schlick, Carnap and others in the left wing argued that truth 
could not effectively function as a foundation for scientific knowledge.
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employed as an entry point to discussions of other instances where explanations 
are provided. Accepted explanatory candidates exhibit a form outlined by the D- 
N structure and that structure can be applied to other explanations as a way of 
assessing their structure, scope and the assumptions meant to prop them up. 
However, ‘apriorism’ ought not indicate that Hempel appeals to some absolute 
notion of the a priori: logical empiricists reject notions like the Kantian synthetic 
a priori. Rather, basic observational predicates, formal frameworks and 
idealizations consisting of employment of the two, are taken as ‘a priori’ in the 
sense that they are conventional starting points for the adoption of the given 
methodological framework within which they are assumed, and some starting 
points or other are necessary.3
Discussions pertaining to Hempel’s intentions in constructing the D-N 
account should be understood against this backdrop. In short, that account is not 
intended to give a strict criterion of adequacy for particular explanations in 
science. Rather, in virtue of its being an idealization, it outlines an explanatory 
framework that reflects what scientists generally take themselves to provide in 
scientific practice (the question of its origin is a descriptive/psychological one) 
and a benchmark against which to assess the scope and structure of particular 
candidates of explanation. As will be demonstrated in the following section, 
Hempel does not suggest that there are laws in the world that science merely 
needs to discover to vindicate its claims to knowledge. Rather, laws and other 
nomological functors within an adopted idealized explanatory framework are 
employed to connect -  to a greater or lesser extent -  antecedent with consequent 
statements of empirical circumstances to flesh out the nature of explanations.
3 This is not to argue that the given methodological framework is the necessary 
framework with which to account for scientific knowledge. Following Carnap, 
one might hold a certain ambivalence about the selected methodology. It is 
important only to be clear about the structure and empirical limits of the 
methodology in a given context. It can be assessed based on how well it serves 
the purpose at hand. For logical empiricists, given their particular programme of 
constructing an account of the structure of science based on a (huge, 
descriptively-produced) class of observation sentences in conjunction with an 
adopted logical framework, empirical statements and a system of logic provide 
the necessary starting points to build up this particular methodological approach.
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Hempel’s D-N methodology is not intended to provide the answer to the problem 
of scientific knowledge. It affords a systematic way into the problem.
D-N as an explicatory model and the distinction between logical and pragmatic
aspects of explanation
Hempel’s analysis of scientific explanation marks a cornerstone in the history of 
analytic philosophy. And yet, if not explicitly, there seems to be an underlying 
assumption that his covering-law model is a somewhat naive, if remarkable, 
attempt to characterize scientific explanation through its reliance upon 
discovered scientific laws and relevant empirical conditions. The problem 
appears to be that a host of counterexamples do not conform to the D-N 
explanatory model, while false explanations can be seen to fit the D-N form. 
However, a survey of key papers with an eye for the emergent principles in the 
protocol sentence debate suggests an orientation of the D-N account as a 
pragmatic and systematic methodology for the clarification of explanatory 
candidates.
This section will survey Hempel and Oppenheim’s seminal (1948) paper 
on explanation. Their account of explanation is not new, but has been assumed in 
previous discussions among other authors (ibid, p. 265,fn 7). What they attempt 
to do, in part, is make explicit certain assumptions about explanation through an 
elementary sketch of its apparent basic pattern. Though the paper was written by 
Hempel and Oppenheim, Hempel appears to be the primary author since he takes 
responsibility for its deficiencies. For the sake of brevity, the paper will be 
referred to as Hempel (1948).
Hempel (1948, p. 245) writes that “one of the foremost objectives of 
empirical science” is to explain “the phenomena in the world of our experience.” 
And to explain phenomena is to answer the question ‘why?’ and not just ‘what?’ 
regarding those phenomena. Though generally this is accepted, he (ibid) notes 
that, “there exists considerable difference of opinion as to the function and the
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essential characteristics of scientific explanation.” He intends the essay to “shed 
light” on the problems of explanation by providing both an “elementary” sketch 
of the “basic pattern” of scientific explanation and “a subsequent more rigorous 
analysis of the concept of law and the logical structure of explanatory 
arguments ”
Hempel (1948, p. 246) gives some illustrations to demonstrate the basic 
pattern of explanations to be found in science. For example, when one drops a 
mercury thermometer in hot water, the mercury drops rapidly and then climbs. 
An explanation involves statements that the glass tube heats up initially 
expanding the glass and causing the mercury to fall slightly. Heat conduction 
transfers the heat to the mercury and (ibid), “as its coefficient of expansion is 
considerably larger than that of the glass, a rise of the mercury level results.” He 
remarks that there are two types of statements in this explanation: those 
regarding the antecedent conditions of the glass, the mercury, the application of 
heat, etc., and those expressing general laws under which the event can be 
understood to fall -  laws of “thermic expansion” of glass and mercury and of 
conductivity of glass (ibid). The event is explained by indicating how the 
antecedent conditions when falling under stated laws bring about the consequent 
conditions (fall and subsequent rise of the mercury).
A second example exhibiting this basic pattern (ibid), is the explanation 
of why the oar of a rowboat looks bent upward when placed in the water. This 
can be explained with reference to statements about antecedent conditions 
regarding the oar being straight, partially in the water, and about general laws of 
refraction and water being an “optically denser medium than air.” The general 
laws under which the circumstances fall bring about the consequence that the oar 
looks bent. He (ibid) writes, “the question ‘Why does the phenomenon occur?’ is 
construed as meaning ‘according to what general laws, and by virtue of what 
antecedent conditions does the phenomenon occur?” By specifying antecedent 
circumstances and employing particular general laws, one can construct an 
explanation connecting these circumstances to the statement about the event or 
object to be explained.
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Third, science provides explanations of not just particular events, but of 
laws with reference to more general laws. According to Hempel (ibid, p. 247), 
“the question might be asked: Why does the propagation of light conform to the 
law of refraction?” He replies that classical physics answers “in terms of the 
undulatory theory of light,” which asserts that light propogation is a certain 
general type of wave phenomenon and that all phenomenon of this type fall 
under the law of refraction (ibid). Thus, one explains a law by indicating how it 
falls under a more general, comprehensive law. Likewise, they note (ibid), 
Galileo’s law for the “free fall of bodies” can be explained by deducing it from 
Newton’s laws of motion and the law of gravitation, along with statements 
regarding the mass and radius of the earth, etc.
Hempel (ibid, p. 249) locates some general characteristics of explanation 
from examples to bring about the basic pattern of the D-N model of explanation 
consisting of the two types of statements referred to above:
Explanans
C; , C2, ..., Ck Statements about antecedent circumstances
L15L2 , . . . ,L r General laws
Explanandum
E Description of the empirical phenomenon to be explained
This pattern of explanation contains statements of antecedent circumstances and 
the employed laws under which the circumstances are said to fall.
He contains analysis to a simple formal system (in which one can 
facilitate a deduction from the explanans to the explanandum) and (ibid) notes 
that for a proposed explanation to be “sound” its statements need to satisfy 
logical and empirical conditions of adequacy. There are three logical conditions 
of adequacy within a simple formal system: 1.) The explanandum must follow 
logically from the explanans, “for otherwise, the explanans would not constitute
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adequate grounds for the explanandum.” 2.) The explanans need to contain 
general laws that serve to deduce the explanandum. When deducing a general 
law from the explanans it may be the case that the explanans contain only 
statements about laws. 3.) The explanans must be empirical, at least in principle: 
they must be observable or testable (in principle).
Furthermore (ibid), as an empirical condition of adequacy, ‘The 
sentences constituting the explanans must be true.” The discussion in the 
chapters above regarding the distinction between truth and acceptance -  that is, 
between the truth of statements within a formal framework and the acceptability 
of empirical statements formulated roughly according to the structure outlined in 
the formal framework - appears to present a disconnect between what Hempel 
seems to hold in the Vienna Circle debates and what he asserts in this article. 
Attention needs to be given to account for the apparent distinction to indicate the 
way in which Hempel is committed to the empirical condition of adequacy. In 
short, there is a distinction between simple formal scientific explanations and 
more general statements that incorporate a large range of empirical assertions 
that can be structured according to the simple formal form. The former affords a 
simple domain in which to clarify the logical structure of a scientific explanation 
given the D-N account, while the latter involves a greater emphasis on how 
empirical data are formulated according to that structure.
The ‘truth’ claim is asserted relative to a simple formal framework for the 
purposes of spelling out the idealized structure. If the idealization from which 
one confronts empirical phenomena does not incorporate the truth condition, then 
it cannot function as a methodology because there is no systematic framework 
with which to link the explanans with the explanandum. Hempel either is being 
infuriatingly vague here by appearing to conflate empirical with formal aspects, 
or, perhaps more interestingly, advocating a subtle distinction in the specification 
of his methodology that it will be helpful to illuminate. His employment of the 
truth condition trades on the distinction emphasized in the protocol sentence 
debate between the formal and empirical aspects of science -  and in this case of 
scientific explanation. The condition of truth is crucial for the formulation of the
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methodology in the formal structure of the model. Though it is not necessary for 
strictly logical assessment of the structure of an argument, it is necessary to 
define a law within the methodological framework -  a definition without which 
the framework cannot function in the deductive-nomological pattern. One cannot 
deduce the explanandum from the explanans without a law, but one cannot 
define a law or other nomological connector in the formal framework without 
specifying it relative to true statements. The truth condition, which might appear 
to conflate the distinction that was so central to the protocol sentence debate, 
rather asserts that distinction for the purpose of clarifying the structure of the 
methodological framework. Asserting the distinction between logical and 
empirical conditions is crucial for defining a law in the methodology.
Hempel applies the concept of law within a formal language to true 
statements only (ibid, p. 265):
The apparently plausible alternative procedure of requiring high 
confirmation rather than truth of a law seems to be inadequate: It would 
lead to a relativized concept of law, which would be expressed by the 
phrase ‘sentence S is a law relative to the evidence E \
He (ibid) notes, for example, that Bode’s “general formula for the distance of 
planets from the sun” cannot have been considered only a law relative to the 
astronomical evidence available in the 1770s, such that the discovery of Neptune 
would cause it to cease to be a law. He remarks that the discovery of Neptune, 
rather, suggests that existing evidence provided a certain probability that the 
formula was a law. New evidence, such as the discovery of Neptune, reduces the 
probability to an extent that Bode’s formula cannot be understood to have been 
true (and therefore not a law). He (ibid,yh 22) adds in a footnote that,
The requirement of truth for laws has the consequence that a given 
empirical statement S can never be definitely known to be a law; for the 
sentence affirming the truth of S is tantamount to S and is therefore 
capable only of acquiring a more or less high probability, or degree of
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confirmation, relative to the experimental evidence available at any given
time.
The truth requirement is essential for defining the concept Taw’ in the idealized 
model. Otherwise one cannot employ the law in the idealized formal structure to 
deduce the explanandum. A generalization cannot serve this nomological 
purpose in the idealized form. Of course, there is then the question of the 
empirical application of the law and one’s knowledge of it, but this points to the 
pragmatic aspects.4
Moreover, Hempel (ibid, pp. 251-8) gives an example to suggest that 
explanations in the social sciences fit the D-N form. Hempel (ibid, p. 251-2) 
points to a severe price drop in American cotton exchanges in 1946 that led 
exchanges in major trading centres to stop trading temporarily. The explanation 
given at the time involved a large holder who worried his stake was too big and 
consequently liquidated his stocks. Smaller speculators panicked and sold off 
their shares, which led to the sharp drop. Hempel (ibid, p. 252) notes that this 
explanation (regardless of its merits) can be understood to account for the 
phenomena by “integrating it into a general pattern of economic and socio- 
psychological regularities.” It involves both statements of antecedent 
circumstances pertaining to the holdings of the large-scale speculator and sizable 
collective shares of the smaller holders, and of implied general regularities of 
supply and demand, and those of speculators who want to increase or sustain 
their financial positions -i.e. an increase in supply will send the price down and 
when prices drop, speculators will unload their stocks to limit losses, which 
sends the price down further.
Examples such as the cotton exchange suggest, for Hempel, that 
explanations in the social sciences have the same structure as those in the
4 To contain the scope of this analysis, it focuses on deterministic laws, but laws 
can also be understood to have a certain probability. Hempel holds that 
explanations of this sort share the form of the D-N model, but a strict deduction 
to the explanandum cannot be produced. Rather it can be said to bring about the 
explanandum with a certain probability.
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physical sciences, but many feel that causal explanations are inadequate in fields 
of human behaviour (ibid, p. 253). He assesses three arguments to this end: 1.) 
that causal explanations of the sort indicated by the covering-law models assume 
a repeatability that cannot occur in human behaviour; 2.) one cannot establish 
generalizations of human behaviour because responses to a given situation are 
based upon, not just the situation itself, but, the history of the individual; and 3.) 
explanation in the social sciences involves reference to motivations and 
teleological analysis, rather than causal analysis.
First of all, human behaviour in events such as the downturn of cotton 
prices has (ibid), “a particular uniqueness and irrepeatability” that cannot be 
accounted for in causal explanations, which assume a “repeatability of the 
phenomena under consideration.” Furthermore, events in the social sciences do 
not lend themselves to testability. Hempel argues these claims misunderstand the 
“logical character of causal explanation,” and are inconclusive. No event in the 
physical sciences in repeatable: each is distinct. “Nevertheless,” argues Hempel 
(ibid), “individual events may conform to, and thus be explainable by means of, 
general [causal] laws” because causal laws assert only that any event of specified 
characteristics “is accompanied by another event which in turn has certain 
specified characteristics.” Thus, friction brings about heat, so an event involving 
friction will beget heat. Moreover, for testability, events require only a set of 
instances where events of certain characteristics are followed by those of other 
specified characteristics. In the price drop of cotton, one can employ laws of 
supply and demand and generalities about actions of speculators to indicate that 
given certain statements about antecedent circumstances, they accompany 
consequences like the rapid drop in the price of a commodity. The extent to 
which a range of instances can be located in which particular antecedent 
conditions are followed by certain consequences like the price drop gives a range 
of application in which the general regularities can be said to apply.
This latter point is important because it indicates that explanations 
involving assumed regularities have a certain scope that is limited by the 
statements of empirical circumstances in which they apply and the general
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regularities employed to link statements about antecedent with consequent 
circumstances. When the range of circumstances is deemed wide enough that the 
regularity may be accepted as suitable to be used as a law within the 
methodology, then the law may be suggested as an employable explanatory 
device across a wider domain. The law will be taken a priori in the 
methodological assessment for the purpose of constructing an explanatory 
account, but it is adopted via convention. With respect to pragmatic aspects, one 
then needs to determine whether empirically the domain of the generalization 
may be expanded, or at least whether employing the law affords a systematic 
heuristic that can be tested to see whether it indeed holds. Barring testability it 
can be assessed based on whether it contributes to the expansion of the 
theoretical framework with which one confronts empirical phenomena.5
For Hempel, this point provides occasion to emphasize that reference to 
an event in an explanation is reference to particular characteristics of the event -  
to “the occurrence of some more or less complex characteristic in a specific 
spatio-temporal location, or in a certain object.” Reference to an event does not 
refer to all the characteristics of the occurrence relating to the object. Neither 
does it refer to all the spatio-temporal characteristics surrounding the event. Thus 
an ‘event’ is not explained in its entirety, but only with respect to the specified 
characteristics noted within the explanatory account. If one wants to explain the 
drop in cotton prices with respect to supply and demand laws and statements 
about the circumstances under which the event occurred, that explanation needs 
to indicate that a drop in price corresponds to an increase in supply relative to 
demand and consequent drop in the price of cotton over a range of instances. The 
flip side is that the explanation appealing to general laws of supply and demand 
might prove too general to afford any enlightening explanation of the particular 
event.
Nevertheless, two points may be made regarding this situation. First of 
all, Hempel is attempting to indicate that the structure of the explanatory
5 For a discussion about theoretical expansion as a criterion for acceptance of a 
regularity or explanatory candidate generally, see Hempel (1958).
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candidate in this financial example shares the logical form of those employed in 
the natural sciences, which shows, for him, that the covering law models he has 
attempted to explicate can be utilized to assess explanations in the social 
sciences. This of course gives rise to the second point, regarding the empirical 
import of explanations of this form. The question is whether an explanation 
employing general laws of supply and demand and those regarding behaviour of 
speculators provides a ‘good’ explanation in this instance. This question must be 
distinguished from the former and to understand the point of Hempel’s account 
one must be clear about the distinction: fitting the logical form of a covering law 
model does not, in itself, guarantee an acceptable empirical explanation. As will 
be discussed below, although the large body of Hempel’s work attends to many 
logical aspects of explanation, these always give rise to the question of the 
empirical aspects. The covering law models give a framework for confronting 
empirical phenomena. They afford a systematic way into the problem of how to 
account for explanations in science. But to understand attentions to the logical 
aspects of this framework as an attempt to give necessary and sufficient 
conditions for any and all explanations in science is to place upon the covering 
laws models, and the deterministic D-N account in particular, demands that they 
are not constructed to address. This is to confuse the two points that, for clarity 
of assessing scientific explanation, must be held distinct.
This distinction of course can be seen to have roots in the protocol 
sentence debate, discussed in the chapters above, wherein Carnap held that the 
distinction between formal and empirical aspects of science is indispensible for 
the clarification of science. As argued, Hempel endorsed this distinction. One 
problem with Hempel (1948) is that in attempting to render explicit an assumed 
structure of explanations by practitioners of science, that distinction may have 
been obscured, which leads to the assumption that, with the covering law models, 
he is attempting to give criteria of acceptance for all explanation in science. 
Although the formal features of the D-N account may, indeed, preclude certain 
explanatory candidates that violate the logical form (i.e. by appealing to the 
consequent rather than the generalizations that bring about the consequent), the 
model functions principally to render explicit explanatory candidates in order to
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decide whether they ought to be accepted or not. The point of the covering law 
models is to attempt to explicate explanatory candidates in science by giving one 
a framework against which to specify statements of antecedent circumstances 
and their relation to consequent circumstances via employed general laws.
The second argument that explanations in the social sciences are distinct 
from those in the natural sciences is that human responses to situations depend 
upon not just the context of the situation, but also on the history of the person 
responding. This suggests that responses cannot be repeatable and thus, for 
example, any appeal to laws of supply and demand and dispositions of 
speculators wanting to improve their situation cannot afford any causal 
explanation. Hempel replies that there is no a priori reason why one cannot 
uncover generalizations that take into account the history of individuals. He 
(ibid, p. 254) notes, for example, that in the natural sciences regularities can be 
established for “physical phenomena, such as magnetic hysteresis and elastic 
fatigue, in which the magnitude of a specific physical effect depends upon the 
past history of the system involved.” He argues no single events are repeatable, 
but features of events show enough repeatability that explanations may serve 
fruitfully across a range of events in both the natural sciences and the social 
sciences. One emerging question then is what is the range of application of a 
given explanation? Answers to this question surround attempting to specify both 
the empirical applicability of the employed laws within the explanatory account 
and the specific features of the specified circumstances of a given event that can 
be said to be repeatable.
The third argument against the employment of causal analysis present in 
covering-law models is that explanations of human behaviour involve reference 
to motivations, which employ teleological, as opposed to causal, analysis. Given 
this argument, explanation of the drop in cotton prices would need to specify the 
speculator’s motivations as a factor, thereby indicating the need to refer to goals, 
which distinguishes it from the natural sciences. Hempel (ibid) agrees, but argues 
that this does not render them “essentially different” from causal explanations. 
Though reference to goals points to the future as a cause, he remarks that goals
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would still fall within antecedent circumstances, since the intention to bring 
about a future outcome is a desire (to effect a certain outcome) and therefore sits 
among the circumstances at the beginning of the action. He (ibid) concludes that 
there is “no formal difference on this account between motivational and causal 
explanation.”
Furthermore, that motives cannot be observed does not indicate a 
difference between causal and teleological explanation because the same occurs 
in the natural sciences: electric charges cannot be observed, but are tested 
indirectly, which is (ibid), “sufficient to guarantee the empirical character of the 
explanatory statement.” Likewise, motivations may be determined by indirect 
methods: “linguistic utterances ... slips of the pen or tongue.” He (ibid) writes, 
“as long as these methods are ‘operationally determined’ with reasonable clarity 
and precision, there is no essential difference in this respect between 
motivational explanation and causal explanation in physics.”
Hempel lays out the basic pattern assumed in scientific explanations. This 
thesis will forgo his subsequent closer look at a definition of explanation in order 
to emphasize how attention to the basic pattern suggests a revised interpretation 
of the point of his work.
One can consider the development of Hempel’s account with an 
examination of another key paper. His “Aspects of scientific explanation” 
(1965q, p. 412) outlines three types of models characterizable as covering-law 
models: deductive-nomological, inductive-statistical and deductive-statistical 
models of explanation. He notes that these models are not intended to “describe 
how working scientists actually formulate their explanatory accounts.” Rather he 
writes that they are intended (ibid), “to indicate in reasonably precise terms the 
logical structure and the rationale of various ways in which empirical science 
answers explanation-seeking why-questions.” Hempel (ibid) argues that 
formulating covering-law models “is not to deny that there are other contexts in 
which we speak of explanation, nor is it to assert that the corresponding uses of 
the word ‘explain’ conform to one or another of our models.” But he (ibid, p.
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413) suggests that to “deplore” the D-N model on the grounds that it cannot fit 
with certain cases of explanation “is to miss the intent of the model.” For 
Hempel, since the logical aspects of covering-law models pertain to clarifying 
the structure and rationale of explanation, it is not an argument against them to 
locate counter-examples wherein they appear not to apply. Explanation in 
science is a variously constituted enterprise and abstracting from particulars to an 
idealization affords a framework with which to assess those particulars.
One might think of any number of counter-examples for the D-N account. 
One illustration, emblematic of the often-trivializing nature of canonical 
philosophical discussions of explanation, is the event that someone attempts 
suicide by taking arsenic, but is hit by a bus before the arsenic does its job. A D- 
N explanation of the event would assert statements about antecedent 
circumstances that the man wants to die and he takes arsenic. It employs some 
statement of a general regularity that if someone takes arsenic he will die. If, 
with respect to taking arsenic, one construes an explanation regarding the 
individual’s death according to the D-N model, one would have an explanation 
that fits the D-N form, but is empirically false.
1. A man who wants to die takes arsenic.
2. If a man takes arsenic, he will die.
3. Hedies.
(1) is a statement about antecedent circumstances. (2) is the law
employed in this explanation to link antecedent circumstances with (3), the
explanandum. The account provides an explanatory candidate for the death of a
man -  indeed all the premises are true, but in fact a bus hit the man before the 
arsenic actually killed him. The explanation is thus false. The obvious point of 
the counter-example is to indicate the inadequacy of the D-N account.
A Hempelian response to this counter-example, which will be examined 
in the next section, is that, empirically, the explanation is elliptically formulated
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and that to render the explanation acceptable one would have to articulate the 
premise that it was the arsenic that killed the man. That premise would be false. 
Thus the problem elicited by the counter-example does not testify against the 
viability of the D-N account, so much as locate the empirical aspects necessary 
for acceptance: for explanations to be accepted, one criterion is that they must be 
understood to be empirically adequate.6 The formal structure of the D-N model is 
not intended to provide empirical adequacy for every explanation. Rather it is to 
give a framework with which to clarify the structure of explanatory candidates. 
In this instance, by representing the explanation in the D-N framework, one can 
locate the implicit and false premise that renders the explanation false.7 To be 
sure, the D-N framework does not do a great deal of work here. And one may be 
led to attempt to locate false premises without using the D-N structure. However, 
it does provide a (very general) backdrop against which to proceed to assess the 
explanatory candidate for its empirical adequacy (and whether the extent of that 
adequacy is sufficient to lead one to accept it as an explanation). The question in 
the D-N framework pertains to the application of the general regularity: it is a 
sufficient law that if one takes enough arsenic one will die, but the empirically 
relevant question is whether that regularity applies in this particular instance. 
Does the arsenic cause the death of the individual in this situation? This 
empirical question cannot be answered by rendering an explanation in the D-N 
form. It is answered by an empirical inquiry into the cause of the death. The 
general regularity is not relevant to this particular instance because it does not 
locate the cause of the death.
6 ‘Empirical adequacy’ is not strictly specifiable for Hempel. Though formulating 
a criterion of adequacy might be possible in order to apply ‘empirical adequacy’ 
more systematically across a wide domain, whether one determines an 
explanation empirically adequate or not, or indeed whether one selects a 
particular adequacy criterion, ultimately rests upon a decision, which suggests 
the need for a descriptive assessment of the context within which an explanation 
has been accepted.
7 It is not being argued here that the D-N framework locates the false premise. It 
remains for Hempel an empirical question whether premises provide an 
acceptable explanation. Employing the D-N framework (perhaps trivially at 
times) aids in clarifying the structure of a given explanation so as to indicate 
where further empirical inquiry can indicate whether the explanation in question 
might be accepted.
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To illustrate the distinction between the pragmatic aspects of explanation 
and the explicatory aspects intended by the D-N model, one might consider 
Hempel’s response (1965, p. 420) to Michael Scriven’s (1962) counter-example. 
It shares the form of the objection just considered, but is somewhat less 
ridiculous in nature. Scriven’s intention is to argue that the D-N account is not 
sufficient and should be supplemented with the extra stipulation that “total 
evidence” must be included to render it adequate. The example will be 
paraphrased slightly, but will maintain the features of the argument. An old rail 
bridge needs to be destroyed and replaced by a newer one. A demolition crew 
places dynamite in all the key places on the bridge and sets a timer. Thirty 
seconds before the timer triggers detonation, an earthquake drops the bridge 
entirely. The explosives go off and the bridge is destroyed.8 An explanation, 
relative to the dynamite premises and represented roughly by the D-N form, 
might look like the following:
1. Dynamite has been placed in strategic points on a bridge and a
timed-detonator has been set.
2. The dynamite goes off.
3. If dynamite is set in appropriate points on a bridge and goes off,
then the bridge will be destroyed.
4. The bridge is destroyed.
According to Scriven’s argument, this explanation fits the D-N form, but 
is empirically false. That is, one can deduce the explanandum from the 
explanans, but premises (1) to (3) are not an empirically adequate explanation of 
the destruction of the bridge. As a result, the D-N model needs to be 
supplemented with an additional requirement of “total evidence.”
Hempel’s reply is that such a counter-example does not rule against the 
D-N account itself. He argues that Scriven’s counter-example misses the intent
8 For Scriven’s example, see his (1962, pp. 229-30).
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of the covering-law model. The point there is to explicate the explanatory 
candidate in order to clarify the statements involved in the proposed explanation. 
Hempel argues that although Scriven’s counter-example fits the D-N form, it 
amounts to an elliptically formulated explanation that is based on an assumed 
false premise. The explanation that the bridge was destroyed because of the 
dynamite is based on the false premise that there was a bridge to destroy in the 
first place. Since the bridge had been destroyed already immediately prior to the 
detonation of the dynamite, then the premise involving the claim that there was a 
bridge cannot have been asserted. Though the explanation fits the D-N form, it is 
incorrect because it employs a false premise, not because the D-N framework has 
misfired.
Nevertheless this is not to argue that the point of the D-N account is to 
provide sufficient conditions for a satisfactory explanation. What it does do is 
give the methodological framework with which to clarify the structure of the 
explanation and explore the empirical adequacy of its premises. In this case, 
although the false explanation is complete according to the D-N form, this does 
not mean it is acceptable. An empirical examination of the conditions under 
which the bridge was destroyed would indicate, first, that there was a bridge to 
destroy when the dynamite ignited, which there was not. This would suggest, 
second, that the regularity employed would not apply in this instance: (3) may be 
an acceptable law applicable under certain circumstances, but it does not apply in 
this situation. One can say then that the explanation is not acceptable. Examining 
the empirical adequacy of the premises renders more clearly the features of the 
explanation so that one can decide whether that explanation will in fact be 
accepted or not.
Moreover, for Hempel, Scriven’s additional criterion of “total evidence” 
(ibid) is unnecessary and “too strong to be tenable.” In no scientific research can 
a criterion of “total evidence” of all the facts be a reasonable demand in order to 
construct an acceptable explanation. Acceptable scientific explanations are not 
complete explanations of phenomena. To look for ‘total evidence’ misses the 
methodological import of the D-N account. Given Hempel’s view, Scriven’s
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counter-example against the D-N account conflates that account as an 
“explicatory model” with the pragmatic aspects explanation -  conflating the 
clarification aspects of the model with whether one decides to accept the 
explanation.
Of course, if one assumes the D-N account, then one can tell the extent to 
which such an explanatory candidate adequately fits the D-N form. For instance, 
it can suggest when a proposed explanation can be rejected as an explanation -  
for example, if the explanandum simply does not follow from the explanans even 
in a loosely formulated way. Hempel (1959) argues that functional ‘explanations’ 
are not explanations because they do not fit the D-N form -  he characterizes 
functionalism rather as an analysis. This is not to argue that functional analysis is 
not of central importance to scientific inquiry because it is a heuristic device, 
wherein one proposes functional hypotheses to determine whether they may be 
adequately characterizable as laws that operate across a sufficiently wide domain 
to be employed in explanations. Rejecting that an explanatory candidate actually 
fits the D-N form is not the same as rejecting an explanatory candidate that fits 
the form, but turns out to be either empirically false or insufficiently warranted to 
be accepted on the view of an inquirer. The former falls within the logical 
aspects of explanation that are given by the formal structure of the framework, 
while the latter pertain to pragmatic aspects, wherein one decides whether or not 
to accept an explanatory candidate.
According to Hempel, to explain is to make something (1965a, p. 425) 
“plain and intelligent,” which is to understand it in pragmatic terms. The terms 
require “reference to persons involved in the process of explaining.” Pragmatic 
explanation is relative in the sense that an explanation may suffice for one 
person, but not another, as in the case where an explanation involving a 
mathematical proof would be unintelligible to someone unfamiliar with higher- 
level mathematics. Hempel (ibid, p. 426) writes,
whether a given argument Y proves (or explains) a certain item X to a
person P will depend not only on X and Y, but quite importantly also on
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P's beliefs at the time as well as on his intelligence, his critical standards,
his personal idiosyncrasies, and so forth.
On the other hand, Hempel (ibid) argues that there is an important role for the 
logic of explanation: some objective notion is required in scientific explanation, 
such that “empirical implications and their evidential support” do not rely on 
individuals and their idiosyncratic beliefs. What this suggests is that some notion 
of explanation should be constructed that can be applied uniformly regardless of 
individuals involved. Thus a “nonpragmatic” structure of scientific explanation is 
abstracted from the pragmatic one (ibid): “it is this nonpragmatic conception of 
explanation which the covering-law models are meant to explicate.” The D-N 
account is a systematic framework with which to indicate empirical adequacy of 
an explanation and the relation of evidence to a given explanation. But of course, 
the framework need be neither considered necessary for the assessment of 
explanations, nor designed to give universal sufficiency conditions for the 
acceptance of particular explanations.
Assessing non-pragmatic models of explanation does not imply that 
pragmatic aspects of explanation are not important (ibid, pp. 426-7); neither is it 
intended to say that someone will find an explanation satisfying only insofar as 
an explanation conforms to the covering-law models. Hempel notes that one 
might be satisfied with the identification of a particular causal fact in an instance 
without considering how that fact fits in with an explanatory model. He notes an 
example where in winter a man finds his house gets cold when he watches the 
television. Noting that the device is under the thermostat explains why the heat 
turns off when the television is on (the heat from the, by now antiquated, 
television raises the temperature under the thermostat). He (ibid, p. 427) remarks 
thus, “the pragmatic conditions for the acceptability of a proposed explanation do 
not coincide with the logic-systematic ones that the covering-law models are 
meant to explicate.”
Categories within D-N explanation
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Hempel notes that scientific explanations vary with respect to relative 
completeness. A complete D-N explanation is one in which the explanandum can 
be reached by a deduction from the explanans. For example, one can deduce the 
period in a model of the idealized pendulum with reference to the length of the 
pendulum and law of gravity. As will be discussed, scientific explanations are 
characterizable into categories reflecting relative degrees of completeness: 
elliptic explanations, partial explanations and explanatory sketches. It will be 
important to stress that for Hempel, these are methodological categories 
constructed for the purpose of clarifying the nature of explanations and are 
specified relative to the formal features of the D-N model. Moreover, there are 
no ultimate decision rules that tell one whether an explanation is partial, elliptical 
or a sketch, so it falls to the “judicious interpretation” of the individual 
characterizing explanatory candidates. This indicates that the categories are 
methodological constructs, which provide a framework with which to clarify the 
structure of explanatory candidates. And it gives rise to an assessment of the 
pragmatic aspects of explanation -  the consideration of the empirical statements 
involved in the acceptance of an explanation.
The categories serve also, for the present purposes, to indicate how 
Hempel might characterize a good deal of scientific activity: the complete 
explanation functions as an idealized methodological imperative. Scientific 
explanation of phenomena would aim at expanding the class of accepted 
complete explanations. An expansion to cover all phenomena, of course, is not 
possible with existing frameworks and denotes the limits of scientific knowledge 
generally, but it marks a methodological directive in scientific activity. One aims 
to expand the theoretical and empirical application of accepted complete 
explanations and fill in partial explanations and explanation sketches with 
empirical statements such that they might be rendered complete.
Explanations vary widely in terms of (ibid, p. 424) “explicitness, 
completeness, and precision with which they specify the explanans and the 
explanandum.” Thus they (ibid) “diverge more or less markedly from the 
idealized and schematized covering-law models.” However, Hempel (ibid, p.
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425) notes that, “adequate” scientific explanations “presuppose at least implicitly 
the deductive or inductive subsumability of whatever is to be explained under 
general laws or theoretical principles.” He clarifies in a footnote that he is not 
claiming that any empirical phenomena can be explained by subsuming it under 
the cover of a law or some other nomological functor.9 Rather, he (ibid, p. 425 fn 
17) suggests that the “logic of all scientific explanations” is of the covering-law 
sort, which indicates that the D-N framework is a general starting point from 
which to assess explanations -  the deductive connection between the explanans 
and explanandum provides an inferential framework employed in incomplete 
explanations. He is skeptical whether all phenomena can be scientifically 
explained and is not even sure the question whether all phenomena can be 
explained is intelligible: “I am inclined to think that it cannot be given any clear 
meaning at all.” Moreover, any assertion about what laws actually hold in nature 
(ibid) “surely cannot be formed on analytic grounds alone but must be based on 
the results of empirical research.” For Hempel, explanation requires both 
standards for analytic assessment and empirical research, but it is not the case 
that all phenomena are amenable to explanation via subsumption under covering 
laws.
Hempel is often understood to be giving necessary conditions for the 
adequacy of scientific explanations. However, the logic of the explanations does 
not give exclusive criteria of adequacy. Although it provides systematic rules of 
inference as a benchmark against which to assess explanatory candidates, 
adequacy is assumed in the explanatory candidates put forward. The rules of 
inference thus provide a methodical framework within which to locate and assess 
constitutive premises for their empirical adequacy (and whether and on what 
grounds an explanatory candidate is accepted).
Empirical explanations outlined by the D-N form consist in a range of 
incomplete explanations in which the explanandum cannot be deduced strictly 
from the explanans. All categories of incomplete explanations share the D-N
9 “Nomological functor” is understood as the regularity, law, statement, fact or 
sets of these that function to connect the explanandum with the statements about 
antecedent circumstances.
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form to a greater or lesser extent, but move progressively farther from the 
deductive closure of a complete explanation. To be sure, some empirical 
explanations fit the complete category: with a relatively simple explanandum, 
one may construct a deductively closed link with the explanans—i.e., the simple 
physical model of the pendulum. However, as one moves into the domain of 
richer scientific statements that incorporate a wider range of empirical statements 
and proposed laws under which those statements can be said to fall, the 
explanatoiy candidates introduce a higher level of variables that may not be 
amenable to specification (Neurath’s Ballungen). This factor indicates that part 
of the two-fold features of scientific inquiry (as given by the D-N methodology) 
is to hunt for empirical circumstances and regularities that can facilitate a more 
tightly connected inferential link between the explanans and explanandum, 
thereby pushing partial explanations toward the complete category. Science in 
this sense consists in a heuristic: a systematic, methodological confrontation of 
phenomena that aims at constructing ever-expanding classes of accepted, 
complete explanatory candidates.
Thus, Hempel should not be understood to be asserting that explanations 
of complex phenomena are deemed acceptable when formulated as complete 
explanations. Rather, as indicated from his position in the protocol sentence 
debate, it remains a question for him how far formal idealizations or 
schematizations (that include empirical statements of a specified scope of 
application) could be expanded to cover a widening empirical range. This 
characterizes a feature of the problem itself and is not understood as a solution to 
the problem of the limits of scientific knowledge.
As noted, elliptical and partial explanations and explanation sketches are 
three categories into which one might place an explanatory candidate. The first 
category of incompleteness is an elliptical explanation (ibid, p. 415), an example 
of which might be “a proposed mathematical proof’ when one refrains from 
mention of “certain laws or particular facts that are tacitly taken for granted.” 
Would they be included, they would facilitate a complete explanation. Hempel 
(ibid) gives an empirical example of a small rainbow in the spray of a lawn
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sprinkler, the explanation for which would be “because sunlight was reflected 
and refracted in the water droplets.” Though no explicit rendering of the laws of 
reflection and refraction are given, they are implicit.
However, elliptical explanations must be considered in two ways -  a 
point which Hempel does not make clear in his discussion. The first use, just 
mentioned, pertains to the logical structure of an explanation and defines 
elliptical explanations based on their structural features. However his example of 
the bridge employs the elliptical category in a different way: it pertains to 
pragmatic aspects of acceptance, rather than the logical aspects by which he 
defines the category, and denotes the incompleteness of any empirical 
explanation. It raises the question of the empirical relevance of omitted premises 
involved in an acceptable explanation.
Hempel remarks that the explanation that the dynamite destroyed the 
bridge was false because it was elliptically formulated and did not render explicit 
the empirically erroneous premise that there was a bridge for the dynamite to 
destroy. At first glance, his use appears problematic, since the proposed 
explanation is complete: one can deduce the explanandum (that the dynamite 
destroyed the bridge) from the explanans. It would therefore not be understood as 
elliptically formulated.
Hempel does not make clear that his example points to pragmatic 
questions of acceptance rather than logical ones. Elliptically formulated 
empirical explanations are those which do not include relevant empirical 
premises that would influence their acceptance. The question in this usage is not 
whether the premises can be rendered explicit to construct a complete 
explanation, but whether they affect the empirical adequacy and subsequent 
acceptance of the explanation in question. In this sense, the bridge example is not 
a false explanation because the notions ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ pertain to closed 
formal structures and not the ambiguity of natural language explanations. If 
Hempel were to employ consistently the truth/acceptance distinction he claimed 
to have embraced, he would say, rather, that the explanation is not acceptable.
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Although the explanation of the destruction of the bridge by dynamite is 
complete, the constitutive statements within it are sufficiently ambiguous to 
allow that the explanation is elliptical and that it involves an implicit (and 
erroneous) premise regarding conditions in which the bridge was still intact upon 
the detonation of the dynamite.
In this sense, with regard to the pragmatic aspects of empirical 
explanations, even complete explanations can be understood as potentially 
elliptically formulated on the grounds that they may be too general to say 
anything interesting about particulars. Filling in an idealization with relevant 
statements giving it an empirical interpretation may involve uncovering implicit 
premises that may not be empirically adequate. This underscores why complete 
explanations are not necessarily acceptable. And it underwrites Neurath’s 
worries about the extent to which logical functions can serve to illuminate 
scientific procedure: a complete explanation is so in virtue of the deduction 
facilitated with highly idealized statements. As those statements come to be filled 
out with relevant empirical data, the explanation can be understood as elliptically 
formulated to an extent that Neurath would worry about the degree to which the 
idealized model really says anything about the event in question. However, for a 
reconstituted interpretation of Hempel’s account, this points to the function of 
the D-N methodology as a systematic methodological framework with which to 
confront empirical explanations.
The simple explanation of the drop in cotton prices provides an 
uncomplicated example. It could be formulated completely with reference only 
to the law of supply and demand and some simple statements about antecedent 
conditions. If one states the price of cotton and that there is a rise in market 
supply, then appealing to the law of supply and demand one can expect the 
explanandum that there is a drop in price, since effectively the demand drops 
relative to supply, sending the price downward. However, this is an entirely 
simplified explanatory candidate that precludes reference to any host of causally 
relevant regularities at play. It is an acceptable a priori starting point for 
confrontation of the phenomena (that the price dropped), but it is not very
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interesting empirically because of the innumerable causal factors that are in play 
in a market. One can render this explanation elliptical because it does not 
account for all empirically relevant causes in which one might be interested for 
an explanation of the event.
To be sure, the idealization is a complete explanation, but if one wants an 
empirically richer set of explanatory candidates, it must necessarily be rendered 
elliptical, which then mandates an empirical examination of relevant conditions 
and causal functors. Upon inclusion of a richer set of causal laws regarding 
behaviour of the speculators, one may possibility furnish a complete explanation 
with a wider scope. However, given that, as Hempel notes, strict laws of human 
behavior are difficult to formulate, one may characterize a richer explanatory 
candidate as a partial explanation or perhaps an explanatory sketch.
A less complete explanatory candidate can be classified as a partial 
explanation, wherein the explanans account for the explanandum partially. For 
example, one can consider the Freudian slip. Hempel (ibid) notes that Freud 
would argue the slip of the pen, wherein one writes the wrong date, can be 
explained by the general hypothesis that “when a person has a strong, though 
perhaps subconscious, wish, then if he commits a slip of pen, tongue, or memory, 
the slip will take a form which expresses, and perhaps symbolically fulfills, that 
wish.” Hempel argues that if one grants Freud’s hypothesis (and it is not clear 
that Freud’s hypothesis is acceptable), the explanans would only entail that there 
would be some slip or another, but it does not entail a particular slip that one 
would write a particular date, or make a particular statement (ibid):
But inasmuch as the class, say F, of slips taking this latter form is a 
proper subclass of the class, say W, of those slips of the pen which in 
some way express and perhaps symbolically fulfill the specified wish, we 
might say that the explanandum as described by Freud—i.e., that he made
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a slip falling into the class F—is explained at least in part by this account,
which places the slip into the wider class W.10
Hempel remarks that many explanations in psychoanalysis and historiography 
are “at most” partial explanations and “thus, the explanatory force of the 
argument is less than what it claims or appears to be.” He goes on to contrast 
partial explanation from complete explanation, suggesting that the former “falls 
short” of the latter. Partial explanations, though, can function heuristically to 
give a framework within which to seek out relevant causes of behavior (in this 
example) that can fill in the explanation more completely. This identifies the 
second part of the two-fold features in the methodology: that part of the 
methodological mandate of the D-N account is to take partial explanations as a 
framework to confront the world and attempt to fill them in with a richer account 
of the nomological connections to produce a complete explanation of a 
sufficiently wide empirical scope. Thus, according to the D-N methodology, 
science aims in part to expand the class of accepted existing complete 
explanations and fill in accepted incomplete explanations to render them 
complete.
An explanation sketch can be viewed as (ibid, p. 424), “presenting the 
general outlines of what might well be developed, by gradual elaboration and 
supplementation, into a more closely reasoned explanatory argument.” As with 
partial and elliptical explanations, the explanation sketch shares the D-N form, 
but the connections between the explanandum and the explanans are far looser. 
This is to say that the deductive closure of a complete explanation provides an 
inferential framework against which to structure an incomplete explanation. 
Deduction is the goal, but the limits of scientific knowledge render it a goal 
perhaps out of reach of the bulk of scientific explanations. It nevertheless 
provides an a priori starting point giving an inferential structure to incomplete 
explanations. The rapid price decline in the cotton exchange is an example of the 
explanation sketch. The explanation given for the price drop employs regularities
10 To be more precise, Hempel is referring to statements about a class of slips and 
not the slips themselves.
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of supply and demand and certain behavioral regularities of speculators. 
However, absent the possibility of specifying laws characterizing those 
behavioral regularities in a given context, this may provide only a rough sketch 
of a more complete explanation that might be provided given the development of 
such laws.
The categories are formulated as a way of classifying explanatory 
candidates, but Hempel (ibid, p. 424) writes,
The decision whether a proposed explanatory account is to be qualified as 
an elliptically formulated deductive or probabilistic explanation, as a 
partial explanation, as an explanation sketch, or perhaps as none of these 
is a matter of judicious interpretation; it calls for an appraisal of the intent 
of the given argument and of the background assumptions that may be 
assumed to have been tacitly taken for granted, or at least to be available, 
in the given context. Unequivocal decision rules cannot be set down for 
this purpose.
The question of how one characterizes particular explanations surrounds not the 
nature of the explanations themselves, but how one can fruitfully classify them in 
order to clarify their features.
One may wonder how a “bad explanation” might relate to these 
categories. The term ‘bad’ here can be understood to be ambiguous and rendered 
more precise when thinking in terms of acceptability. Assuming the D-N 
account, an explanation might be deemed bad in one of two ways (though not 
these necessarily exclusively). First, it may not fit the D-N form. To attempt to 
explain the formation of clouds by saying that their function is to drop rain is not 
to explain them at all. (Of course, one might explain the way that clouds release 
moisture, but that is not the same thing.) That would be to appeal to an effect 
rather than some cause (or set of these) that functions as a nomological connector 
that would link cloud formation with statements about water vapor in the air, 
atmospheric pressure, temperature and laws relating to the behavior of these.
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Second, a bad explanation may be characterized as one that is not accepted 
because of erroneous factual statements, the misapplication of certain laws or 
perhaps there is a more suitable explanatory candidate that better fits within the 
canon of existing scientific knowledge. To be sure, a ‘bad’ explanation may be 
one that is accepted.
Partial explanations effectively might be understood to house the bulk of 
empirical explanations in natural science. If one takes Neurath’s worries about 
Ballungen seriously -  and it appears Hempel does -  the complete models, when 
applied to the empirical domain facilitate partial deductions to particular 
phenomena: deductions to a range of phenomena under which the particular can 
be said to fall. When Richard Feynman (1985) indicates the way quantum 
electrodynamics produces deductions about behavior of light over a specified 
range, one may understand that theory to facilitate a complete deduction. But one 
cannot deduce phenomena falling just outside the specified range. In this sense 
quantum electrodynamics can be said to provide a partial explanation of the 
behavior of light. It will be helpful to consider his comments briefly. Feynman’s 
telling of the account is intended as a loose history to indicate developments of 
and the credibility behind quantum electrodynamics. This survey will not delve 
deeply into the details, but will examine the basic ideas to indicate how one 
might understand the scope of quantum electrodynamics and its applications 
according the D-N methodology.
Feynman (1985, p. 5) states, loosely, that the theory of quantum 
mechanics “supplied the theory behind chemistry,” which makes it to have been 
a great success: the more general theory of quantum mechanics was said, 
roughly, to be able to explain the theory behind chemistry. However (ibid), there 
were difficulties calculating the interaction between light and matter, such that 
Maxwell’s theory of electricity and magnetism had to be altered to fit with the 
recent developments of quantum mechanics. Thus, in 1929, quantum 
electrodynamics was developed. The problem for the new theory was that it 
could provide only partial explanations: it afforded rough calculations about the
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behavior of light, but discrepancies were massive when minor corrections were 
made for a more accurate calculation (ibid, p. 6): “So it turned out you couldn’t 
really compute anything beyond a certain accuracy.” In this sense, the model for 
calculation in quantum electrodynamics can be understood according to the D-N 
framework as complete, but once applied to light phenomena, it furnishes a 
partial explanation to be filled in and refined through subsequent testing.
Thus, Feynman (ibid) notes, Paul Dirac formulated a relativistic theory of 
the electron that ignored interaction of the electron with light. He postulated that 
the electron had a “magnetic moment” with a strength of 1 unit. In 1948, 
experiments indicated the strength was nearer to 1.00118 (±3 on the last digit). 
Once corrections were made to account for interaction with light, one could not 
deduce the magnetic strength at 1.00118, but instead (ibid), “the result was 
infinity—which was wrong experimentally.” Feynman (ibid, pp.6-7) notes that in 
1948 he and two others, using a “shell game,” calculated a workable correction at 
1.00116, “which was close enough the experimental number to show that we 
were on the right track,” thereby furnishing quantum electrodynamics with 
partial explanations that accounted for electron interaction with light. He notes 
that experiment over the subsequent fifty years has given more and more 
accurate results to a specification of Dirac’s number at 1.00115965221 (±4 on 
the last digit). The theoretical number is 1.00115965246 (±2 on the second to last 
digit). Thus, though there remains a gap between the theoretical specification and 
the empirical, thereby rendering explanations of magnetic strength of the electron 
partial, the methodology of quantum electrodynamics continues to push toward 
closing the gap. And Feynman stresses that the difference between theory and 
experiment is extremely small, rendering the partial explanations very accurate.
Though the quantum electrodynamics model itself can be characterized as 
a complete explanatory framework of electron behavior generally, its application 
to the electron in particular test cases affords a partial explanation, since it cannot 
explain outside a specified range of application (it goes vastly wrong with minor 
modifications to apply it outside the range). The model explains electron
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partially because one cannot deduce all electron phenomena according to the 
framework specified in the complete model.
One might say, moreover, that when Feynman states that quantum 
electrodynamics synthesizes all of chemistry, or indeed (ibid, p. 8), “describes all 
the phenomena of the physical world” he is employing it more as an explanatory 
sketch to be filled with further empirical study.
The D-N methodology thus affords categories into which to characterize 
explanations in quantum electrodynamics: as a model, one can characterize it as 
complete. When applying it to particular situations, like the behaviour of the 
electron, it affords partial explanations of those phenomena, since it cannot 
explain all the behaviour outside a limited range. And when applied to the 
physical world generally, it can be characterized as an explanation sketch that 
requires empirical study to fill in the explanatory framework in the empirical 
domain to which it is applied.
Likewise one might argue that explanatory sketches can be understood to 
characterize explanation in the social sciences, wherein nomological connections 
between the explanans employing behavioral models and the explanandum about 
particular human behavior are more loosely formulated. The Black-Scholes 
model, which can be classified in the category of complete explanation with 
simplifying assumptions may not facilitate a strict explanation of ‘real world’ 
phenomena when that world does not fit the idealized assumptions. It provides an 
approximation within which the aspects of the actual event described in the 
explanandum may or may not fall, but can be viewed as a heuristic with which 
one attempts to account for the variations of the real world event on the 
simplifying assumptions. It thereby may be characterized as an explanation 
sketch.
The historical backdrop to the development of the D-N account indicates 
that Hempel’s intent with formulating it diverges from canonical expectations of 
the point of its application. A brief consideration of the canonical view, as well
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as an outlook for future discussion, follows in the final section. But this thesis 
has argued that the historical roots of Hempel’s thought indicate a set of 
principles underlying his account.
It also suggests two general principals orienting logical empiricist 
philosophy of science. First of all, the protocol sentence debate suggests a 
distinction to be made between answering questions about our knowledge of the 
world and formulating a fruitful methodology with which to furnish answers to 
those questions. The methodology ought to be assessed for its value on the basis 
of whether it aids in clarification of science, which pertains as much to the logic 
of explanation as the pragmatic conditions within which an explanation, or 
indeed, an explanatory framework, is adopted. Complete models in Hempel’s 
methodology can be applied to afford partial explanations or explanatory 
sketches of phenomena. It provides a systematic way into the problem of 
confronting and systematizing assessments of empirical phenomena. Hempel 
here can be seen as a unifying methodologist: bridging the gap between the 
methodological attentions characterizable in this thesis as Carnap’s logic of 
science and Neurath’s socio-historical naturalism. The D-N account necessitates 
assessment from both technical and empirical philosophical analysis by 
indicating the need to specify the idealized framework of the explanatory 
methodology and the limits and constraints upon it in its applications to the 
empirical world.
Second, Hempel’s D-N account affords claims about scientific 
methodology generally, which could be understood then to have limits that need 
to be spelled out. The account of scientific knowledge that one can construct on 
the basis of Hempel’s methodology indicates something like what Nancy 
Cartwright (1999) has called a ‘dappled’ picture of the world. Science gives a 
patchwork knowledge of the world just where it can be demonstrated that it 
provides acceptable explanations. But those explanations must be understood 
relative to limits specified by the explanans and explanandum statements. 
Explanatory candidates work just where they prove themselves to work. They 
may be employed in other domains as hypotheses for partial explanations or 
explanation sketches to be tested, but this indicates the methodological mandate:
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the possibility of a complete explanation is not assumed at the outset, but is the 
goal when employing incomplete explanations. One fills out the a priori partial 
explanation in the hopes of expanding the class of accepted complete 
explanations. Science claims thus are understood relative to the scope of the 
framework within which they are put forward. And this, one might be inclined to 
assert, appears to characterize the physicalism of the logical empiricists of the 
protocol sentence debate. Knowledge of the world just is the ever-expanding 
class of scientific statements that are given structure and meaning according to a 
more or less specified set of rules. This knowledge is arguably Vienna Circle 
physicalism in the widest sense.
One might worry that embracing the sort of ontological ambivalence or 
agnosticism expressed in this view is to give up on philosophy altogether. 
However, it need not be considered this way. On the contrary, it indicates a 
philosophical skepticism about the possibility of underpinning scientific 
knowledge with a pre-linguistic ontology. But it is skepticism of an ambivalent 
sort.
A personal example might enlighten one to this ambivalence as well as 
(hopefully) provide an agreeable aside. A graduate student took his two-year-old 
son to the London Science Museum where the two were confronted with images 
of the moon in the space-travel exhibit. For the year previous, the two-year-old 
had recognized the moon as a white image in the sky that one could locate at 
night and sometimes on a clear day. “Moo!” and, gradually, “moon!” were the 
common exclamations upon its appearance. But the youngster wanted to know 
more about the moon when confronted with it in the exhibit. With some 
hesitancy about whether the two-year-old could grasp the concepts, the graduate 
student explained that the moon was a place to which one could travel and that 
rockets similar to those on display could take people there the way airplanes 
carry people to see their families far away. The boy remained quiet through the 
antique train and car concourse until reaching an Apollo space capsule that had 
been on the moon. A video displayed footage of the capsule orbiting the moon 
and landing in the ocean back on earth. Upon viewing the video, the boy realized
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that the moon was a place people travelled to. “Dad! The moon! You can go 
there!” Beside himself with joy, the boy watched the video again and again, 
pointing to the capsule in near disbelief that it could be so.
The graduate student wondered to himself what, exactly, he had taught 
his son. Had he taught him something real about the world, or had he introduced 
him to a sophisticated set of accepted concepts in science that facilitate 
technological advances, but are no more “real” than ancient stories about the 
moon being a chariot in the sky? Informally, the question might seem absurd, 
but, philosophically speaking, given that the bounds of Vienna Circle 
physicalism allow one to assert only that scientific knowledge is an ever- 
expanding set of statements about the world, one might be more reserved about 
the scope of the lesson taught. To be sure, knowledge of the moon landings 
involves the accounts of all the engineers in the control centre of the particular 
launches, the astronauts, historical accounts of the scientific theoretical and 
technological developments over centuries; also, newspaper reporting, 
technicians involved in construction and even conspiracy theories challenging 
the verity of the landings at all. This rather trite list could be expanded to account 
for the role of scientific pedagogy, a history of wars, cultural and political history 
etc. The point is that given the breadth of physicalism as a conception of the 
world, lifetimes of generations of inquirers could be, and indeed are, taken up 
examining what science is and does. With this consideration, the question of 
whether science “really” explains the world might become rather uninteresting. 
Philosophically speaking one may be resigned to assert that there are limits to 
what one can know about the world and that science is one -  more or less 
systematic -  way of confronting the world. What might be left to the philosopher 
in part is critically examining the details of the structure, problems and limits of 
that systematic methodology. The question of what is real may come to have less 
significance, and much less be understood as an important question to which an 
answer might underwrite whatever science can say about the world.
To be sure, one need not assume this view from the present assessment of 
the D-N account. However, it may be a relevant position one could take when
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asserting that the D-N account is a systematic framework for assessing 
explanatory candidates. One may remain ambivalent about the underpinnings of 
such an account and employ it via convention to examine how far it can clarify 
what science is explaining about empirical phenomena. One may do that without 
being drawn into debates surrounding questions of ontology. The historical 
question of whether Hempel held this view, or indeed Carnap or Neurath, is not 
the focus of this examination. But it can at least vindicate that their physicalism 
was not a naive scientism that simply disregarded foundational questions. They 
shared a skepticism about foundations and endeavored to formulate a positive 
account of knowledge in the face of that skepticism.
Two Examples: Ecological versus cultural explanation of societal development 
and the usefulness of idealized models in economics
The following examples programmatically suggest how the D-N account informs 
an understanding of explanations. There are a host of other examples that might 
be used, but it should suffice to indicate the research direction motivated by the 
present thesis. It is not intended as the last, or exhaustive, word on the 
fruitfulness of the D-N account.
What basis does one have to recommend one explanation over another? 
This section considers a debate over explanations of societal development in 
Eurasian and African regions. Jared Diamond’s (1997) Guns, Germs and Steel, 
gives an ecological explanation for why these respective societies developed on a 
different trajectory from one another. William H. McNeil (1997), in reviewing 
the book, takes issue with Diamond’s ecological explanation on the grounds that 
it fails to acknowledge the role of individual human decisions in that 
development. One can clarify this debate and an ecological explanatory 
candidate by specifying the structure and scope of ecological explanations and 
indicating the way in which they need not be understood as opposing historico- 
cultural explanations. The short answer to the question of how to recommend one 
explanation over another surrounds the clarification of the explanatory
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candidates and an understanding of the purposes the particular explanations are 
intended to serve: whether ecological explanations are acceptable or not involves 
reference to the purposes of the inquirers themselves.
Diamond attempts to provide a general explanation of the development of 
various societies over 13,000 years. His book takes up the question of why some 
societies developed organized social structures, technology, writing and other 
features enabling them to conquer peoples of other continents, while others 
remained hunter-gatherers. He asks, “Why didn’t Africans instead conquer 
Eurasia, bringing Native Americans as slaves?”
He (1997b) suggests that current historical analysis predominantly 
focuses on a scope too limited to answer “history’s biggest unsolved question.” 
Attending primarily to Eurasia since 3000 BC, these historical analyses do not 
adequately explain why Eurasia should be the focus of development rather than, 
for example, southwestern United States or Africa.
Thus, Diamond points out the role of ecological factors in development: 
certain ecological conditions facilitated food production. Moreover (ibid), 
cultural development can be mapped out roughly beginning with the advent of 
food production, which beget “dense populations, food storage, social 
stratification, and political centralization,” and which led to “chiefdoms (5500 
BC), metal tools (4000 BC), states (3700 BC), and writing (3200 BC).” In short, 
he argues that 11,000 years ago, the world was populated with hunter-gatherer 
societies, while certain conditions such as a decline in availability of wild foods 
led to the consequent increase in farming products, technology and resultant 
increase in population density. Population numbers themselves, in conjunction 
with technologies and diseases that arose from the development of those 
technologies (for example, new strains of disease in domesticated animals) 
facilitated the predominance of farmers neighboring hunter-gatherer societies.
However, Diamond needs to account for why certain peoples moved to 
food production, while others remained hunter-gatherers in spite of their relative
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environmental similarities. “Why Eurasia?” To respond to this consideration he 
outlines issues of the domesticability of wild animals, the flora and fauna of (in 
particular) the Fertile Crescent and the axes of travel of ideas of food production. 
For example, certain animals of different regions are more readily domesticable 
than others -  i.e., the horse and zebra respectively. Moreover, Diamond argues 
that certain areas developed sooner because of the axes of distributed localities.
Major axes of the 
continents
Eurasian local practices of animal domestication and food production could more 
readily spread along the east-west axis of similar latitudes than those axes 
running north and south in the Americas and Africa.11
So, Diamond’s account outlines the development of societies from 
hunter-gatherers to food producers and consequently to a highly structured 
cultural fabric that coincided with the predominance of that culture. Statements 
about environmental circumstances fall under the scope of nomological 
statements covering broad conditions: food production, domesticability of 
animals found in a region and farming technologies etc. led the Eurasian peoples 
to develop structured societies more so than those in Africa, which remained 
largely migratory and hunter-gatherers. Importantly, Diamond takes himself to 
explain “history’s broadest pattern.” Such an explanation meets head-on an 
otherwise predominant, if only implicit, account centered on race. He writes 
(1997b),
11 Figure courtesy of Dr. Jason Alexander, London School of Economics.
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In the absence of convincing explanations, many (most?) people resort, 
consciously or unconsciously, to racist assumptions: the conquerors 
supposedly had superior IQ or culture. That prevalence of racist theories, 
as loathsome as they are unsupported, is the strongest reason for studying 
the long-term factors behind human history.
In reviewing Diamond’s book, McNeill argues that by Diamond’s 
explanation, human agency recedes into the background of ecologically 
explanatory features. McNeill argues that the events of history must be explained 
in terms of decisions of participants in history -  decisions that affected how 
certain societies developed. How can any adequate account of human history 
ignore human agency? He writes (1997),
Diamond does not explicitly dismiss conscious human action as a factor 
in history.... It is rather that he seizes upon the early era in the unfolding 
of human capacities when food production was getting started some 
13,000 years ago, and then, with a single leap of the imagination, 
attributes all the contemporary differences among human societies to the 
relative advantages particular populations have enjoyed as a result of the 
differences in the plants and animals available for domestication in 
different parts of the earth.... The vast differences in the wealth and 
power that different human societies have at their command today reflect 
what long chains of ancestors did, and did not, do by way of accepting 
and rejecting new ways of thought and action, most of which were in no 
way dictated by, or directly dependent on, environmental factors.
McNeill suggests the problem with Diamond’s account is that it explains human 
history as determinately following the course set out 13,000 years ago with the 
advent of food production. It fails to account for the relevant individual decisions 
that have shaped the course of history since then.
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The nature of their dispute is civilized, but McNeill’s otherwise glowing 
review of Diamond’s book raises the question about how to recommend one of 
their respective explanatory candidates. Thus there are two accounts: one that 
emphasizes broad patterns and one more locally situated -  the first considering 
human development in the context of ecology; the second in one of culture and 
human agency. Which explanation more adequately accounts for the 
development of certain societies and not others? What explanation ought one to 
adopt? Which is the better account of societal development?
The D-N framework can be employed to clarify the explanatory scope of 
ecological explanations and recast the question of what is at stake in the 
discussion. One might be led initially to frame the discussion as one over 
competing explanations, but by specifying the domain of application of an 
ecological explanation, the D-N framework can underscore that an explanation 
brought about by appeal to ecological regularities gives a general backdrop to 
more locally situated historical explanations of events. Though one cannot 
deduce, for example, the emergence of the Achaemenid Empire in the mid-sixth 
century BC, one can nevertheless indicate ecological conditions that can be said 
to have brought about a level of social organization that led to specific conflicts 
in the region.
First of all however, it has been important in this thesis, and will be 
important to emphasize in this example, that one need not feel compelled to 
adopt the D-N framework as the only one that might illuminate this discussion 
about explanation. It is adopted conventionally -  that is, without any attempt to 
justify it as the right account of explanation -  and employed on the grounds that 
it can provide a fruitful means to clarify the discussion. With this in mind, it is 
assumed as an a priori framework with which to frame the discussion. 
Furthermore, it employs a distinction between the formal aspects of explanatory 
candidates that can specify the range of their application and the empirical 
aspects that illuminate features on which to base acceptance.
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Moreover, the D-N account emphasizes that what is being explained is 
the explanandum -  the statement regarding the development of Eurasian and 
African societies. This suggests that the question of whether to accept ecological 
or cultural explanations pertains not to the event itself, but to statements 
regarding the event. This changes what is at stake in an assessment of the debate, 
since one, thus, is not arguing for one correct explanation of the respective 
development of Eurasian and African regions. Rather, acceptance of an 
explanatory candidate will be informed by the different worries one holds in their 
explanations. McNeill questions whether Diamond’s explanation is acceptable on 
the grounds that the latter does not account for human agency. However, 
Diamond’s goal is not to provide such an account, but to study the “long-term 
factors behind human history.” Thus the question of whether to accept an 
ecological or historical explanation depends upon the sort of explanation one is 
after: does one want to explain development in certain instances by an appeal to 
ecological regularities or more local human agency?
The explanandum in question -  societal development of different regions 
-  is a statement regarding the event, an explanation of which must be understood 
relative to the explanatory framework in which it is couched. An ecological 
explanation of the development of Eurasian cultures employs general statements 
of the ecological circumstances in which society was found: any explanation thus 
is understood relative to the general ecological regularities intended to indicate 
the resultant explanandum. The flip side of this is that ecological explanations 
are understood to cover a certain scope at a certain level of generality. Ecological 
conditions falling under the umbrella of ecological regularities beget an 
explanandum of a certain scope and generality.
Since food production proliferated in Eurasia, one can use that feature to 
explain development of food storage technologies, social stratification and 
subsequent political organization. However, as noted, Diamond then needs to 
provide an explanation of the emergence of food production. This involves 
statements of the general circumstances in Eurasia and regularities under which 
they can be said to fall: types and availability of food resources relative to
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population, flora and fauna conditions and types of animals facilitated a growth 
of farming communities over nomadic hunter-gatherers. The explanation of 
societal development is thus put forward by the employment of statements of 
ecological conditions and general ecological regularities indicating that given 
antecedent conditions beget consequent conditions.
In virtue of it being an explanation according to the D-N inferential 
framework, an ecological explanation could be structured as statements of the 
following:
1. Ecological circumstances pertaining to domesticable animals, flora and 
fauna suitable for cultivation and competition for food:
Cj, C2 ..., Cn
2. General regularities covering these circumstances that claim domesticable 
animals, cultivatable vegetation etc. leads to the proliferation of food 
production:
L15L2... ,Ln
3. Further regularities specifying that food production begets a certain level 
of societal development:
L*,Ly—
4. Explanandum: societal development of a particular region
Rendering the explanatory candidate according to this structure can illuminate a 
number of features of the ecological explanation. First, it indicates the scope of 
the explanation. The explanandum indicated by the explanation is understood 
relative to specified ecological conditions and regularities. One need not expect 
that it will say anything about specific events involving human agency.
Second, the explanation clearly is not complete insofar as one can deduce 
the explanandum from the explanans. If one could construct an idealized version 
of the explanation by isolating certain premises such that a deduction could be 
produced, one would characterize it rather as a partial explanation in which the 
explanans could deduce a range of statements of development. Though one
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might construct an idealized explanation that a level of societal development 
occurred in Eurasia in the mid-sixth century BC, one could not deduce which 
empire arose out of more specific statements of historical circumstances.
Third, one might recognize the saliency of Neurath’s concept of 
Ballungen in this rendering. Recall that for Neurath any statement is always 
reducible to more finely grained analysis, which for him amounts in part to an 
argument for the limits of logic in characterizing language employed in science: 
one cannot deduce complex scientific statements from primitive logical 
reconstructions. Much less can one deduce complex statements from complex 
statements: in the case of Diamond’s explanatory framework one cannot deduce 
the explanandum from the explanans. In this sense, the explanation might be 
characterizable as an explanation sketch that gives an inferential framework 
according to which one can organize various empirical statements and laws or 
regularities. The connection between empirical statements of flora and fauna 
conditions to regularities indicating they “beget” food production in itself is 
worthy of an industry of research.
On the other hand, with respect to the formal aspects of the D-N 
framework as a methodology, one can recognize, its usefulness in systematically 
examining Ballungen. It is employed to provide an inferential framework with 
which to confront the question of explanation. By rendering Diamond’s 
ecological explanation according to the D-N structure, it presents areas for 
further empirical assessment. One might attend to an examination of 
domesticable animals and the way in which, for example, the horse, as opposed 
to the zebra, had been used to bring about conditions under which food 
production thrives. Or one may undertake research questioning when the 
regularity ‘food production begets a certain type of social organization’ can be 
said, historically to be an apt generalization. That may inform the extent to which 
the food production thesis can be an appropriate nomological connector in 
ecological explanations. By framing the explanation according to the D-N 
framework one can clarify the constituent premises of an explanation,
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illuminating where areas for further research can fill in explanatory sketches or 
partial explanations to render them more complete.
Having specified the structure and features of an ecological explanation, 
one can consider the conditions under which to accept such an explanation.
The question of acceptability of a given explanatory candidate is raised 
with reference to both the logical connection between the explanans and 
explanandum and an assessment of whether empirical premises respond to 
relevant empirical worries. One can examine whether descriptive statements 
regarding the ecological conditions in Eurasia are empirically adequate and the 
extent to which the employed regularities can be said to bring about the 
explanandum: that is, whether “food production begets” the societal development 
outlined in Diamond’s explanandum. Moreover, examining the logical 
connection indicates that ecological considerations can be specified as distinct 
from more local cultural ones: statements about human agency need not be 
understood to follow from the employment of ecological regularities.
McNeil is worried, not only that Diamond’s explanation does not account 
for human agency, but also -  that Diamond’s explanation puts forward a 
deterministic view of the behaviour of human agents -  that “with a leap 
imagination” Diamond attempts to explain all current differences in human 
development in virtue of the availability of domesticable plants and animals. 
However, Diamond’s ecological framework does not need to explain particular 
human actions because the explanandum of societal development must be 
understood relative to the framework producing the explanation. That framework 
employs general regularities that would not entail individual human actions. This 
is not to say that human agency is not relevant to the explanation of societal 
development. Rather, it indicates that ecological explanations operate on a level 
of generality that does not bring about inferences to particular human actions or 
events that shape the course of history. When one considers whether to accept 
Diamond’s ecological explanation, one does so with an eye for competing
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explanatory accounts on a similar level of generality (like the racist accounts 
Diamond claims to be addressing).
With regard to recommending ecological or cultural explanations of 
societal development, the interesting question may become how does one 
reconcile historico-cultural explanations with ecological ones? How do they fit 
together? The two families of explanatory candidates thus would not be 
conceived as competing, but rather as referring to different species of regularities 
that can be assessed for the way in which they may supplement one another.
Given these brief points, one can restructure the discussion between 
McNeil and Diamond. The former criticizes ecological explanations on the 
grounds that they ignore human agency -  the way particular human decisions 
shaped the development of respective societies in Eurasia and Africa. This 
presents their differences as being a competition between explanatory candidates. 
However, if one characterizes an ecological explanation as understood with 
reference to general ecological regularities that function as a nomological 
connector within a D-N framework, then one can be clearer about the scope and 
generality of application of that candidate. If one then is concerned about human 
agency, more locally situated cultural explanations can be characterized against 
the backdrop of the broadly construed environmental ones. The latter need not 
preclude the former, but provides a general backdrop against which to begin to 
describe the role of human agency.
One further point: for the purpose of this discussion, it has been assumed 
that both families of explanatory candidates refer to the same explanandum. This 
view suffices to emphasize the point above. However more may be said with 
respect to the statement about the event -  namely that the phrase ‘societal 
development of Eurasia and Africa’ is sufficiently ambiguous to allow 
explanations with varying degrees of generality (ecological or historical), which 
might lead to the conclusion that historical and ecological explanations are in 
competition. However, the explanandum in the ecological sense might be posed 
more precisely as “the societal development trajectory of Eurasia with reference
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to ecological conditions.” This would serve to be more clear about the intended 
generality of employed regularities in the explanans and could reduce ambiguity 
that might give rise to the worry that ecological explanations ignore or obscure 
human agency. Likewise, the historico-cultural explanations may have an 
explanandum “the societal development trajectory of Eurasia with reference to 
historico-cultural conditions of human agency.” Merely restating the respective 
explananda as such would reduce the worry that there is a problem of competing 
explanations.
Before considering the second example, it should be remarked that one 
might suggest this assessment misses McNeill’s obvious point: he is just worried 
that Diamond has ignored human agents in his explanation. Merely structuring 
the ecological explanation to more clearly specify that statements of ecological 
regularities link statements of environmental circumstances with an ambiguous 
statement about societal development does not address the worry. However, the 
D-N framework puts one in a position more clearly to underscore the point of 
Diamond’s premise: ecological factors can be employed to uncover broader 
trends behind human development. And Diamond is addressing explanations that 
generalize from localized historical accounts of human history to general racist 
claims about the dominance of certain cultures over others. His ecological 
account gives compelling -  indeed acceptable -  arguments as an alternative to 
unsubstantiated racist explanations for different societal' development tracks in 
Eurasia and Africa. Of course, the D-N account itself does not give the 
arguments. Neither does it tell whether either account is acceptable. But it does 
afford one the means systematically to structure an assessment of the respective 
families of explanatory candidates in order to more clearly determine whether 
and in which circumstances one might accept one or other of these.
The second example considers how to characterize the usefulness of 
models in economics. John Pemberton (1993) argues that idealized models are of 
limited use in economics on the grounds that they employ restrictive antecedent 
clauses (RACs) and one can never be certain that the correct clauses are present 
to get the model right. The D-N account, as a methodological framework,
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enables one to clarify some key features of his argument and suggests how one 
can fruitfully relocate the source of the challenge for idealized models from the 
RACs defining a given model to the domain where complexity arises -  among 
the (ibid, p. 10), “heterogeneity of the microcomponents of economics, such as 
consumers and commodities.”
Thus, this section proceeds in three parts. First, it outlines Pemberton’s 
argument, showing how he motivates his claim regarding the limited usefulness 
of idealized models. Second, it uses the D-N framework and its formal/empirical 
distinction to clarify how idealized models can be understood to fit within an 
explanatory candidate.12 Third, it gives a critical assessment of Pemberton’s 
conclusion and locates some general implications for an understanding of the 
point of the D-N methodology. To address the problem of models’ usefulness 
one needs to look, not exclusively to the causes characterizing the idealized 
model (pertaining to the formal aspects), but to the users and the context in 
which the models are applied (pertaining to the question of acceptance and 
empirical adequacy).
According to the D-N framework, idealized models can be characterized 
within a broader explanatory methodology as an apriori framework used to group 
empirical phenomena according to certain regularities. An idealization can then 
be applied to the empirical domain as an explanatory sketch that gives an 
inferential framework to be filled in with further empirical inquiry. This suggests 
that Pemberton’s worries about the usefulness of idealizations is perhaps 
misplaced. Further, it points to a feature of the D-N account as a unifying 
methodology: one employs it to clarify the relation of the explanans within a 
model to the statement about economic phenomena to be explained and then 
looks to further empirical conditions and regularities under which they fall to 
indicate how and when the model works.
12 It will be noted below that economic models are utilized to make predictions, 
which is a distinct usage from the explanatory discussion here. However, in 
fleshing out the relation of idealized models to economic phenomena, the D-N 
framework can nevertheless prove useful without wading into questions about 
the structural relations between prediction and explanation.
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Pemberton argues that when idealized models fail to capture relevant 
material causes they can be very wrong. In addition, one cannot predict when 
those models will go wrong. Thus, he argues (ibid, p. 1), “doubt is cast on the 
ability of simple ideal models to capture the causal complexity of economics 
sufficiently well to provide reliable accurate predictions.” What are idealized 
models according to Pemberton?
Idealized models (IMRACs) are defined by restrictive antecedent clauses. 
That is, these models get their definition by a prescribed set of clauses that 
isolate certain causal antecedents and ignore others. These other ignored clauses 
may actually be relevant in a given phenomenon -  they may turn out to be 
relevant material causes in the economic event in question. It is when the 
idealized model does not capture the relevant material causes of an event that it 
fails to provide an adequate account of economic phenomena.
One example he provides of a restrictive antecedent clause is the 
assumption of perfect knowledge among consumers whose aim is to maximize 
their wellbeing. He remarks that this assumption (ibid, p. 2), “is of course false 
of all actual consumers or producers -  it underpins a model in which behaviour is 
more simple and more predictable than in reality.” Many various complex 
features of human behaviour are ignored to isolate certain defining causes: the 
model is defined by the clauses stating perfect knowledge of consumers and their 
desire to maximize wellbeing. Thus, as a simple example with reference to 
choices, one can explain an individual’s choice of an apple over a cigarette with 
reference to the law that consumers aim to maximize their wellbeing. One can 
represent it in the D-N form and assert that given statements about antecedent 
circumstances that an individual desires an apple; he desires also a cigarette, but, 
for the purposes of exposition, cannot have both. Under the behavioral law that 
individuals aim at maximizing their wellbeing and additional empirical 
statements that choice of the apple rather than the cigarette maximizes an 
individual’s wellbeing, one can deduce that the individual chooses the apple over 
the cigarette. However, this provides an explanation of choice with reference to
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one law, while other laws, or nomological functors, will be at play in the actual 
behavior of individuals, who may opt for the cigarette.
The question then arises how the model says anything about real events: 
in virtue of defining the regularities in the model by two clauses (perfect 
knowledge and maximizing wellbeing), for example, the model necessarily 
ignores material causes that are going to be relevant to any actual event -  like 
those of addiction, or behavioral dispositions in certain social contexts, etc. 
Consumers do not have perfect knowledge of all relevant factors; nor do they 
aim to maximize their wellbeing in all instances.
Pemberton is, of course, correct: if an idealized model captures the 
relevant material causes of an event, then it is going to be able to tell something 
about that event. Moreover, since often one cannot know when a model will 
capture these material causes in economics, one cannot reliably use idealized 
models alone to give knowledge about economic phenomena. The problem 
Pemberton suggests is in locating the right causes in a given instance in idealized 
models in order for them to be useful. However, if idealizations are defined 
precisely in virtue of isolating particular clauses and ignoring other potentially 
empirically relevant ones, then it may not seem consistent to worry that the 
idealization should be assessed for its empirical relevance.
Recall that Hempel argued the D-N model is not about how scientists 
actually formulate their explanations. Rather the explicatory nature of the model 
is intended to render explanatory candidates more precise by providing an 
inferential framework against which to assess them. Likewise, if one assumes the 
D-N methodology, IMRACs need not be required to be about any particular 
event. Their RACs isolate particular clauses that render precise the relation 
between variables representing circumstances and employed regularities of the 
explanans and the explanandum, which is the statement about the event to be 
explained.
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Hempel’s categories of explanation can aid here in specifying the relation 
of idealizations to the broader methodology within which they are being 
employed: IMRACS (idealized models) can be characterized as complete when 
one can deduce specific conclusions from them. The model of choice between an 
apple and a cigarette can be characterized as complete when one can deduce an 
explanation of the choice of an apple in an idealized situation. However, one can 
characterize the application of that model to a particular situation as an 
explanatory sketch. It gives an inferential framework to fill in with relevant 
empirical statements.
Moreover, one can specify with Hempel’s methodology what one should 
expect IMRACs to do. Employing the distinction between formal and empirical 
aspects of the application of models, one defines the model according to the 
formal aspects: the structure of the model gives inference rules for the idealized 
clauses employed within it. This serves to specify what the model is. But the 
empirical aspects are distinct. They pertain to how the idealized model is applied 
to a particular empirical situation and point to an empirical examination of the 
conditions under which, and the extent to which, the model actually provides a 
fruitful approximation of the empirical domain. It is the empirical examination of 
the application of the model that determines when the model has been successful. 
Acceptance of the model as useful therefore, pertains to the empirical assessment 
of its application. It does not relate to the idealized RACs that define the model. 
The point of the IMRAC is to provide the formal inference structure that 
indicates the way in which the explanans (RACs) connect with the explanandum 
(the statement about the economic event). The IMRAC is not meant to give an 
adequate picture of the empirical domain. It serves as the benchmark against 
which to assess actual applications in economics.
Pemberton uses another example of the Black-Scholes model. Black- 
Scholes derives a formula to value a stock option with a number of restrictive 
antecedent clauses. Pemberton notes that if the RACs are correct then the 
formula makes a correct prediction. However, he claims that the RACs are often
204
false and generates a counter example to a prediction made by the Black-Scholes 
model. Thus he has shown that Black-Scholes can go wrong.
One may not be surprised by this. Given that an idealized model 
eliminates potentially relevant material causes, there necessarily will be counter­
examples to its predictions. Pemberton’s counter-example does not show 
anything more than an instance of when Black-Scholes does not apply. However 
the problem is not that Black-Scholes fails to capture relevant material causes in 
the counter-example, but that one might expect it to do this in the first place.
Furthermore, Pemberton argues that the RACs in a model are “false,” but 
this conflates the formal/empirical distinction that is indispensible in clarifying 
the difference between an IMRAC’s usefulness as an idealization within a 
methodological framework and the question of whether the framework should be 
accepted as empirically adequate. He suggests that RACs are false because they 
do not define a particular economic event with which one is concerned. 
However, RACs are not meant to characterize any real event, but rather are 
intended to characterize an idealized model, with which one can furnish 
empirical explanations of events. If one wants to assert that the assumptions of 
Black-Scholes are false, what is being asserted is that the assumptions do not 
accurately characterize the model -  that the descriptions of the model are false. 
This is because, given the distinction between truth and acceptance, truth or 
falsity apply only within a closed formal framework -  in this case the framework 
of the Black-Scholes model. Whether an explanation provided with that model is 
acceptable is a distinct question. Of course, what Pemberton means is that as 
false assumptions, they do not characterize any actual economic event. But this 
should not tell anything new if one maintains an unambiguous notion of the 
character of idealized models. The notion of falsity is misplaced here.
Thus, Pemberton obscures his conception of an IMRAC by asserting both 
that a model is defined by restrictive antecedent clauses, and that models must 
capture relevant material causes in order to tell anything about economic 
phenomena. Of course, if an idealized model does capture relevant material
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causes, it will tell something about that event. However Pemberton is mistaken to 
locate the source of this challenge in getting the right causes into the idealized 
model. Clarifying the nature of an idealized model suggests that the problem lies 
not in failed attempts to get the right causes into the model, but in the complexity 
of economic phenomena itself: in the (ibid, p. 10), “heterogeneity of the 
microcomponents of economics, such as consumers and commodities.”
A clarification on the emphasis must be made here. One difference 
between the Black-Scholes example and the question of explanation is that 
Black-Scholes attempts to make projections about stock prices so that 
speculators can hedge against volatility of the pricing. The present discussion 
confines itself to explanation for the purpose of clarifying the point of the D-N 
model of explanation, excluding discussions about prediction. This is to argue 
that the D-N account -  and by generalization from that account, models or 
theories in general -  provides an explanatory framework for confronting 
phenomena (in Carnap’s terms). Black-Scholes idealizes causes to provide a 
systematic framework. As idealizations, models ought not be understood to be 
about empirical phenomena, but ought to be understood as conventionally 
adopted a priori frameworks for characterizing phenomena with more or less 
specification.
So although the Black-Scholes model focuses on projections, one can 
characterize its framework according to the explanatory structure outlined by the 
D-N account -  namely that a certain range of stock prices can be said to have 
been expected given statements of empirical conditions in the form of variables 
in the equation and regularities indicated by the functions of the model. And, 
moreover, if Black-Scholes is idealized precisely in virtue of excluding relevant 
material causes, then it cannot be expected to capture relevant material causes 
bringing about an actual stock price. It can only be expected to provide the 
approximations that are deduced more or less completely within the model and 
relative to its constitutive (idealized) assumptions. This not only locates the 
limits of Black-Scholes, but suggests, positively, how one might understand its 
function within a methodology construed according to the D-N account: Black-
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Scholes provides a relativized a priori framework with which to formulate 
approximations of economic phenomena. An empirical assessment of its 
application can indicate how and when it can serve as a useful device in a 
systematic approach to organizing economic phenomena.
Now, perhaps it will be argued that this assessment misses the point. 
Pemberton has suggested that IMRACs are of limited use precisely because their 
empirical application is in question. However the point here is the D-N 
methodology recasts the problem from one of getting just the right causes into 
the model, to examining the empirical domain in which it is applied. The 
usefulness of an idealization is to give a systematic framework with which to 
confront the empirical domain. In this sense an IMRAC should not be considered 
as constituting the methodology itself, but as being a constitutive member within 
a broader framework that considers, not just the idealization, but the necessary 
empirical caveats and statements required to apply it to a given situation. 
Acceptance of an IMRAC pertains to the pragmatic aspects of the methodology 
within which it is found. Whether one uses Black-Scholes or some other formula 
for deriving projections is taken here as a sociological fact. The pragmatic 
question of its usefulness surrounds first, a clarification of the structure of the 
idealization and second, an assessment of the range of successes of its 
application.
A general claim about the D-N methodology may be made here. It was 
argued above that one of the lessons from the protocol sentence debate was that 
the philosophical methodology characterizing logical positivism could be the 
programme determining the extent to which one may pursue technical and 
historic-sociological aspects in given contexts. Further, it was suggested that 
Hempel’s emerging philosophy of science can be seen to unify these two 
methodological aspects: the D-N methodology has a place for both technical 
considerations of the structure of employed models and internal formal problems 
that may arise, and the broader empirical considerations relevant to whether 
particular applications of those models might be accepted or not. In the case of 
Pemberton’s IMRACs, the usefulness of idealizations lies in their providing a
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systematic framework for the application of a methodology. Though more 
successful models may be produced, it is attention to the domain of their 
empirical application that is relevant to whether they are accepted or not. 
Questioning the usefulness of an idealization on the grounds that it is not 
empirically adequate is to miss the intent of the idealization.
The canonical view considered and outlook
The argument for the orientation of the D-N account in this thesis affords a 
certain understanding of the point of Hempel’s methodology that distinguishes 
itself from what can be called the canonical view. This final section will look 
briefly at how one may address standard views on the point of the D-N account 
by looking at one example of its portrayal.
In Fact and method, Richard Miller (1987, p. 3) writes that although few 
people would call themselves positivists, it is nevertheless the dominant 
philosophy of science. He (ibid) claims the most urgent task for philosophy of 
science is to develop a replacement that provides philosophical and practical 
guidance “that positivism promised.” He (ibid) defines positivism as:
the assumption that most important methodological notions—for 
example, explanation, confirmation and the identification of one kind of 
entity with another—can each be applied according to rules that are the 
same for all sciences and historical periods, that are valid a priori, and 
that only require knowledge of the internal content of the propositions 
involved for their effective application. Positivism, in this sense, is an 
expression of the worship of generality that has dominated philosophy at 
least since Kant: the idea that absolutely general, a priori rules determine 
what is reasonable.
For Miller, the problems for positivism lead to a certain class of post­
positivist criticisms that he rejects. He argues, rather, that the failures of
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positivism lead to some version of realism. This may be fine, but the failure of 
positivism to deliver on its goals of providing an accepted systematic standard of 
philosophical assessment need not lead inevitably to discussions on either post­
positivism or realism. Clarifying a ‘positivist’ programme suggests that Hempel, 
in particular, need not share the sorts of commitments attributed to positivists by 
Miller.13
First of all, Miller (ibid, p. 3) attributes to positivism the commitment that 
explanation “can ... be applied according to rules that are the same for all 
sciences and historical periods.” As can be seen from the discussion above, 
Hempel’s commitment is not to the assertion that explanation can be applied 
according to specified rules that are the same for all sciences. Rather, he argues 
that in general, explanations put forward in the natural and social sciences and 
history share the form outlined by the D-N model to a greater or lesser extent. 
And he argues that in contrast to the pragmatic aspects of explanation pertaining 
to when explanations are acceptable or not, an adequate philosophical 
methodology for analyzing science needs a systematic standard that does not fall 
prey to idiosyncrasies of individual inquirers. So he attempts to explicate one 
standard with the covering-law models (which may or may not be adopted in 
practice) in order to show how the methodology might work across a sufficiently 
wide domain to prove its worth.
Second, Miller (ibid) argues that positivists hold that explanation 
principles are “valid a priori” and that the appeal to the a priori is a commitment 
to a Kantian notion that “absolutely general, a priori rules determine what is 
reasonable” (ibid). It has been shown that debates among the left wing of the 
Vienna Circle did not embrace the Kantian notion of the a priori, but attempted, 
rather, to deal with the problem of the breakdown of the assertion that there can 
be such a notion of general a priori principles that can be given scientific 
formulation. As early as the Vienna Circle manifesto in 1929, the Vienna Circle
13 Of course, ‘positivism’ can have many understandings. This thesis has 
considered the ‘positivism’ of Hempel as it can be understood to have emerged 
in debates with Carnap and Neurath.
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members explicitly rejected the Kantian synthetic a priori (Neurath et. al. 1929, 
p. 308):
The scientific world-conception knows no unconditionally valid 
knowledge derived from pure reason, no ‘synthetic judgments a priori’ of 
the kind that lie at the basis of Kantian epistemology and even more, of 
all pre- and post-Kantian ontology and metaphysics.... It is precisely in 
the rejection of the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori that the 
basic thesis of modern empiricism lies.
To be sure, a priori notions are an important feature of the development 
of what has been called here a Camapian constitutional system, but any such 
notions are assumed to be relativized and adopted via convention. It has been 
shown that, for Carnap -  and Hempel who embraced Carnap’s approach -  certain 
features are taken as an a priori starting point for the construction of a system of 
scientific knowledge. One starts with an adopted class of basic observational 
predicates and a logical framework with which to articulate relations among 
statements within science. Though factual and formal features of any 
constitutional system are revisable in the face of further empirical developments, 
they are nevertheless necessary and taken a priori for the construction of the 
system in question. Likewise, for a philosophical methodology aimed at 
explicating explanatory candidates in science, the D-N form is taken a priori in 
the sense that some form is necessary to characterize explanation and this one 
appears to be widespread throughout scientific practice. As a methodology, it is 
employed to clarify what scientists appear to take themselves to offer when 
giving systematic explanations of the world.
Third, Miller (ibid, p.3) argues that positivists are committed to the notion 
that explanations require only “knowledge of the internal content of the 
propositions involved for their effective application.” This point appears to be 
wrong, given the present historical assessment. Certainly, with regard to the 
logical aspects of explanation, one is concerned with the internal structure of 
propositions. In order to clarify an explanation, one attends to how the explanans
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are connected to the explanandum. However, for Hempel, the logical aspects of 
explanation pertain to clarifying an explanatory candidate. They do not preclude 
the pragmatic aspects of when one accepts an explanation. Indeed they point to 
further empirical research required to expand and develop hypotheses within an 
explanation. Idealized explanations are not about the particular phenomena. They 
give a framework with which to confront phenomena. As one moves farther into 
the empirical domain, an explanation diverges more and more from the idealized 
model. Hempel’s positivism does not claim that the world fits his model: that is 
to get the situation the wrong way around. The D-N model is part of a 
methodological framework with which to confront the world. For Hempel it 
reflects what scientists generally take themselves to be offering and can be 
applied fruitfully to further clarify what is on offer.
This of course is not intended to be the last word. Rather, it suggests 
where further research might lead to flesh out this reconstituted interpretation. 
One glaring historical question that must be addressed is how such a view of 
Hempel’s thought relates to the broader canon of his work. This chapter has 
located particular instances wherein principles of the historical roots of his 
thought appear to align themselves with a reconstituted understanding of a key 
idea for which he has become known (D-N as an explicatory model). However 
there needs to be further discussion on how it fits into his overall work, including 
later work wherein, as noted, Friedman has said Hempel converted from 
Camapian logic of explanation to a reconstituted version of Neurath’s historico- 
naturalism. It has been suggested in this thesis that such a conversion amounted 
to a shift of methodological focus within a relatively (though surely not strictly) 
unified philosophical outlook. Moreover, an understanding of Hempel’s view 
surely might benefit from an assessment that incorporates richer categories than 
merely those characterizable as Camapian in early and Neurathian in later life.
Further, the concept ‘a priori’ presents an interesting set of problems. One 
should be worried about what it means to employ a relativized a priori. Friedman 
(2001) provides what can serve as a fruitful launch point regarding what he calls 
a dynamic and relativized a priori and how that might shape future conceptions
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of the way philosophers view their modus operandi. In terms of understanding 
how any such feature fit within the intellectual landscape of positivists like 
Carnap and Hempel, Richardson (1998), treated in the second chapter of this 
thesis, affords a look at understanding Carnap in relation to neo-Kantianism. 
Both Friedman and Richardson indicate that early positivism is fruitfully 
understood to be dealing with the challenge of the breakdown of the Kantian 
synthetic a priori.
This thesis has mined a fragment of the history of a leading figure of 
twentieth-century philosophy of science in order to clarify his place therein. It 
does not argue that the way forward for philosophy of science is to return to 
logical empiricism (or positivism). Rather, insofar as its concern is at all about 
where philosophy might go, it suggests that an adequate historical understanding 
of the point of this great influence in the line of philosophical ideas may yet 
provide a resource to inform how one asks questions in philosophy of science. 
Whether philosophers take up the torch of D-N explanations in a reconstituted 
and revitalized form is matter for the course of history. But it is hoped in this 
thesis that Hempel’s contribution might not sit unexamined as a naive view on 
philosophical approaches to science that leads to disputes over what the ‘right’ 
account of explanation might be. Rather, a richer grasp of the emphasis and 
dynamics of the development of his thought might serve to provide a framework 
with which theorists of econometrics, economic methodologists or philosophers 
of science (among others) can contextualize their more technical pursuits to 
further clarify the scope and limitations of scientific knowledge.
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